# Beth Definability in Expressive Description Logics 

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#### Abstract

The Beth definability property, a well-known property from classical logic, is investigated in the context of description logics: if a general $\mathscr{L}$-TBox implicitly defines an $\mathscr{L}$-concept in terms of a given signature, where $\mathscr{L}$ is a description logic, then does there always exist over this signature an explicit definition in $\mathscr{L}$ for the concept? This property has been studied before and used to optimize reasoning in description logics. In this paper a complete classification of Beth definability is provided for extensions of the basic description logic $\mathcal{A L C}$ with transitive roles, inverse roles, role hierarchies, and/or functionality restrictions, both on arbitrary and on finite structures. Moreover, we present a tableaubased algorithm which computes explicit definitions of at most double exponential size. This algorithm is optimal because it is also shown that the smallest explicit definition of an implicitly defined concept may be double exponentially long in the size of the input TBox. Finally, if explicit definitions are allowed to be expressed in first-order logic, then we show how to compute them in single exponential time.


## 1. Introduction

We address the Beth definability property (Beth, 1953) in the context of description logics (DLs). The Beth definability property relates two notions of definability in a logic $\mathscr{L}$, implicit definability and explicit definability. Implicit definability is a semantic notion: it asks whether the interpretation of a given $\mathscr{L}$-formula $\varphi$ is fully determined by the universe of discourse and the interpretation of some given predicates $\Sigma$ in all models of a theory $\mathcal{T}$. Explicit definability on the other hand is more syntactic: it asks whether there is some $\mathscr{L}$-formula $\psi$ over the set of predicates $\Sigma$ that is equivalent to $\varphi$ under $\mathcal{T}$. Clearly, explicit definability implies implicit definability. If the converse holds as well, then the logic $\mathscr{L}$ is said to have the Beth definability property. Logics having this property are considered to be well-balanced in terms of their syntax and semantics since it connects the model-theoretic notion of implicit definability to explicit definability.

The Beth definability property can be naturally formulated for DLs by slightly changing the terminology in the paragraph above: formulas become concepts, theories become TBoxes, and $\Sigma$ consists of unary and binary predicates (respectively called concept names and role names).

Example 1.1. Consider the following $\mathcal{A L C}$-TBox $\mathcal{T}$.

| Parent | $\equiv \exists$ hasChild. $T$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| Parent | $\equiv$ Father $\sqcup$ Mother |
| Father | $\sqsubseteq$ Man |
| Mother | $\sqsubseteq$ Woman |
| Man | $\sqsubseteq \neg$ Woman |

The concept name Mother is implicitly definable from $\Sigma=$ \{hasChild, Woman\} under $\mathcal{T}$. Precisely what we mean by this will be clear once we present Definition 4.1; intuitively, we mean that the instances of Mother in a model $\mathcal{I}$ of $\mathcal{T}$ can be exactly determined once we know the domain of $\mathcal{I}$ and the instances of $\Sigma$ in $\mathcal{I}$. In fact, we can spell this implicit definition out as the $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}$-concept Woman $\sqcap \exists$ hasChild. T. This concept is an explicit definition of Mother from $\Sigma$ under $\mathcal{T}$ because $\mathcal{T} \models$ Mother $\equiv$ Woman $\sqcap$ ヨhasChild. $T$ ( $c f$. Definition 4.5).

Beth definability in DLs has found applications in optimizing reasoning. The first application is related to extracting an equivalent acyclic $\mathscr{L}$-terminology from a general TBox in $\mathscr{L}$ (Baader \& Nutt, 2003; ten Cate, Conradie, Marx, \& Venema, 2006). An acyclic terminology consists only of acyclic definitions for concept names and they are of particular interest because reasoning with them is 'easier' than with general TBoxes. For example, satisfiability of an $\mathcal{A L C}$-terminology is a PSpace-complete problem whereas the same problem for general $\mathcal{A L C}$-TBoxes is ExpTime-complete (Donini, 2003). The second application is related to an ontology-based data access setting, which assumes the existence of a database instance (also referred to as 'DBox' in this context) and a TBox that may speak about more predicates than the database instance (Seylan, Franconi, \& de Bruijn, 2009). In this setting, the user may ask concept queries over the signature of the TBox; and the idea is to find an equivalent rewriting of the original query in terms of the predicates that appear in the DBox. If such a rewriting exists, then determining the certain answers of the query can be reduced to query answering in relational databases, which is known to be in $\mathrm{AC}^{0}$ in data complexity in contrast to the general coNP-completeness of concept querying in $\mathcal{A L C}$ with DBoxes (Seylan et al., 2009).

Both of these applications involve computing explicit definitions on the basis of implicit definitions. Here, the problem is that this may not always be possible for some DLs, i.e., some DLs may lack the Beth definability property.

Example 1.2. In this example, we model a scenario about cars, their owners, and the relationships between the owners and their cars. Consider the following $\mathcal{A L C H}-T B o x ~ \mathcal{T}$ consisting of the concept inclusion axioms

| SportsCar | $\sqsubseteq \mathrm{Car}$ |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| FuelEfficientCar | $\sqsubseteq \mathrm{Car}$ |  |
| SportsCar | $\sqsubseteq \neg$ FuelEfficientCar |  |
| $\neg$ proudOwner.Car | $\sqsubseteq$ | (Vloves.SportsCar $\sqcap \neg \exists$ owns.SportsCar)) $\sqcup$ |
|  |  | (Vloves.FuelEfficientCar $\sqcap \neg$ قowns.FuelEfficientCar)) |

and the role inclusion axioms

$$
\begin{array}{lll}
\text { proudOwner } & \sqsubseteq & \text { owns } \\
\text { proudOwner } & \sqsubseteq & \text { loves }
\end{array}
$$

The concept ヨproudOwner.Car is implicitly definable from $\Sigma=\{$ owns, loves $\}$ under $\mathcal{T}$, in the sense that the instances of $\exists$ proudOwner.Car in a model $\mathcal{I}$ of $\mathcal{T}$ can be exactly determined once we know the domain of $\mathcal{I}$ and the instances of the roles in $\Sigma$. Indeed, an individual is a proud owner of a car if and only if the individual owns something that he/she loves. The fact that the left-to-right direction of this equivalence holds in every model of $\mathcal{T}$ follows immediately from the role inclusion axioms, and similarly, the fact that the (contrapositive of the) right-to-left direction holds in models of $\mathcal{T}$ follows immediately from the other TBox axioms. This implicit definition can be made explicit using the role conjunction operator as the concept $\exists$ (owns $\sqcap$ loves). $\top$. However, it can be shown that no $\mathcal{A L C H}$-concept is an explicit definition of $\exists$ proudOwner.Car from $\Sigma$ under $\mathcal{T}$. We will not formally prove this here, but see the proof of Theorem 4.18 in Section 4.2 for a similar example. In particular, this shows that $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C H}$ lacks the Beth definability property.

A natural research agenda in this case is to identify DLs that have the Beth definability property. Since this property is useful for computing explicit definitions on the basis of implicit definitions, a vital question then is the complexity of this task, both in terms of the time needed to compute the explicit definitions, and in terms of the size of the explicit definitions obtained. This question was first studied by ten Cate et al. (2006) for a weaker Beth definability property, which considers only concept names in the signature. In this paper we are interested in the more general Beth definability property that takes into account role names in the signature. We believe that this is more natural for DLs because in a DL knowledge base, role names are considered to be a part of the signature. We present a worst-case optimal algorithm for constructing explicit definitions.

Since the work of Craig (1957), it has been customary to establish Beth definability via an interpolation theorem; and our work is no exception. In particular, we obtain our positive results on Beth definability through a worst-case optimal algorithm for constructing interpolants in the description logics that we consider.

Our contributions in this paper are as follows.

- We obtain a complete classification of the Beth definability property for extensions of $\mathcal{A L C}$ with transitive roles, inverse roles, role hierarchies, and/or functionality restrictions, both on arbitrary structures (BP) and on finite structures (BPF). These results are summarized in Table 1. Note that the finite model property (FMP) of all sub-logics of $\mathcal{S H O Q}$ is shown by Lutz, Areces, Horrocks, and Sattler (2005); FMP of all sub-logics of $\mathcal{S H I} \mathcal{O}_{+}$by Duc and Lamolle (2010); and the failure of FMP in $\mathcal{A L C F I}$ and all its extensions is well-known (cf. Calvanese \& Giacomo, 2003).
- We present a constructive algorithm based on an interpolating tableau calculus to compute explicit definitions in $\mathcal{A L C}$ and all of its considered extensions having the Beth definability property. This algorithm runs in double exponential time and computes in the worst case an explicit definition of double exponential size if the concept is implicitly definable. In this respect, the algorithm is optimal because we also show that the smallest explicit definition of an implicitly defined concept may be double exponentially long in the size of the input TBox for each of these DLs.
- We consider the case where explicit definitions are allowed to be expressed in firstorder logic. This is particularly relevant for the use case for computing certain answers

| $\mathcal{S}$ | $\mathcal{H}$ | $\mathcal{I}$ | $\mathcal{F}$ | FMP | BP | BPF |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | + | + | + |
|  |  | $\bullet$ |  | + | + | + |
|  |  | $\bullet$ | $\bullet$ | + | + | + |
|  | $\bullet$ |  |  | + | + | - |
|  | $\bullet$ |  | $\bullet$ | + | - | - |
|  | $\bullet$ | $\bullet$ |  | + | - | - |
|  | $\bullet$ | $\bullet$ | $\bullet$ | - | - | - |
| $\bullet$ |  |  |  | + | + | + |
| $\bullet$ |  |  | $\bullet$ | + | + | + |
| $\bullet$ |  | $\bullet$ |  | + | + | + |
| $\bullet$ |  | $\bullet$ | $\bullet$ | - | + | - |
| $\bullet$ | $\bullet$ |  |  | + | - | - |
| $\bullet$ | $\bullet$ |  | $\bullet$ | + | - | - |
| $\bullet$ | $\bullet$ | $\bullet$ |  | + | - | - |
| $\bullet$ | $\bullet$ | $\bullet$ | $\bullet$ | - | - | - |

Table 1: BP and BPF from $\mathcal{A L C}$ to $\mathcal{S H} \mathcal{I} \mathcal{F}$
of a query given a DBox and a TBox. We present an algorithm that computes a firstorder explicit definition of an implicitly defined concept in single exponential time for all DLs with BP or BPF.

### 1.1 Related Work

The Beth definability property, in the general sense, has been first shown to hold for firstorder logic (Beth, 1953). Beth definability comes in different flavors and the one we are interested in is related more to projective Beth definability. Here, projective refers to the ability to specify the set of predicates $\Sigma$. The projective version is known be stronger than Beth's original formulation (cf. Hoogland, 2001) and first shown to hold for first-order logic by Craig (1957). Since the seminal works of Beth and Craig, Beth definability has been studied for many other logics.

Lang and Marquis (2008), also motivated from AI, study the propositional variant. The modal and temporal variants have been extensively studied (cf. Gabbay \& Maksimova, 2005). The $k$-variable fragment of first-order logic, for $k \geq 2$, is known to lack the Beth definability property, whereas the Guarded and Packed Fragments satisfy a non-projective version of the Beth property (cf. Hoogland, 2001). The guarded-negation fragment was recently shown to have the Beth definability property as well (Bárány, Benedikt, \& ten Cate, 2013).

Beth definability has practical applications in relational databases for query rewriting using exact views (Nash, Segoufin, \& Vianu, 2010; Afrati, 2011; Marx, 2007; Pasaila, 2011; Bárány et al., 2013). Here, the idea is to decide if the answers to a given query can be inferred from the content of a collection of views (that is, whether the theory consisting of the view definitions implicitly defines the query in terms of the view predicates), and, if this is indeed the case, to rewrite the query into a query over the schema consisting of the view predicates
(that is, an explicit definition of the query in terms of the view predicates). View-based query rewriting naturally arises in various settings, including query optimization, querying under access restrictions, data integration, and privacy analysis.

Beth definability has also been studied in the DL literature. Similarly to the relational database case, it finds applications in computing explicit definitions on the basis of implicit definitions (Baader \& Nutt, 2003; ten Cate et al., 2006; Seylan et al., 2009; Seylan, Franconi, \& de Bruijn, 2010). Some of these papers also present results on the size of explicit definitions that can be obtained for implicitly defined concepts. Ten Cate et al. establish a single exponential lower bound and a triple exponential upper bound for $\mathcal{A L C}$. It is not hard to see that the lower bound proof by ten Cate et al. carries to the Beth definability property we consider. A matching single exponential upper bound on the size of explicit definitions was claimed to be established by Seylan et al. (2010) in Theorem 1; however, this theorem is wrong since a crucial step for its proof, namely Lemma 1, is erroneous. In this paper, we improve the single exponential lower bound of ten Cate et al. to double exponential and correct the single exponential upper bound of Seylan et al. to double exponential, thus obtaining tight complexity bounds. These bounds in DLs are in sharp contrast to first-order logic since there is no recursive bound on the minimal number of quantifier alternations in explicit definitions in first-order logic (Friedman, 1976). BP has been first shown to hold for $\mathcal{A L C}$ by Seylan et al. (2009) and it is stronger than the variant studied by ten Cate et al.. Specifically, we show that all DLs we consider that support role hierarchies actually lack BP, whereas they satisfy the variant of BP studied by ten Cate et al.. In this respect, Theorem 10 by Seylan et al. (2010) claiming that these DLs have BP is erroneous. The mistake in the proof is that Theorem 9, which presents a reduction from the concept satisfiability problem w.r.t. TBoxes in $\mathcal{S H} \mathcal{I}$ to the same problem in $\mathcal{A L C}$, can not actually be used for computing $\mathcal{S H} \mathcal{I}$-interpolants.

Since the work of Craig (1957), it has been customary to establish Beth definability via an interpolation lemma; and our work is no exception. An interpolation lemma is usually established by a model-theoretic or a proof-theoretic argument (Hoogland, 2001). The advantage of the latter over the former is that it yields a procedure to construct the interpolant. Several interpolation properties formulated for general TBoxes were studied in the $\mathcal{A L C}$ - (ten Cate et al., 2006; Ghilardi, Lutz, \& Wolter, 2006; Konev, Lutz, Walther, \& Wolter, 2009a; Seylan et al., 2009; Konev, Lutz, Ponomaryov, \& Wolter, 2010; Lutz \& Wolter, 2011) and $\mathcal{E} \mathcal{L}$-family of DLs (Konev, Walther, \& Wolter, 2009b; Lutz, Piro, \& Wolter, 2010; Nikitina \& Rudolph, 2012; Lutz, Seylan, \& Wolter, 2012a). A notable variant is the uniform interpolation property. A uniform interpolant of a given $\mathscr{L}$-TBox $\mathcal{T}$ and a set of predicates $\Sigma$ is another $\mathscr{L}$-TBox $\mathcal{T}^{\prime}$ such that $\mathcal{T}^{\prime}$ uses only predicates from $\Sigma$ and the logical consequences of $\mathcal{T}$ and $\mathcal{T}^{\prime}$ formulated over $\Sigma$ coincide. In this paper, we do not consider uniform interpolation because it is not the right interpolation property for establishing tight bounds on the size of explicit definitions. This is witnessed by the following observations. Deciding the existence of a uniform interpolant for a given $\mathcal{A L C}$ TBox and a set of predicates is known to be 2-ExpTime-complete (Lutz \& Wolter, 2011), whereas the same problem formulated for the interpolation property we study here is in ExpTime. In the simpler DL $\mathcal{E} \mathcal{L}$, uniform interpolants are also more 'expensive' than the non-uniform ones. In particular, deciding the existence of uniform interpolants in $\mathcal{E} \mathcal{L}$ is ExpTime-complete (Lutz et al., 2012a); and Nikitina and Rudolph (2012) establish triple
exponential tight bounds on the size of uniform interpolants. On the other hand, deciding the existence of interpolants, as we consider in this paper but for the description logic $\mathcal{E L}$, is in PTime because this problem can be reduced to concept subsumption w.r.t. a TBox in $\mathcal{E} \mathcal{L}$ by Lemma 3 of Lutz, Seylan, and Wolter (2012b).

Most of the results in this paper were announced by ten Cate, Franconi, and Seylan (2011) in an extended abstract. The current paper extends this work by full proofs of the claimed results and the new material in Section 4.4 .

### 1.2 Outline

We start by introducing in Section 2 the DLs for which we study BP and some reasoning problems that are relevant for us in this paper. We also fix in this section our first-order notation and the standard translation of DLs to first-order logic. We will be using firstorder logic extensively in Section 3.3. The hammer with which we nail all the positive results, i.e., + , to the columns BP and BPF in Table 11, is a worst-case optimal algorithm for constructing interpolants. Section 3 is dedicated to this interpolation result. Finally, all our results about BP are presented in Section 4. Since the interpolation results are used to prove BP, Section 3 naturally comes before Section 4, but the reader who is less interested in the interpolation results may prefer to skip Section 3 initially.

## 2. Preliminaries

In this section, we introduce the description logics that we will study. They are frequently used logics in the expressive $\mathcal{A L C}$-family of description logics.

### 2.1 Description Logics

Let $N_{C}$ and $N_{R}$ be countably infinite and mutually disjoint sets of concept names and role names, respectively. For reasons that will become clear in a moment, we also assume a countably infinite subset of $N_{R}$, denoted by $N_{R^{+}}$, where $N_{R} \backslash N_{R^{+}}$is also countably infinite. The role names in $N_{R^{+}}$are, intuitively, designated as being transitive, and are allowed to be used only in description logics with transitive roles. An element of $N_{C}$ or $N_{R}$ is also called a predicate, and a set $\Sigma \subseteq N_{C} \cup N_{R}$ of concept and role names is called a signature.

To ease the exposition, we first introduce the description logic $\mathcal{A L C \mathcal { F I }}$, and we then define the other description logics that we study. The concept language of $\mathcal{A L C} \mathcal{F I}$ is defined as follows:

$$
\begin{array}{lll}
\text { Concepts: } & C, D & ::=\top|A| \neg C|C \sqcap D| \exists R . C \mid \leq 1 R \\
\text { Roles: } & R & ::=P \mid P^{-}
\end{array}
$$

where $A \in N_{C}$ and $P \in N_{R} \backslash N_{R^{+}}$. The concept constructors $\perp, \sqcup, \forall R . C$, and $\geq 2 R$ are defined as abbreviations in the usual way. Also, by a slight abuse of notation, we will sometimes write $\left(P^{-}\right)^{-}$, for $P \in N_{R}$, in which case it refers to the role name $P$ itself. An $\mathcal{A L C F I}$-TBox $\mathcal{T}$ is a finite set of concept inclusion axioms (CIAs) $C \sqsubseteq D$, where $C$ and $D$ are $\mathcal{A L C F I}$-concepts.

The semantics of $\mathcal{A L C F I}$-concepts and roles is given in terms of interpretations. An interpretation is a pair $\mathcal{I}=\left\langle\Delta^{\mathcal{I}},,^{\mathcal{I}}\right\rangle$ where $\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$ is a non-empty set called the domain of

$$
\begin{aligned}
\top^{\mathcal{I}} & =\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}, \\
(\neg C)^{\mathcal{I}} & =\Delta^{\mathcal{I}} \backslash C^{\mathcal{I}}, \\
(C \sqcap D)^{\mathcal{I}} & =C^{\mathcal{I}} \cap D^{\mathcal{I}}, \\
(\exists R . C)^{\mathcal{I}} & =\left\{s \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}} \mid \text { there exists } t \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}} \text { such that }\langle s, t\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{I}} \text { and } t \in C^{\mathcal{I}}\right\}, \\
(\leq 1 R)^{\mathcal{I}} & =\left\{s \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}} \mid \text { for all } t, u \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}, \text { if }\langle s, t\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{I}} \text { and }\langle s, u\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{I}} \text { then } t=u\right\}, \\
\left(P^{-}\right)^{\mathcal{I}} & =\left\{\langle s, t\rangle \mid\langle t, s\rangle \in P^{\mathcal{I}}\right\} .
\end{aligned}
$$

Table 2: Semantics of complex $\mathcal{A L C F I}$-concepts and roles
$\mathcal{I}$, and $\cdot{ }^{\mathcal{I}}$ is a function that maps each concept name $A \in N_{C}$ to a subset $A^{\mathcal{I}}$ of $\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$ and each role name $P \in N_{R}$ to a binary relation $P^{\mathcal{I}}$ on $\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$. In anticipation of the discussion of description logics with transitive roles below, we require also that for each $P \in N_{R^{+}}$, the relation $P^{\mathcal{I}}$ is transitive. The map. $\cdot^{\mathcal{I}}$ is extended to complex concepts and roles by means of the inductive definitions provided in Table 2

An interpretation $\mathcal{I}$ satisfies (or, is a model of) a CIA $C \sqsubseteq D$ if $C^{\mathcal{I}} \subseteq D^{\mathcal{I}}$, and $\mathcal{I}$ satisfies (or, is a model of) a TBox $\mathcal{T}$ if it satisfies every CIA in $\mathcal{T}$. We use the notation $\mathcal{I} \models C \sqsubseteq D$ and $\mathcal{I} \models \mathcal{T}$ to express that $\mathcal{I}$ satisfies $C \sqsubseteq D$, respectively, that $\mathcal{I}$ satisfies $\mathcal{T}$.

The description logic $\mathcal{A L C \mathcal { L I }}$ that we defined above is a member of a larger family of description logics. The "basic" description logic $\mathcal{A L C}$ is defined as $\mathcal{A L C F I}$ without inverse roles (i.e., without roles of the form $P^{-}$) and without functionality restrictions (i.e., without concepts of the form $\leq 1 R)$. For $X \subseteq\{\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{I}, \mathcal{F}\}$, the description logic $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C} X$ extends $\mathcal{A L C}$ with

1. Functionality restrictions (as in $\mathcal{A L C F I}$ ) if $\mathcal{F} \in X$,
2. Inverse roles (as in $\mathcal{A L C \mathcal { L }}$ ) if $\mathcal{I} \in X$,
3. Transitive roles if $\mathcal{S} \in X$. By this, we mean that the role names in $N_{R^{+}}$are allowed to be used.
4. Role hierarchies if $\mathcal{H} \in X$. By this, we mean that a TBox may contain role inclusion axioms (RIAs) of the form $R \sqsubseteq S$, where $R$ and $S$ are roles, which are satisfied in an interpretation $\mathcal{I}$ if $R^{\mathcal{I}} \subseteq S^{\mathcal{I}}$.

For DLs that include both transitive roles $(\mathcal{S})$ and functionality restrictions $(\mathcal{F})$, a further syntactic restriction is imposed: whenever $\leq 1 R$ occurs in a concept, then $R$ is required to be a simple role with respect to the TBox at hand (Horrocks, Sattler, \& Tobies, 2000). A simple role is, intuitively, a role does not have a transitive subrole. The formal definition of simplicity is as follows: let us write $R \sqsubseteq_{\mathcal{T}} S$ if either $R=S$ or there are roles $R_{1}, \ldots, R_{n}$ such that $R_{1}=R, R_{n}=S$, and for all $1 \leq i<n, \mathcal{T}$ contains either the RIA $R_{i} \sqsubseteq R_{i+1}$ or the RIA $R_{i}^{-} \sqsubseteq R_{i+1}^{-}$. We say $R$ is simple with respect to $\mathcal{T}$ if there does not exist a role $S$ such that $S \sqsubseteq_{\mathcal{T}} R$ and such that $S$ is of the form $P$ or $P^{-}$with $P \in N_{R^{+}}$. The motivation for this standard syntactic restriction is that, without it, basic decision problems such as satisfiability and concept subsumption with respect to a TBox (defined below) quickly become undecidable (Horrocks et al., 2000).

For $X \subseteq\{\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{I}, \mathcal{F}\}$ with $\mathcal{S} \in X$, it is customary to omit the prefix $\mathcal{A L C}$ in the notation $\mathcal{A L C} X$. In particular, the description logic $\mathcal{A L C S H I F}$ (which is the most expressive description logic we consider in this paper) is referred to simply as $\mathcal{S H} \mathcal{I F}$. $\mathcal{S H I F}$ is also the theoretical basis of the Web Ontology Language OWL-Lite (Horrocks, Patel-Schneider, \& van Harmelen, 2003), which makes it an important DL from a practical viewpoint.

For an $\mathscr{L}$-concept $C$, the set sub $(C)$ consists of $C$ and all its subconcepts. For a concept $C$ and a TBox $\mathcal{T}$, $\operatorname{rol}(C, \mathcal{T})$ denotes the set of roles occurring in $C$ or $\mathcal{T} ;$ and $\operatorname{sig}(C, \mathcal{T})$ denotes the set of concept names and role names occurring in $C$ or $\mathcal{T}$, i.e., the signature of $C$ and $\mathcal{T}$. We use $\operatorname{sig}(C)$ as an abbreviation for $\operatorname{sig}(C, \emptyset)$. The size of an $\mathscr{L}$-concept $C$ ( $\mathscr{L}$-role $R$ ), written $|C|$ (resp. $|R|$ ), is the number of occurrences of symbols needed to write $C$ (resp. $R$ ). The size of an $\mathscr{L}$-TBox $\mathcal{T}$, written $|\mathcal{T}|$, is defined analogously. Later on, in Section 3.3 we will also consider other, more succinct, ways of representing concepts.

There are alternative ways to represent functionality restrictions and transitive roles in the DL literature. For example, functionality and transitivity axioms of the form funct $R$ or $\operatorname{Trans}(R)$ are sometimes treated as axioms in the TBox. Although such syntactic differences can be considered minor as far as the standard reasoning tasks (cf. Section 2.2) are concerned, interpolation results are sensitive to changes in the language. For example, opting for TBox axioms of the form funct $R$ instead of freely allowing $\leq 1 R$ as a construct in the concept language would change the expressive power of languages we consider. In Section [3.1, we show that $\mathcal{A L C \mathcal { F }}$ has the interpolation property. The interested reader is invited to check if our proof can be adapted to the case where we allow functionality restrictions only as TBox axioms.

### 2.2 Decision Problems

A concept $C$ is satisfiable with respect to TBox $\mathcal{T}$ if there exists a model $\mathcal{I}$ of $\mathcal{T}$ such that $C^{\mathcal{I}} \neq \emptyset$. A CIA $C \sqsubseteq D$ follows from a TBox $\mathcal{T}$ (denoted by $\mathcal{T} \models C \sqsubseteq D$ ), if every model of $\mathcal{T}$ is a model of $C \sqsubseteq D$. We write $\mathcal{T} \models C \equiv D$ if both $\mathcal{T} \models C \sqsubseteq D$ and $\mathcal{T} \models D \sqsubseteq C$ hold true.

The following decision problems will be relevant for us:

- Concept satisfiability with respect to a TBox:

Given $C$ and $\mathcal{T}$, to determine if $C$ is satisfiable w.r.t. $\mathcal{T}$.

- Concept subsumption with respect to a TBox:

Given $C \sqsubseteq D$ and $\mathcal{T}$, to determine if $\mathcal{T} \models C \sqsubseteq D$.
Both problems are parametrized by a description $\operatorname{logic} \mathscr{L}$, in which the input concept(s) and TBox are specified. The two problems are reducible to each (or, more accurately, to each others complement) for all the logics we consider, due to the fact that their concept languages are closed under negation. In fact, both problems are ExpTime-complete for each of the description logics that we consider (Tobies, 2001).

The same decision problems can also be considered over the restricted class of finite interpretations, i.e., interpretations whose domain is a finite set. We will refer to these variants of the above decision problems as finite concept satisfiability and finite concept subsumption. Thus, finite concept satisfiability with respect to a TBox is the problem of deciding whether a given concept has a non-empty denotation in some finite model of a
given TBox. It is known (Lutz, Sattler, \& Tendera, 2005) that finite concept satisfiability and finite concept subsumption are also ExpTime-complete for all the description logics we consider here.

When the finite concept satisfiability problem coincides with the unrestricted satisfiability problem, then we say that the description logic in question has the finite model property.

Definition 2.1 (Finite model property). $A D L \mathscr{L}$ is said to have the finite model property (FMP) if for every $\mathscr{L}$-concept $C$ and every $\mathscr{L}$-TBox $\mathcal{T}$, if $C$ is satisfiable w.r.t. $\mathcal{T}$, then there is some finite interpretation $\mathcal{I}$ such that $\mathcal{I}$ is a model of $\mathcal{T}$ and $C^{\mathcal{I}} \neq \emptyset$.

It is well-known that $\mathcal{A L C F I}$ and its extensions lack the finite model property (Calvanese \& Giacomo, 2003).

### 2.3 First-Order Translation

It is well-known from the correspondence theory of modal/description logics that description logic concepts can, in general, be translated into first-order logic formulae with one free variable (Sattler, Calvanese, \& Molitor, 2003). In this translation, each concept name $A$ is viewed as a unary predicate symbol and each role name $R$ is viewed as a binary predicate symbol of our first-order language. An interpretation, then, corresponds to a first-order structure.

We assume that the reader is familiar with basic notation and terminology for first-order logic. In particular, we will use the notation $\mathcal{I}, \alpha \models \varphi$ to express that the first-order formula $\varphi$ is satisfied in the structure $\mathcal{I}$ under the first-order variable assignment $\alpha$. Sometimes, it will be convenient to use a different notation to express the same thing: if $\varphi\left(x_{1}, \ldots, x_{n}\right)$ is a first-order formula whose free variables are $x_{1}, \ldots, x_{n}$, and if $a_{1}, \ldots, a_{n}$ are elements of the domain of a structure $\mathcal{I}$, we will write $\mathcal{I} \models \varphi\left[a_{1}, \ldots, a_{n}\right]$ to express that $\varphi$ is satisfied in $\mathcal{I}$ under the variable assignment that sends each variable $x_{i}$ to the corresponding element $a_{i}$. Note that this notation implicitly assumes an order on the free variables of $\varphi$, which will always be clear from the context.

Definition 2.2. The mapping $\pi_{x}$ from $\mathcal{S H} \mathcal{H F}$-concepts to first-order formulae is defined as follows:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\pi_{x}(\top) & =\top, \\
\pi_{x}(A) & =A(x), \\
\pi_{x}(\neg C) & =\neg \pi_{x}(C), \\
\pi_{x}(C \sqcap D) & =\pi_{x}(C) \wedge \pi_{x}(D), \\
\pi_{x}(\exists P . C) & =\exists y\left[P(x, y) \wedge \pi_{y}(C)\right], \\
\pi_{x}\left(\exists P^{-} . C\right) & =\exists y\left[P(y, x) \wedge \pi_{y}(C)\right], \\
\pi_{x}(\leq 1 P) & =\forall z_{1} \forall z_{2}\left[P\left(x, z_{1}\right) \wedge P\left(x, z_{2}\right) \rightarrow z_{1}=z_{2}\right], \\
\pi_{x}\left(\leq 1 P^{-}\right) & =\forall z_{1} \forall z_{2}\left[P\left(z_{1}, x\right) \wedge P\left(z_{2}, x\right) \rightarrow z_{1}=z_{2}\right],
\end{aligned}
$$

where $\pi_{y}$ is obtained from the above definition by replacing all occurrences of $x$ by $y$ and vice versa. For a SHIF-TBox $\mathcal{T}, \pi(\mathcal{T})$ is defined as $\bigwedge_{\varphi \in \mathcal{T}} \pi(\varphi)$, where

$$
\begin{aligned}
\pi(C \sqsubseteq D) & =\forall x\left[\pi_{x}(C) \rightarrow \pi_{x}(D)\right] \\
\pi(R \sqsubseteq S) & =\forall x \forall y\left[\pi_{x y}(R) \rightarrow \pi_{x y}(S)\right]
\end{aligned}
$$

where, for $P \in N_{R}, \pi_{x y}(P)=P(x, y)$ and $\pi_{x y}\left(P^{-}\right)=P(y, x)$.
The translation above is model-preserving, i.e., for all $\mathcal{S H \mathcal { L F }}$-concepts $C$, interpretations $\mathcal{I}$, and first-order assignments $\alpha$ for $\mathcal{I}$, we have $\alpha(x) \in C^{\mathcal{I}}$ iff $\mathcal{I}, \alpha=\pi_{x}(C)$; and similarly for CIAs, RIAs, and TBoxes.

## 3. Constructive Interpolation with Tableaux

This section provides a constructive proof of an interpolation property in the DLs we are interested in. This property will be the essential part of the proof of BP in these DLs (cf. Definition 4.7). Resorting to interpolation to show the Beth definability property in a logic has been a standard technique since the seminal work of Craig (1957). We start by defining this interpolation property.

Definition 3.1 (Interpolation property). $A D L \mathscr{L}$ is said to have the interpolation property if and only if for all $\mathscr{L}$-concepts $C_{1}, C_{2}$ and all $\mathscr{L}$-TBoxes $\mathcal{T}_{1}$, $\mathcal{T}_{2}$, if $\mathcal{T}_{1} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2} \models C_{1} \sqsubseteq C_{2}$, then there is some $\mathscr{L}$-concept I such that

- $\operatorname{sig}(I) \subseteq \operatorname{sig}\left(C_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{1}\right) \cap \operatorname{sig}\left(C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right)$,
- $\mathcal{T}_{1} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2} \models C_{1} \sqsubseteq I$, and
- $\mathcal{T}_{1} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2} \models I \sqsubseteq C_{2}$.

Such a concept is called an interpolant of $C_{1}$ and $C_{2}$ under $\left\langle\mathcal{T}_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right\rangle$.
The interpolation property we consider is defined specifically to prove BP. Normally, the Craig interpolation property for first-order logic is stated as follows: for all first-order formulae $\varphi$ and $\psi$, if $\varphi \models \psi$, then there exists a first-order formula $\vartheta \operatorname{such}$ that $\operatorname{sig}(\vartheta) \subseteq$ $\operatorname{sig}(\varphi) \cap \operatorname{sig}(\psi), \varphi \models \vartheta$, and $\vartheta \models \psi$. We can however relate the interpolation property we consider to first-order Craig interpolation using the standard translation of Definition 2.2, Given $\mathscr{L}$-concepts $C_{1}, C_{2}$ and $\mathscr{L}$-TBoxes $\mathcal{T}_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{2}$, we have by the standard translation the following equivalences:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{T}_{1} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2} & \models C_{1} \sqsubseteq C_{2} \\
\pi\left(\mathcal{T}_{1}\right) \wedge \pi\left(\mathcal{T}_{2}\right) & \models \pi_{x}\left(C_{1}\right) \rightarrow \pi_{x}\left(C_{2}\right) \\
\pi\left(\mathcal{T}_{1}\right) \wedge \pi_{x}\left(C_{1}\right) & \models \pi\left(\mathcal{T}_{2}\right) \rightarrow \pi_{x}\left(C_{2}\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

Thus, by setting $\varphi=\pi\left(\mathcal{T}_{1}\right) \wedge \pi_{x}\left(C_{1}\right)$ and $\psi=\pi\left(\mathcal{T}_{2}\right) \rightarrow \pi_{x}\left(C_{2}\right)$, we know by Craig's Interpolation Theorem for first-order logic that we always have a first-order interpolant $\vartheta$ for $\varphi$ and $\psi$, if $\varphi \vDash \psi$ (Craig, 1957). However, we do not know in general whether such an interpolant can be expressed as an $\mathscr{L}$-concept. Because of this reason we will work in
the DL setting instead of full first-order. Our proofs are constructive in the sense that we present effective procedures for computing the interpolants. This also allows us to establish upper bounds on the size of interpolants.

This section is organized as follows. In Section 3.1, we show directly that the interpolation property holds for $\mathcal{A L C}$ and $\mathcal{A L C F}$ using a worst-case optimal tableau (plural: tableaux) algorithm in the style of Goré and Nguyen (2007). Then in Section 3.2, we show that the interpolation property also holds in the extensions of $\mathcal{A L C}$ and $\mathcal{A L C F}$ with transitive and inverse roles. Instead of establishing these results directly using tableaux, we make use of some satisfiability and signature preserving reductions to $\mathcal{A L C}$ and $\mathcal{A L C} \mathcal{F}$. Our main result says that the interpolants in these logics can be computed in double exponential time. In Section 3.3, we study what happens when interpolants are allowed to be expressed in full first-order logic and show that first-order interpolants can be computed in single exponential time.

### 3.1 A Direct Algorithm for Computing Interpolants in $\mathcal{A L C F}$

In this section, we assume that $\mathcal{A L C} \mathcal{F}$-concepts are defined recursively as in Section 2.1using also $\perp, \sqcup, \forall R . C$, and $\geq 2 R$ as primitives, i.e., we assume that, e.g., $\geq 2 R$ is a constructor of our concept language and not an abbreviation for $\neg(\leq 1 R)$ anymore. Moreover, we assume that all concepts are in negation normal form (NNF), i.e., the negation occurs only in front of concept names. It is well-known that every $\mathcal{A L C} \mathcal{F}$-concept can easily be transformed to an equivalent one in NNF by pushing the negation inwards using the dualities between concept constructors (Tobies, 2001), e.g., $\forall R . C$ and $\neg \exists R$. $\neg C$. The NNF of the complement of a concept $C$ is written as $\dot{\neg} C$. Another assumption we make is that $\mathcal{A L C F}$-TBoxes consist only of axioms of the form $\top \sqsubseteq C$. These assumptions make our tableau notation more compatible with the standard tableau notation for DLs. More precisely, we want to have a separate rule for each concept constructor in the language (Horrocks et al., 2000). The main result we present in this section, namely Theorem 3.10, can easily be shown to hold in the case where we do not make these assumptions.

Definition 3.2. Let $C$ be an $\mathcal{A L C F}$-concept and let $\mathcal{T}$ be an $\mathcal{A L C F}$-TBox. The concept closure $\mathrm{cl}(C, \mathcal{T})$ of $C$ and $\mathcal{T}$ is the smallest set of concepts satisfying the following conditions:

- $C \in \mathrm{cl}(C, \mathcal{T})$;
- if $\top \sqsubseteq D \in \mathcal{T}$, then $D \in \operatorname{cl}(C, \mathcal{T})$;
- if $D \in \operatorname{cl}(C, \mathcal{T})$ and $E \in \operatorname{sub}(D)$, then $E \in \operatorname{cl}(C, \mathcal{T})$;
- if $\exists R . D \in \mathrm{cl}(C, \mathcal{T})$ then $\forall R . D \in \mathrm{cl}(C, \mathcal{T})$.

For the rest of this section, fix two $\mathcal{A L C F}$-concepts $C_{0}, D_{0}$ and two $\mathcal{A L C F}$-TBoxes $\mathcal{T}_{1}$, $\mathcal{T}_{\mathbf{r}}$. We will denote the union $\mathcal{T}_{\mathbf{1}} \cup \mathcal{T}_{\mathbf{r}}$ by $\mathcal{T}$. l stands for left and $\mathbf{r}$ for right and it is a naming scheme adopted from Fitting (1996). It will allow us to identify from which TBox ( $\mathcal{T}_{1}$ or $\mathcal{T}_{\mathbf{r}}$ ) or concept ( $C_{0}$ or $D_{0}$ ) an inference is made. A biased concept is an expression of the form $C^{\lambda}$, where $C$ is an $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C} \mathcal{F}$-concept and $\lambda \in\{\mathbf{l}, \mathbf{r}\}$ is a bias. Two relevant biased concept closures cll and clr are defined as follows.

$$
\mathrm{cll}=\left\{C^{\mathbf{l}} \mid C \in \mathrm{cl}\left(C_{0}, \mathcal{T}_{\mathbf{1}}\right)\right\} \text { and } \mathrm{clr}=\left\{C^{\mathbf{r}} \mid C \in \mathrm{cl}\left(\dot{\neg} D_{0}, \mathcal{T}_{\mathbf{r}}\right)\right\} .
$$

We use the Greek letters $\lambda, \kappa$ to denote a bias.
Our tableau rules will be producing subsets of $\mathrm{cll} \cup \mathrm{clr}$ in a systematic way. To this aim, we make use of the metaphor of a burden and relief. Intuitively, a subset $\Phi$ of cll $\cup \mathrm{clr}$ has a burden if the satisfiability of $\Phi$ depends on the satisfiability of one or more subsets of $\mathrm{cll} \cup \mathrm{clr}$ that we call the reliefs of $\Phi$.

Definition 3.3. Let $\Phi \subseteq \mathrm{cll} \cup \mathrm{clr}$. Then

- $\left(C_{1} \sqcap C_{2}\right)^{\lambda}$ is an $\sqcap$-burden of $\Phi$ iff $\left(C_{1} \sqcap C_{2}\right)^{\lambda} \in \Phi$ and $\left\{\left(C_{1}\right)^{\lambda},\left(C_{2}\right)^{\lambda}\right\} \nsubseteq \Phi$;
- $\left(C_{1} \sqcup C_{2}\right)^{\lambda}$ is an $\sqcup$-burden of $\Phi$ iff $\left(C_{1} \sqcup C_{2}\right)^{\lambda} \in \Phi$ and $\left\{\left(C_{1}\right)^{\lambda},\left(C_{2}\right)^{\lambda}\right\} \cap \Phi=\emptyset$;
- $(\leq 1 R)^{\lambda}$ is an $\leq 1$-burden of $\Phi$ iff $(\leq 1 R)^{\lambda} \in \Phi$ and $\left\{(\forall R . C)^{\kappa} \mid(\exists R . C)^{\kappa} \in \Phi\right\} \nsubseteq \Phi$;
- $(\exists R . C)^{\lambda}$ is an $\exists$-burden of $\Phi$ iff $(\exists R . C)^{\lambda}$ is in $\Phi$;
- $(\geq 2 R)^{\lambda}$ is an $\geq 2$-burden of $\Phi$ iff $(\geq 2 R)^{\lambda}$ is in $\Phi$.
$A$ burden of $\Phi$ is any type of burden from above.
Definition 3.4. Let $\Phi \subseteq \mathrm{cll} \cup \mathrm{clr}, C^{\lambda}$ be a burden of $\Phi$, and $S=\left\{D^{\mathbf{1}} \mid \top \sqsubseteq D \in \mathcal{T}_{1}\right\} \cup\left\{D^{\mathbf{r}} \mid\right.$ $\left.\top \sqsubseteq D \in \mathcal{T}_{\mathbf{r}}\right\}$. Then $\Psi \subseteq \mathrm{cll} \cup \mathrm{clr}$ is called a $C^{\lambda}$-relief of $\Phi$ if
- $C=\left(C_{1} \sqcap C_{2}\right)^{\lambda}$ and $\Psi=\left\{\left(C_{1}\right)^{\lambda},\left(C_{2}\right)^{\lambda}\right\} \cup \Phi$;
- $C=\left(C_{1} \sqcup C_{2}\right)^{\lambda}$ and either $\Psi=\Phi \cup\left\{\left(C_{1}\right)^{\lambda}\right\}$ or $\Psi=\Phi \cup\left\{\left(C_{2}\right)^{\lambda}\right\}$;
- $C=(\leq 1 R)^{\lambda}$ and $\Psi=\Phi \cup\left\{(\forall R . C)^{\kappa} \mid(\exists R . C)^{\kappa} \in \Phi\right\}$;
- $C=(\exists R . C)^{\lambda}$ and $\Psi=\left\{C^{\lambda}\right\} \cup\left\{D^{\kappa} \mid(\forall R . D)^{\kappa} \in \Phi\right\} \cup S$;
- $C=(\geq 2 R)^{\lambda}$ and $\Psi=\left\{D^{\kappa} \mid(\forall R . D)^{\kappa} \in \Phi\right\} \cup S$.

A biased $\left\langle C_{0} \sqsubseteq D_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right\rangle$-tableau ( $\left\langle C_{0} \sqsubseteq D_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right\rangle$-tableau for short) is a vertex-labeled directed graph $\langle\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E}\rangle$ with the labeling content : $\mathcal{V} \rightarrow 2^{\text {clluclr. Intuitively, for all edges }\left\langle g, g^{\prime}\right\rangle}$ constructed by our algorithm, $g^{\prime}$.content will correspond to some $C^{\lambda}$-relief of $g$.content. Note that a tableau is neither required to be a tree nor a directed acyclic graph (DAG) because cycles may occur in general. We say that a node $g$ in a tableau contains a clash if and only if either one of the following holds.

- $\perp^{\lambda} \in g$.content,
- $\left\{A^{\lambda},(\neg A)^{\kappa}\right\} \subseteq g$.content,
- $\left\{(\leq 1 R)^{\lambda},(\geq 2 R)^{\kappa}\right\} \subseteq g$.content.

The tableau expansion rules given in Figure 1 expand a tableau by making use of the semantics of concepts. A rule is said to be applicable to a node $g$ if and only if its condition is satisfied in $g$, no rule was applied to $g$ before, and $g$ does not contain a clash. In order to guarantee a finite expansion, we use proxies in the following way. Whenever a rule creates a new node $g^{\prime}$ from $g$, before attaching the edge $\left\langle g, g^{\prime}\right\rangle$ to $\mathcal{E}$, the tableau is searched for a

| The $\mathrm{R}_{\square}$ rule |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| Condition: | $\left(C_{1} \sqcap C_{2}\right)^{\lambda}$ is an $\Pi$-burden of $g$.content. |
| Action: | $\mathcal{E} \leftarrow \mathcal{E} \cup\left\{\left\langle g, g^{\prime}\right\rangle\right\}$ and $g^{\prime}$.content $\leftarrow \Phi$, where $\Phi$ is the $\left(C_{1} \sqcap C_{2}\right)^{\lambda}$-relief of $g$.content. |
| The $\mathrm{R}_{\sqcup}$ rule |  |
| Condition: | $\left(C_{1} \sqcup C_{2}\right)^{\lambda}$ is an $\sqcup$-burden of $g$.content. |
| Action: | $\mathcal{E} \leftarrow \mathcal{E} \cup\left\{\left\langle g, g_{1}\right\rangle,\left\langle g, g_{2}\right\rangle\right\}, g_{1}$.content $\leftarrow \Phi_{1}$, and $g_{2}$. content $\leftarrow \Phi_{2}$, where $\Phi_{1}, \Phi_{2}$ are $\left(C_{1} \sqcup C_{2}\right)^{\lambda}$-reliefs of $g$.content. |
| The $\mathrm{R}_{\leq 1}$ rule |  |
| Condition: | ( $\leq 1 R)^{\lambda}$ is an $\leq 1$-burden of $g$.content. |
| Action: | $\mathcal{E} \leftarrow \mathcal{E} \cup\left\{\left\langle g, g^{\prime}\right\rangle\right\}$ and $g^{\prime}$.content $\leftarrow \Phi$, where $\Phi$ is the $(\leq 1 R)^{\lambda}$-relief of $g$.content. |
| The $\mathrm{R}_{\mathrm{g}}$ rule |  |
| Condition: | $\Phi=\left\{\left(C_{1}\right)^{\lambda_{1}}, \ldots,\left(C_{n}\right)^{\lambda_{n}}\right\}$ such that $C^{\lambda} \in \Phi$ iff $C^{\lambda}$ is an $\exists$ - or $\geq 2$-burden of $g$.content. |
| Action: | $\mathcal{E} \leftarrow \mathcal{E} \cup\left\{\left\langle g, g_{i}\right\rangle \mid 1 \leq i \leq n\right\}$ and for $1 \leq i \leq n$, $g_{i}$.content $\leftarrow \Phi_{i}$, where $\Phi_{i}$ is the $\left(C_{i}\right)^{\lambda_{i}}$-relief of $g$.content. |

Figure 1: Tableau expansion rules for $\mathcal{A L C \mathcal { F }}$
node $g^{\prime \prime} \in \mathcal{V}$ such that $g^{\prime}$.content $=g^{\prime \prime}$.content. If such a $g^{\prime \prime}$ is found, then the edge $\left\langle g, g^{\prime \prime}\right\rangle$ is added to $\mathcal{E}$ and $g^{\prime}$ is discarded.

We are interested in deciding $\mathcal{T} \models C_{0} \sqsubseteq D_{0}$. The tableau algorithm consists of two phases. The first phase starts with the initial $\left\langle C_{0} \sqsubseteq D_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right\rangle$-tableau $\mathbf{T}=\left\langle\left\{g_{0}\right\}, \emptyset\right\rangle$, where $g_{0}$.content $=\left\{\left(C_{0}\right)^{\mathbf{1}},\left(\neg D_{0}\right)^{\mathbf{r}}\right\} \cup\left\{E^{\mathbf{l}} \mid \top \sqsubseteq E \in \mathcal{T}_{\mathbf{1}}\right\} \cup\left\{E^{\mathbf{r}} \mid \top \sqsubseteq E \in \mathcal{T}_{\mathbf{r}}\right\}$. $\mathbf{T}$ is then expanded by repeatedly applying the tableau expansion rules in such a way that if more than one rule is applicable to a node at the same time, then the first applicable rule in the list $\left[R_{\square}, R_{\sqcup}, R_{\leq 1}, R_{\exists}\right]$ is chosen. The first phase continues as long as some rule is applicable to $\mathbf{T}$. A $\left\langle C_{0} \sqsubseteq D_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right\rangle$-tableau is called complete if and only if it is the output of the first phase of the tableau algorithm.

Lemma 3.5. The first phase of the tableau algorithm terminates in time $2^{O(n)}$, where $n=|\mathrm{cll} \cup \mathrm{clr}|$. Moreover for the complete $\left\langle C_{0} \sqsubseteq D_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right\rangle$-tableau $\mathbf{T}=\langle\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E}\rangle$ it produces, we have $|\mathcal{V}| \leq 2^{n}$ and $|\mathcal{E}| \in 2^{O(n)}$.

Proof. By definition, the first phase continues as long as some rule is applicable to some node in the tableau. Then by the definition of applicability, we have that at most one rule is applied to a node in the tableau.

Let $n=|\mathrm{cll} \cup \mathrm{clr}|$. By the definition of a proxy, we have $|\mathcal{V}| \leq 2^{n}$ since there are $2^{n}$ distinct subsets of $\mathrm{cll} \cup \mathrm{clr}$. Combining this with the fact that there is at most one rule application per node, we obtain $2^{n}$ as a bound on the number of rule applications. Now, it is easy to see that each rule executes in time polynomial in $n$, i.e., the execution time of each rule is bounded by $n^{k}$, where $k$ is a constant. Then we have that the whole running
time of the first phase is $2^{n} \cdot n^{k}$. That is,

$$
\begin{aligned}
2^{n} \cdot n^{k} & =2^{n+\log n^{k}} \\
& =2^{n+k \cdot \log n} \\
& \in 2^{O(n)}
\end{aligned}
$$

It only remains to show the bound on $|\mathcal{E}|$. By the definition of tableau rules, the out-degree of a node cannot exceed $n$. Therefore, $|\mathcal{E}| \leq n \cdot 2^{n}$, i.e., $|\mathcal{E}| \in 2^{O(n)}$.

Let $\mathbf{T}$ be the complete $\left\langle C_{0} \sqsubseteq D_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right\rangle$-tableau obtained from the first phase of the algorithm. The purpose of the second phase of the tableau algorithm, i.e., Algorithm 11, is to construct the following functions:

1. status : $\mathcal{V} \rightarrow\{$ sat, unsat $\}$ is a total function,
2. int is a partial function from $\mathcal{V}$ to $\mathcal{A L C} \mathcal{F}$-concepts.

For a $g \in \mathcal{V}$, the values that are assigned to $g$ by these functions are denoted by $g$.status and $\operatorname{int}(g)$. Intuitively, the status of a node $g$ denotes if $\prod_{C^{\lambda} \in g \text {.content }} C$ is satisfiable or not w.r.t. $\mathcal{T}$; and $\operatorname{int}(g)$, if defined, is an interpolant of $g$.content in the following sense.

Definition 3.6. Let $\Phi \subseteq$ cll $\cup$ clr. A concept $I$ is called an interpolant of $\Phi$ if and only if

- $\mathcal{T} \models \prod_{C^{\mathbf{1}} \in \Phi} C \sqsubseteq I$ and $\mathcal{T} \models I \sqsubseteq \bigsqcup_{C^{\mathbf{r}} \in \Phi} \neg C$
- $\operatorname{sig}(I) \subseteq \operatorname{sig}\left(\prod_{C^{\mathbf{1}} \in \Phi} C\right) \cap \operatorname{sig}\left(\bigsqcup_{C^{\mathbf{r}} \in \Phi} \neg C\right)$,

By the definition of Algorithm 1, it will be that for all $g \in \mathcal{V}$, $\operatorname{int}(g)$ is defined if, and only if, $g$. status = unsat. In order to compute $\operatorname{int}(g)$ for a node $g \in \mathcal{V}$ with $g$.status = unsat, Algorithm 1 uses the interpolant calculation rules that are presented in Figures 2, 3, 4. The rules in Figure 2 compute int $(g)$ based solely on $g$.content; ones in Figure 3 take into account $g$.content and for some successor $g^{\prime}$ of $g$, the values $g^{\prime}$.content and $\operatorname{int}\left(g^{\prime}\right)$; and finally, ones in Figure 4 take into account $g$.content and for every successor $g^{\prime}$ of $g$, the values $g^{\prime}$.content and $\operatorname{int}\left(g^{\prime}\right)$. We invite the reader to verify that, indeed, whenever Algorithm 1 assigns unsat to $g$.status, for a node $g$ of the tableau, then there is an interpolant calculation rule that can be applied to compute $\operatorname{int}(g)$. Furthermore, each interpolant calculation rule is easily seen to be sound. For example, the interpolant calculation rule $\mathrm{C}_{\square}$ in Figure 3 is sound because, if for a successor $g^{\prime}$ of $g, g^{\prime}$.content is the $\left(C_{1} \sqcap C_{2}\right)^{\lambda}$-relief of $g$.content and int $\left(g^{\prime}\right)$ is an interpolant of $g^{\prime}$.content (in the sense of Definition 3.6) then it is necessarily also an interpolant of $g$.content.

Let $\mathbf{T}=\langle\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E}\rangle$ be a complete $\left\langle C_{0} \sqsubseteq D_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right\rangle$-tableau which is an output of the second phase. $\mathbf{T}$ is said to be open if and only if $g_{0}$.status $=$ sat; and it is said to be closed if and only if $g_{0}$.status $=$ unsat. If $\mathbf{T}$ is determined to be open after the second phase, then the tableau algorithm returns " $\mathcal{T} \not \vDash C_{0} \sqsubseteq D_{0}$ ", otherwise it returns " $\mathcal{T} \models C_{0} \sqsubseteq D_{0}$ ".

The next three results establish some important properties of our tableau algorithm and we use them to prove Theorem 3.10. The proofs of these results require the introduction of standard but substantial amount of notation from the DL and modal logic literature. In order to present Theorem 3.10 more clearly, we defer these proofs to Appendix C.

## Algorithm 1 Second phase of the tableau algorithm <br> Propagate: <br> do

- done $\leftarrow$ true.
- For every $g \in \mathcal{V}$ with $g$.status $\neq$ unsat:
- if $g$ contains a clash, then

1. g.status $\leftarrow$ unsat,
2. apply one of $\left\{C_{\perp}^{l}, C_{\perp}^{r}, C_{\neg}^{l l}, C_{\neg}^{\mathbf{r r}}, C_{\neg}^{\mathbf{r r}}, C_{\neg}^{\text {rl }}\right\}$, one whose condition is satisfied, to calculate int $(g)$,
3. done $\leftarrow$ false.

- if $\exists g^{\prime} \in \mathcal{V}$ with $\left\langle g, g^{\prime}\right\rangle \in \mathcal{E}, g^{\prime}$.status $=$ unsat, and $g^{\prime}$.content is some $\left(C_{1} \sqcap C_{2}\right)^{\lambda}$-, $(\leq 1 R)^{\lambda}-,(\exists R . C)^{\lambda}$, or $(\geq 2 R)^{\lambda}$-relief of $g$.content, then

1. g.status $\leftarrow$ unsat,
2. apply one of $\left\{\mathrm{C}_{\square}, \mathrm{C}_{\leq 1}^{1 / R}, \mathrm{C}_{\leq 1}^{\mathrm{r} \not R}, \mathrm{C}_{\leq 1}^{1 R}, \mathrm{C}_{\leq 1}^{\mathrm{r} R}, \mathrm{C}_{\exists}^{1 / R}, \mathrm{C}_{\exists}^{\mathrm{r} \not R}, \mathrm{C}_{\exists}^{1 R}, \mathrm{C}_{\exists}^{\mathrm{r} R}\right\}$, one whose condition is satisfied, to calculate $\operatorname{int}(g)$,
3. done $\leftarrow$ false.

- if $\exists g_{1}, g_{2} \in \mathcal{V}$ with $g_{1} \neq g_{2},\left\langle g, g_{1}\right\rangle,\left\langle g, g_{2}\right\rangle \in \mathcal{E}, g_{i}$.status $=$ unsat for each $i \in\{1,2\}, g_{i}$.content is a $\left(C_{1} \sqcup C_{2}\right)^{\lambda}$-relief of $g$.content for each $i \in\{1,2\}$, then

1. g.status $\leftarrow$ unsat,
2. apply one of $\left\{\mathrm{C}_{\sqcup}^{\mathrm{l}}, \mathrm{C}_{\sqcup}^{\mathbf{r}}\right\}$, one whose condition is satisfied, to calculate $\operatorname{int}(g)$,
3. done $\leftarrow$ false.
while done $=$ false.
Assign:
For every $g \in \mathcal{V}$ with $g$.status $\neq$ unsat, $g$.status $\leftarrow$ sat.
```
The \(C_{\perp}^{1}\) rule
Condition: \(\quad \perp^{1} \in g\).content.
Action: \(\quad \operatorname{int}(g) \leftarrow \perp\)
The \(C_{\perp}^{\text {r }}\) rule
Condition: \(\quad \perp^{\mathbf{r}} \in\) g.content.
Action: \(\quad \operatorname{int}(g) \leftarrow \top\)
The C \({ }^{11}\) rule
Condition:
Action:
    \(\operatorname{int}(g) \leftarrow \perp\)
The \(\mathrm{C}_{7}^{\mathrm{rr}}\) rule
Condition: \(\quad\left\{C^{\mathbf{r}},(\neg C)^{\mathbf{r}}\right\} \subseteq g\).content, for a \(C\) of the form \(A\) or \(\leq 1 R\).
Action: \(\quad \operatorname{int}(g) \leftarrow \top\)
The C \({ }_{7}^{\text {lr }}\) rule
Condition: \(\quad\left\{C^{\mathbf{1}},(\neg C)^{\mathbf{r}}\right\} \subseteq g\).content, for a \(C\) of the form \(A\) or \(\leq 1 R\).
Action: \(\quad \operatorname{int}(g) \leftarrow C\)
The \({ }^{\text {rl }}\) r rule
Condition: \(\quad\left\{C^{\mathbf{r}},(\dot{\neg} C)^{\mathbf{1}}\right\} \subseteq g\).content, for a \(C\) of the form \(A\) or \(\leq 1 R\).
Action: \(\quad \operatorname{int}(g) \leftarrow \dot{\neg} C\)
```

Figure 2: Interpolant calculation rules for $\mathcal{A L C \mathcal { F }}$ (content dependent rules)

Lemma 3.7. Let $\mathbf{T}=\langle\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E}\rangle$ be the output of the second phase. For all $g \in \mathcal{V}$, if $g$. status $=$ unsat, then

1. g.content is unsatisfiable w.r.t. $\mathcal{T}$;
2. $\operatorname{int}(g)$ is defined and it is an interpolant of $g$.content; and
3. $|\operatorname{int}(g)| \in O\left(2^{2^{n}}\right)$, where $n=|\mathrm{cll} \cup \mathrm{clr}|$.

The next lemma establishes a double exponential upper bound for the runtime of Algorithm 1. This is a consequence of interpolant calculation and our double exponential upper bound on the size of these interpolants (cf. Lemma 3.7).

Lemma 3.8. The second phase of the tableau algorithm, i.e., Algorithm 1, runs in time $O\left(2^{2^{n}}\right)$, where $n=|\mathrm{cll} \cup \mathrm{clr}|$.

The next proposition establishes the soundness and the completeness of our algorithm for concept subsumption w.r.t. TBoxes in $\mathcal{A L C F}$.

Proposition 3.9. $\mathbf{T}$ is a closed $\left\langle C_{0} \sqsubseteq D_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right\rangle$-tableau if and only if $\mathcal{T} \models C_{0} \sqsubseteq D_{0}$.
The tableau algorithm we presented in this section with the two phases is actually an algorithm to compute interpolants of at most double exponential size in $\mathcal{A L C \mathcal { F }}$. This upper bound is optimal because the results we establish in Section 4 imply that smallest interpolants can be of double exponential size.


Figure 3: Interpolant calculation rules for $\mathcal{A L C F}$ (single successor dependent rules)

Theorem 3.10. For all $\mathcal{A L C F}$-concepts $C, D$ and all $\mathcal{A L C F}$-TBoxes $\mathcal{T}_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{2}$ if $\mathcal{T}_{1} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2} \models$ $C \sqsubseteq D$ then there exists an interpolant of $C$ and $D$ under $\left\langle\mathcal{T}_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right\rangle$ that can be computed in time double exponential in $\left|\mathcal{T}_{1}\right|+\left|\mathcal{T}_{2}\right|+|C|+|D|$.

Proof. Suppose $C, D$ are $\mathcal{A L C} \mathcal{F}$-concepts and $\mathcal{T}_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{2}$, and $\mathcal{T}$ are $\mathcal{A L C} \mathcal{F}$-TBoxes such that $\mathcal{T}_{1} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2}=\mathcal{T}$ and $\mathcal{T} \models C \sqsubseteq D$. Then by Proposition 3.9, there is a closed $\langle C \sqsubseteq D, \mathcal{T}\rangle$ -

| The $C_{\sqcup}^{1}$ rule |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| Condition: | $g_{1}$.content, $g_{2}$.content are $\left(C_{1} \sqcup C_{2}\right)^{1}$-reliefs of $g$.content. |
| Action: | $\operatorname{int}(g) \leftarrow \operatorname{int}\left(g_{1}\right) \sqcup \operatorname{int}\left(g_{2}\right)$. |
| The C $\sqcup$ rule |  |
| Condition: | $g_{1}$. content, $g_{2}$.content are $\left(C_{1} \sqcup C_{2}\right)^{\mathbf{r}}$-reliefs of $g$.content. |
| Action: | $\operatorname{int}(g) \leftarrow \operatorname{int}\left(g_{1}\right) \sqcap \operatorname{int}\left(g_{2}\right)$. |

Figure 4: Interpolant calculation rules for $\mathcal{A L C F}$ (multiple successor dependent rules)
tableau $\mathbf{T}=\langle\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E}\rangle$. This means $g_{0}$.status $=$ unsat, and thus by Lemma 3.7, there is some $\mathcal{A L C F}$-concept $I$ such that $\operatorname{int}\left(g_{0}\right)=I$ and $I$ is an interpolant of $g_{0}$.content. Let $X=\Pi_{T \sqsubseteq E \in \mathcal{T}_{1}} E$ and $Y=\bigsqcup_{T \sqsubseteq E \in \mathcal{T}_{2}} \neg E$. Since $I$ is an interpolant of $g_{0}$.content, we have $\mathcal{T} \vDash C \sqcap X \sqsubseteq I, \mathcal{T} \models I \sqsubseteq D \sqcup Y$, and $\operatorname{sig}(I) \subseteq \operatorname{sig}(C \sqcap X) \cap \operatorname{sig}(D \sqcup Y)$. Then by the fact that $\mathcal{T} \models X \equiv \top$ and $\mathcal{T} \models Y \equiv \perp$, we obtain $\mathcal{T} \models C \sqsubseteq I$ and $\mathcal{T} \models I \sqsubseteq D$; and by $\operatorname{sig}(I) \subseteq \operatorname{sig}(C \sqcap X) \cap \operatorname{sig}(D \sqcup Y)$, we obtain $\operatorname{sig}(I) \subseteq \operatorname{sig}\left(C, \mathcal{T}_{1}\right) \cap \operatorname{sig}\left(D, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right)$. Hence $I$ is an interpolant of $C$ and $D$ under $\left\langle\mathcal{T}_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right\rangle$. Finally by Lemma 3.8, $I$ can be computed in time double exponential in $\left|\mathcal{T}_{1}\right|+\left|\mathcal{T}_{2}\right|+|C|+|D|$.

We end this section with a discussion of the techniques we used. The tableau algorithm we defined is based on a tableau algorithm by Goré and Nguyen (2007). Here we extended this algorithm for $\mathcal{A L C F}$ and added more machinery to compute interpolants. In general interpolation follows as a corollary to a cut-free sequent or tableau calculus ${ }^{11}$ for a logic (e.g., see Rautenberg, 1983; Fitting, 1996; Kracht, 2007); but such a corollary does not give upper bounds on the size and computation time of interpolants unless the calculus is combined with a decision procedure. In this section, our goal was to obtain tight upper bounds on the size and computation time of interpolants in $\mathcal{A L C \mathcal { F }}$. More traditional tableau algorithms for DLs, e.g., the one by Horrocks et al. (2000), can also be used to establish similar results (Seylan et al., 2009). Here the crucial idea is that the tableau algorithm should provide an explicit representation of the tableau rule applications so that an interpolant can be calculated by induction on the rule applications. We chose a non-traditional DL tableau algorithm for our purposes because it is based on a non-labeled ${ }^{2}$ tableau calculus and such calculi are actually more commonly used for proving interpolation results in modal logics (e.g., Rautenberg, 1983).

### 3.2 Extending Interpolation to Transitive and Inverse Roles

In this section, we extend Theorem 3.10 to more logics in order to obtain our main interpolation result Theorem 3.22. To this aim, we present various polynomial reductions from reasoning in one DL to another. The purpose of these reductions is to eliminate some constructors in the language. The technique we use for these reductions is well-known in the DL literature and it is called the axiom schema instantiation technique (Calvanese, Giacomo, \& Rosati, 1998; Calvanese, Giacomo, Lenzerini, \& Nardi, 2001). Similar techniques also

1. A tableau calculus is defined as a set of tableau rules.
2. A non-labeled tableau calculus provides no explicit representation of individuals in the interpretations.
appear in modal logic (Kracht, 2007). The idea behind this technique can be summarized as follows.

DLs are syntactic variants of modal logics. It is well-known that an axiom schema that is valid in a modal logic corresponds to a certain condition on the accessibility relation in the frames of that logic (Blackburn, de Rijke, \& Venema, 2001). For example the axiom schema $4: \square \varphi \rightarrow \square \square \varphi$ defines the class of transitive frames. The axiom schema instantiation technique is based on instantiating an axiom schema a finite number of times for each concept in cl or a relevant concept closure, and adding these instances to the TBox to obtain an equi-satisfiable TBox. The resulting TBox will then be free of the constructor in the language for which we instantiated the axiom schema.

We note that the input in these reductions is normally a concept and a TBox; but for interpolation, we are given a pair of concepts $C_{1}, C_{2}$ and a pair of TBoxes $\mathcal{T}_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{2}$. Therefore, we require from these reductions that they do not mix the signature of $\operatorname{sig}\left(C_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{1}\right)$ and $\operatorname{sig}\left(C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right)$ in an 'uncontrolled' way. What exactly we mean by this will be clear in Lemma 3.14 and Lemma 3.19. Naturally, this calls for extra notation.

Definition 3.11. An injective function $\zeta: X \rightarrow N_{R}$, where $X$ is a finite subset of $N_{R} \cup$ $\left\{P^{-} \mid P \in N_{R}\right\}$, is called a role renaming if for all $P \in N_{R}$, we have $\left\{P, P^{-}\right\} \nsubseteq X$. A role renaming $\zeta$ is called safe for a signature $\Sigma$ if range $(\zeta) \cap \Sigma=\emptyset$.

Given an $\mathscr{L}$-concept $C$ and a role renaming $\zeta, Z_{\zeta}(C)$ is the concept obtained from $C$ by replacing every occurrence of every $R \in \operatorname{dom}(\zeta)$ by $\zeta(R)$.

Intuitively, we use role renamings, as the name suggests, to rename roles in concepts. We need to make sure that the renaming operation is well-defined and thus, we avoid mappings where a role and its inverse are in the domain of the mapping. Safeness of the mapping w.r.t. a signature is a property that we desire in the following reductions. We start with transitive roles and thus, instantiate the axiom schema $\square \varphi \rightarrow \square \square \varphi$.

Definition 3.12. Let $C_{0}$ be a $\mathcal{S I F}$-concept, $\mathcal{T}$ be a $\mathcal{S I F}$-TBox, and $\zeta$ be a safe role renaming for $\operatorname{sig}\left(C_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right)$ with $\operatorname{dom}(\zeta)=\operatorname{sig}\left(C_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right) \cap N_{R^{+}}$and range $(\zeta) \cap N_{R^{+}}=\emptyset$. Then $\tau_{\mathcal{S}}\left(C_{0}, \mathcal{T}, \zeta\right)$ is defined as the $\mathcal{A L C F I}$-TBox $\tau_{\mathcal{S}}^{1}\left(C_{0}, \mathcal{T}, \zeta\right) \cup \tau_{\mathcal{S}}^{2}\left(C_{0}, \mathcal{T}, \zeta\right)$, where $\tau_{\mathcal{S}}^{1}\left(C_{0}, \mathcal{T}, \zeta\right)=$ $\left\{T \sqsubseteq Z_{\zeta}(C) \mid \top \sqsubseteq C \in \mathcal{T}\right\}$ and

$$
\tau_{\mathcal{S}}^{2}\left(C_{0}, \mathcal{T}, \zeta\right)=\left\{Z_{\zeta}(\forall R . C) \sqsubseteq Z_{\zeta}(\forall R . \forall R . C) \mid \forall R . C \in \mathrm{cl}\left(C_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right) \text { and }\left\{R, R^{-}\right\} \cap N_{R^{+}} \neq \emptyset\right\}
$$

Note that in the definition above, the signature of the resulting $\mathcal{A L C \mathcal { L }}$-TBox will not be equal to the signature of the original $\mathcal{S I F}$-TBox $\mathcal{T}$ if $C_{0}$ or $\mathcal{T}$ contains transitive roles. Introducing these new non-transitive role names is necessary because we are not allowed to use symbols from $N_{R^{+}}$in logics without transitive roles (cf. Section 2.1). Although the formulation of the following proposition is slightly different from the one of Lemma 6.23 by Tobies (2001), the proof idea is the same.

Proposition 3.13. $A \mathcal{S I F}$-concept $C_{0}$ is satisfiable w.r.t. a $\mathcal{S I F}$-TBox $\mathcal{T}$ if and only if the $\mathcal{A L C F I}$-concept $Z_{\zeta}\left(C_{0}\right)$ is satisfiable w.r.t. the $\mathcal{A L C F I}$-TBox $\tau_{\mathcal{S}}\left(C_{0}, \mathcal{T}, \zeta\right)$, where $\zeta$ is a safe role renaming for $\operatorname{sig}\left(C_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right)$ with $\operatorname{dom}(\zeta)=\operatorname{sig}\left(C_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right) \cap N_{R^{+}}$and range $(\zeta) \cap N_{R^{+}}=\emptyset$.

The reduction (for concept satisfiability w.r.t. TBoxes) in Definition 3.12 satisfies the following property that will be essential for extending our interpolation results to logics
with transitive roles. In this respect, it also resembles the splitting reduction functions of Kracht (2007).

Lemma 3.14. Let $\mathcal{T}_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{2}$ be $\mathcal{S I \mathcal { F }}$-TBoxes and let $C_{1}, C_{2}$ be $\mathcal{S I \mathcal { I }}$-concepts. Then

$$
\mathcal{T}_{1} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2} \models C_{1} \sqsubseteq C_{2} \text { iff } \tau_{\mathcal{S}}\left(C_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{1}, \zeta\right) \cup \tau_{\mathcal{S}}\left(\dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}, \zeta\right) \models Z_{\zeta}\left(C_{1}\right) \sqsubseteq Z_{\zeta}\left(C_{2}\right)
$$

where $\zeta$ is a safe role renaming for $\operatorname{sig}\left(C_{1} \sqcap \dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{1} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2}\right)$ with $\operatorname{dom}(\zeta)=\operatorname{sig}\left(C_{1} \sqcap \dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{1} \cup\right.$ $\left.\mathcal{T}_{2}\right) \cap N_{R^{+}}$and range $(\zeta) \cap N_{R^{+}}=\emptyset$.

Proof. Let $\zeta$ be a safe role renaming for $\operatorname{sig}\left(C_{1} \sqcap \dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{1} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2}\right)$ as specified in the lemma. We will use the following claims for the proof.

Claim 3.15. $\tau_{\mathcal{S}}\left(C_{1} \sqcap \dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{1} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2}, \zeta\right)=\tau_{\mathcal{S}}\left(C_{1} \sqcap \dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{1}, \zeta\right) \cup \tau_{\mathcal{S}}\left(C_{1} \sqcap \dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}, \zeta\right)$.
Proof of claim. $(\Rightarrow)$ Suppose $C \sqsubseteq D \in \tau_{\mathcal{S}}\left(C_{1} \sqcap \dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{1} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2}, \zeta\right)$. Then either $C \sqsubseteq D \in$ $\tau_{\mathcal{S}}^{1}\left(C_{1} \sqcap \dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{1} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2}, \zeta\right)$ or $C \sqsubseteq D \in \tau_{\mathcal{S}}^{2}\left(C_{1} \sqcap \dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{1} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2}, \zeta\right)$. If the former holds, then we immediately obtain the desired result; thus, suppose the latter holds. Then $C \sqsubseteq D$ is of the form $Z_{\zeta}(\forall R . C) \sqsubseteq Z_{\zeta}(\forall R . \forall R . C), \forall R . C \in \operatorname{cl}\left(C_{1} \sqcap \dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{1} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2}\right)$, and $\left\{R, R^{-}\right\} \cap N_{R^{+}} \neq \emptyset$. Ву Definition 3.2 and $\forall R . C \in \mathrm{cl}\left(C_{1} \sqcap \dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{1} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2}\right)$, we obtain $\forall R . C$ is in $\mathrm{cl}\left(C_{1} \sqcap \dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{1}\right)$ or $\mathrm{cl}\left(C_{1} \sqcap \dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right)$. Then by Definition 3.12 and the fact that either $R \in N_{R^{+}}$or $R^{-} \in N_{R^{+}}$, we have that $Z_{\zeta}(\forall R . C) \sqsubseteq Z_{\zeta}(\forall R . \forall R . C) \in \tau_{\mathcal{S}}\left(C_{1} \sqcap \dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{1}, \zeta\right) \cup \tau_{\mathcal{S}}\left(C_{1} \sqcap \dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}, \zeta\right)$, which is what we wanted to show.
$(\Leftarrow)$ It is rather easy to see that this direction of the claim holds.
Claim 3.16. $\tau_{\mathcal{S}}\left(C_{1} \sqcap \dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{1}, \zeta\right) \cup \tau_{\mathcal{S}}\left(C_{1} \sqcap \dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}, \zeta\right)=\tau_{\mathcal{S}}\left(C_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{1}, \zeta\right) \cup \tau_{\mathcal{S}}\left(\dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}, \zeta\right)$.
Proof of claim. $(\Leftarrow)$ Suppose $C \sqsubseteq D \in \tau_{\mathcal{S}}\left(C_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{1}, \zeta\right) \cup \tau_{\mathcal{S}}\left(\neg_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}, \zeta\right)$. The desired result follows immediately if $C \sqsubseteq D=\top \sqsubseteq Z_{\zeta}\left(C^{\prime}\right)$, for some $\top \sqsubseteq C^{\prime} \in \mathcal{T}_{1} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2}$. Otherwise, we have by Definition 3.12 that $C \sqsubseteq D$ is of the form $Z_{\zeta}(\forall R . C) \sqsubseteq Z_{\zeta}(\forall R . \forall R . C), \forall R . C \in \mathrm{cl}\left(C_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{1}\right) \cup$ $\mathrm{cl}\left(\dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right)$ and either $R \in N_{R^{+}}$or $R^{-} \in N_{R^{+}}$. Then by $\forall R . C \in \mathrm{cl}\left(C_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{1}\right) \cup \mathrm{cl}\left(\dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right)$ and $\mathrm{cl}\left(C_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{1}\right) \cup \mathrm{cl}\left(\dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right) \subseteq \mathrm{cl}\left(C_{1} \sqcap \dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{1}\right) \cup \mathrm{cl}\left(C_{1} \sqcap \dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right)$, we obtain $\forall R . C \in \operatorname{cl}\left(C_{1} \sqcap\right.$ $\left.\dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{1}\right) \cup \mathrm{cl}\left(C_{1} \sqcap \dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right)$. Then by Definition 3.12 and the fact that either $R \in N_{R^{+}}$or $R^{-} \in N_{R^{+}}$, we have $Z_{\zeta}(\forall R . C) \sqsubseteq Z_{\zeta}(\forall R . \forall R . C) \in \tau_{\mathcal{S}}\left(C_{1} \sqcap \dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{1}, \zeta\right) \cup \tau_{\mathcal{S}}\left(C_{1} \sqcap \dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}, \zeta\right)$, which is what we wanted to show.
$(\Rightarrow)$ Suppose $C \sqsubseteq D \in \tau_{\mathcal{S}}\left(C_{1} \sqcap \dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{1}, \zeta\right) \cup \tau_{\mathcal{S}}\left(C_{1} \sqcap \dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}, \zeta\right)$. The desired result follows immediately if $C \sqsubseteq D=\top \sqsubseteq Z_{\zeta}\left(C^{\prime}\right)$, for some $T \sqsubseteq C^{\prime} \in \mathcal{T}_{1} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2}$. Otherwise, we have by Definition 3.12 that $C \sqsubseteq D$ is of the form $Z_{\zeta}(\forall R . C) \sqsubseteq Z_{\zeta}(\forall R . \forall R . C), \forall R . C \in \mathrm{cl}\left(C_{1} \sqcap\right.$ $\left.\dot{A} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{1}\right) \cup \mathrm{cl}\left(C_{1} \sqcap \dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right)$, and either $R \in N_{R^{+}}$or $R^{-} \in N_{R^{+}}$. Then by $\forall R . C \in \mathrm{cl}\left(C_{1} \sqcap\right.$ $\left.\dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{1}\right) \cup \mathrm{cl}\left(C_{1} \sqcap \dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right)$, the fact that $C_{1} \sqcap \dot{\neg} C_{2} \neq \forall R . C$, and Definition 3.2, we obtain $\forall R . C \in \operatorname{cl}\left(C_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{1}\right) \cup \mathrm{cl}\left(\neg C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right)$. Then by Definition 3.12 and the fact that either $R \in N_{R^{+}}$ or $R^{-} \in N_{R^{+}}$, we have $Z_{\zeta}(\forall R . C) \sqsubseteq Z_{\zeta}(\forall R . \forall R . C) \in \tau_{\mathcal{S}}\left(C_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{1}, \zeta\right) \cup \tau_{\mathcal{S}}\left(\dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}, \zeta\right)$, which is what we wanted to show.

Now the lemma can be shown in the following way.

- $\mathcal{T}_{1} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2} \models C_{1} \sqsubseteq C_{2}$, iff
- $C_{1} \sqcap \dot{\neg} C_{2}$ is unsatisfiable w.r.t. $\mathcal{T}_{1} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2}$, iff
- $Z_{\zeta}\left(C_{1} \sqcap \dot{\neg} C_{2}\right)$ is unsatisfiable w.r.t. $\tau_{\mathcal{S}}\left(C_{1} \sqcap \dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{1} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2}, \zeta\right)$ (Proposition 3.13), iff
- $Z_{\zeta}\left(C_{1} \sqcap \dot{\neg} C_{2}\right)$ is unsatisfiable w.r.t. $\tau_{\mathcal{S}}\left(C_{1} \sqcap \dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{1}, \zeta\right) \cup \tau_{\mathcal{S}}\left(C_{1} \sqcap \dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}, \zeta\right)$ (first claim), iff
- $Z_{\zeta}\left(C_{1} \sqcap \dot{\neg} C_{2}\right)$ is unsatisfiable w.r.t. $\tau_{\mathcal{S}}\left(C_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{1}, \zeta\right) \cup \tau_{\mathcal{S}}\left(\neg C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}, \zeta\right)$ (second claim), iff
- $\tau_{\mathcal{S}}\left(C_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{1}, \zeta\right) \cup \tau_{\mathcal{S}}\left(\dot{\neg}_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}, \zeta\right) \models Z_{\zeta}\left(C_{1}\right) \sqsubseteq Z_{\zeta}\left(C_{2}\right)$.

We need a similar reduction to eliminate inverse roles. De Giacomo (1996) presents a method to reduce converse-PDL satisfiability to PDL satisfiability using the axiom schema instantiation technique. Since DLs are notational variants of PDLs, this technique can easily be adapted to DLs as done by Calvanese et al. $(1998,2001)$. The idea is to instantiate the converse-PDL axiom schemas $\varphi \rightarrow[\alpha]\left\langle\alpha^{-}\right\rangle \varphi$ and $\varphi \rightarrow\left[\alpha^{-}\right]\langle\alpha\rangle \varphi$.

Definition 3.17. Let $C_{0}$ be an $\mathcal{A L C F I}$-concept, let $\mathcal{T}$ be an $\mathcal{A L C F I}$-TBox, and $\zeta$ be a safe role renaming for $\operatorname{sig}\left(C_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right)$ with $\operatorname{dom}(\zeta)$ consisting of all inverse roles appearing in $C_{0}$ or $\mathcal{T}$, and range $(\zeta) \cap N_{R^{+}}=\emptyset$. Then $\tau_{\mathcal{I}}\left(C_{0}, \mathcal{T}, \zeta\right)$ is defined as the $\mathcal{A L C F}$-TBox $\tau_{\mathcal{I}}^{1}\left(C_{0}, \mathcal{T}, \zeta\right) \cup \tau_{\mathcal{I}}^{2}\left(C_{0}, \mathcal{T}, \zeta\right)$, where $\tau_{\mathcal{I}}^{1}\left(C_{0}, \mathcal{T}, \zeta\right)=\left\{\top \sqsubseteq Z_{\zeta}(C) \mid \top \sqsubseteq C \in \mathcal{T}\right\}$ and

$$
\tau_{\mathcal{I}}^{2}\left(C_{0}, \mathcal{T}, \zeta\right)=\left\{Z_{\zeta}(\dot{\neg} C) \sqsubseteq Z_{\zeta}\left(\forall R^{-} . \exists R . \dot{\neg}\right) \mid \forall R . C \in \mathrm{cl}\left(C_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right)\right\}
$$

Note that in the definition above, the signature of the resulting $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C F}$-TBox will not be equal to the signature of the original $\mathcal{A L C F I}$-TBox $\mathcal{T}$ if $C_{0}$ or $\mathcal{T}$ contains inverse roles. Proposition 3.18 establishes the correctness of this reduction for concept satisfiability w.r.t. TBoxes. A full proof of this proposition is given by Seylan (2012).

Proposition 3.18. An $\mathcal{A L C F I}$-concept $C_{0}$ is satisfiable w.r.t. an $\mathcal{A L C F I}$-TBox $\mathcal{T}$ if and only if the $\mathcal{A L C \mathcal { L }}$-concept $Z_{\zeta}\left(C_{0}\right)$ is satisfiable w.r.t. the $\mathcal{A L C \mathcal { F }}$-TBox $\tau_{\mathcal{I}}\left(C_{0}, \mathcal{T}, \zeta\right)$, where $\zeta$ is a safe role renaming for $\operatorname{sig}\left(C_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right)$ with $\operatorname{dom}(\zeta)$ consisting of all inverse roles appearing in $C_{0}$ or $\mathcal{T}$ and range $(\zeta) \cap N_{R^{+}}=\emptyset$.

The following property of this reduction will be useful in our interpolation results.
Lemma 3.19. Let $\mathcal{T}_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{2}$ be $\mathcal{A L C F I}$-TBoxes and let $C_{1}, C_{2}$ be $\mathcal{A L C F I}$-concepts. Then

$$
\mathcal{T}_{1} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2} \models C_{1} \sqsubseteq C_{2} \text { iff } \tau_{\mathcal{I}}\left(C_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{1}, \zeta\right) \cup \tau_{\mathcal{I}}\left(\dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}, \zeta\right) \models Z_{\zeta}\left(C_{1}\right) \sqsubseteq Z_{\zeta}\left(C_{2}\right)
$$

where $\zeta$ is a safe role renaming for $\operatorname{sig}\left(C_{1} \sqcap \dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{1} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2}\right)$ with $\operatorname{dom}(\zeta)$ consisting of all inverse roles appearing in $C_{1} \sqcap \neg C_{2}$ or $\mathcal{T}_{1} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2}$ and range $(\zeta) \cap N_{R^{+}}=\emptyset$.

Proof. The following claims can be shown analogously to Claim 3.15 and Claim 3.16, respectively.

Claim 3.20. $\tau_{\mathcal{I}}\left(C_{1} \sqcap \dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{1} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2}, \zeta\right)=\tau_{\mathcal{I}}\left(C_{1} \sqcap \dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{1}, \zeta\right) \cup \tau_{\mathcal{I}}\left(C_{1} \sqcap \dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}, \zeta\right)$.
Claim 3.21. $\tau_{\mathcal{I}}\left(C_{1} \sqcap \dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{1}, \zeta\right) \cup \tau_{\mathcal{I}}\left(C_{1} \sqcap \dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}, \zeta\right)=\tau_{\mathcal{I}}\left(C_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{1}, \zeta\right) \cup \tau_{\mathcal{I}}\left(\dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}, \zeta\right)$.

Then the argument is the same as the last step in the proof of Lemma 3.14.
Theorem 3.22. Let $\mathscr{L}$ be $\mathcal{A L C}$ or any of its extensions with constructors from $\{\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{I}, \mathcal{F}\}$. For all $\mathscr{L}$-concepts $C_{1}, C_{2}$ and all $\mathscr{L}$-TBoxes $\mathcal{T}_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{2}$, if $\mathcal{T}_{1} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2} \models C_{1} \sqsubseteq C_{2}$, then there exists an interpolant of $C_{1}$ and $C_{2}$ under $\left\langle\mathcal{T}_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right\rangle$ that can be computed in time double exponential in $\left|\mathcal{T}_{1}\right|+\left|\mathcal{T}_{2}\right|+\left|C_{1}\right|+\left|C_{2}\right|$.

Proof. Theorem 3.10 already covers the case for $\mathscr{L}=\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C F}$.
For $\mathscr{L}=\mathcal{A L C}$. The tableau algorithm for $\mathcal{A L C F}$ (with which we proved Theorem 3.10) can be used without modification to decide concept satisfiability w.r.t. a TBox in $\overline{\mathcal{A L C}}$. In other words, given $\mathcal{A L C}$-concepts $C_{1}, C_{2}$ and an $\mathcal{A L C}$-TBox $\mathcal{T}=\mathcal{T}_{1} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2}$, we can check if $\mathcal{T} \models C_{1} \sqsubseteq C_{2}$ using the same algorithm. Observe that during the execution of the algorithm, $\mathrm{R}_{\leq 1}$ will never be applied and there will be no clashes involving a concept of the form $\leq 1 R$. If the algorithm constructs a closed $\left\langle C_{1} \sqsubseteq C_{2}, \mathcal{T}\right\rangle$-tableau, then the interpolant calculation algorithm will calculate an interpolant in $\mathcal{A L C F}$. Since $R_{\leq 1}$ was never applied in the first phase and there is no clash involving a concept of the form $\leq 1 R$ in the resulting tableau, the interpolant calculation rules producing concepts of the form $\leq 1 R$ or $\geq 2 R$, namely $\mathrm{C}_{\leq 1}^{1 R}, \mathrm{C}_{\leq 1}^{\mathrm{r} R}$, and the ones in Figure 2, will never be applied in the second phase. Hence the resulting interpolant is actually an $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L}$ - -concept. That there is always an interpolant if $\mathcal{T}_{1} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2} \models C_{1} \sqsubseteq C_{2}$ and the double exponential upper bound on its computation time can be shown as in Theorem 3.10.

For $\mathscr{L} \in\{\mathcal{A L C I}, \mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C F I}\}$. Let $C_{1}, C_{2}$ be $\mathscr{L}$-concepts and $\mathcal{T}_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{2}$ be $\mathscr{L}$-TBoxes such that $\mathcal{T}_{1} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2} \models C_{1} \sqsubseteq C_{2}$. Let $\zeta$ be a role renaming as specified in Lemma 3.19. such a role renaming always exists. Then by Lemma 3.19, $\tau_{\mathcal{I}}\left(C_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{1}, \zeta\right) \cup \tau_{\mathcal{I}}\left(\neg C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}, \zeta\right) \equiv Z_{\zeta}\left(C_{1}\right) \sqsubseteq$ $Z_{\zeta}\left(C_{2}\right)$, where $C_{1}, C_{2}$ are $\mathcal{A L C}$-concepts $\left(\overline{\mathcal{L C} \mathcal{F}}\right.$-concepts) and $\tau_{\mathcal{I}}\left(C_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{1}, \zeta\right), \tau_{\mathcal{I}}\left(\neg C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}, \zeta\right)$ are $\mathcal{A L C}$-TBoxes (respectively $\mathcal{A L C} \mathcal{F}$-TBoxes). We compute an interpolant $I$ of $Z_{\zeta}\left(C_{1}\right)$ and $Z_{\zeta}\left(C_{2}\right)$ under $\left\langle\tau_{\mathcal{I}}\left(C_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{1}, \zeta\right), \tau_{\mathcal{I}}\left(\neg C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}, \zeta\right)\right\rangle$ in time that is at most double exponential in the size of the input. We have

1. $\operatorname{sig}(I) \subseteq \operatorname{sig}\left(Z_{\zeta}\left(C_{1}\right), \tau_{\mathcal{I}}\left(C_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{1}, \zeta\right)\right) \cap \operatorname{sig}\left(Z_{\zeta}\left(C_{2}\right), \tau_{\mathcal{I}}\left(\neg C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}, \zeta\right)\right)$,
2. $\tau_{\mathcal{I}}\left(C_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{1}, \zeta\right) \cup \tau_{\mathcal{I}}\left(\dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}, \zeta\right) \models Z_{\zeta}\left(C_{1}\right) \sqsubseteq I$,
3. $\tau_{\mathcal{I}}\left(C_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{1}, \zeta\right) \cup \tau_{\mathcal{I}}\left(\dot{\neg} C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}, \zeta\right) \models I \sqsubseteq Z_{\zeta}\left(C_{2}\right)$.

Let $\zeta_{1}$ be the restriction of $\zeta$ to $\operatorname{rol}\left(C_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{1}\right)$ and $\zeta_{2}$ be the restriction of $\zeta$ to $\operatorname{rol}\left(\neg C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right)$; and set $\Sigma_{1}=\operatorname{range}\left(\zeta_{1}\right)$ and $\Sigma_{2}=\operatorname{range}\left(\zeta_{2}\right)$. Intuitively, $\Sigma_{1}$ and $\Sigma_{2}$ are exactly the sets of new role names we introduced in $\tau_{\mathcal{I}}\left(C_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{1}, \zeta\right)$ and $\tau_{\mathcal{I}}\left(\neg_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}, \zeta\right)$, respectively. It is easy to see that $\operatorname{sig}\left(Z_{\zeta}\left(C_{1}\right), \tau_{\mathcal{I}}\left(C_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{1}, \zeta\right)\right) \subseteq \operatorname{sig}\left(C_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{1}\right) \cup \Sigma_{1}$, and $\operatorname{sig}\left(Z_{\zeta}\left(C_{2}\right), \tau_{\mathcal{I}}\left(\therefore C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}, \zeta\right)\right) \subseteq$ $\operatorname{sig}\left(C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right) \cup \Sigma_{2}$. Then by item 1 above, we have

$$
\operatorname{sig}(I) \subseteq\left(\operatorname{sig}\left(C_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{1}\right) \cup \Sigma_{1}\right) \cap\left(\operatorname{sig}\left(C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right) \cup \Sigma_{2}\right)
$$

By a simple distributivity argument, we obtain

$$
\begin{aligned}
\operatorname{sig}(I) \subseteq & \left(\operatorname{sig}\left(C_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{1}\right) \cap \operatorname{sig}\left(C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right)\right) \cup\left(\Sigma_{1} \cap \Sigma_{2}\right) \cup \\
& \left(\operatorname{sig}\left(C_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{1}\right) \cap \Sigma_{2}\right) \cup\left(\operatorname{sig}\left(C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right) \cap \Sigma_{1}\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

Since $\operatorname{sig}\left(C_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{1}\right) \cap \Sigma_{2}=\emptyset$ and $\operatorname{sig}\left(C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right) \cap \Sigma_{1}=\emptyset$,

$$
\operatorname{sig}(I) \subseteq\left(\operatorname{sig}\left(C_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{1}\right) \cap \operatorname{sig}\left(C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right)\right) \cup\left(\Sigma_{1} \cap \Sigma_{2}\right)
$$

Now let $D$ be the $\mathscr{L}$-concept that is obtained from $I$ by replacing all occurrences of each role name $P \in \Sigma_{1} \cap \Sigma_{2}$ by the only role $R^{-}$such that $\zeta\left(R^{-}\right)=P$. Since $\zeta$ is injective, this is well defined. Moreover, we have $Z_{\zeta}(D)=I$.

We claim that for every $P \in \Sigma_{1} \cap \Sigma_{2}$, the role name $R$ with $\zeta\left(R^{-}\right)=P$ is in $\operatorname{sig}\left(C_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{1}\right) \cap$ $\operatorname{sig}\left(C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right)$. Suppose $P \in \Sigma_{1} \cap \Sigma_{2}$. Then $P \in \operatorname{range}\left(\zeta_{1}\right) \cap \operatorname{range}\left(\zeta_{2}\right)$. Since $\zeta_{1}$ and $\zeta_{2}$ are defined as restrictions of $\zeta$ to $\operatorname{rol}\left(C_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{1}\right)$ and $\operatorname{rol}\left(C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right)$, respectively, there is some $R^{-} \in \operatorname{rol}\left(C_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{1}\right) \cap \operatorname{rol}\left(C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right)$ such that $\zeta\left(R^{-}\right)=P$. But then $R \in \operatorname{sig}\left(C_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{1}\right) \cap \operatorname{sig}\left(C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right)$.

Now by the claim we have just shown, $\operatorname{sig}(I) \subseteq\left(\operatorname{sig}\left(C_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{1}\right) \cap \operatorname{sig}\left(C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right)\right) \cup\left(\Sigma_{1} \cap \Sigma_{2}\right)$, and the construction of $D$, we have $\operatorname{sig}(D) \subseteq \operatorname{sig}\left(C_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{1}\right) \cap \operatorname{sig}\left(C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right)$. Moreover, by $Z_{\zeta}(D)=I$, items 2 and 3 above, and Lemma 3.19, we obtain $\mathcal{T}_{1} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2} \models C_{1} \sqsubseteq D$ and $\mathcal{T}_{1} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2} \models D \sqsubseteq C_{2}$. Hence $D$ is an interpolant of $C_{1}$ and $C_{2}$ under $\left\langle\mathcal{T}_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right\rangle$. It is easy to see that the time required to compute $D$ is as stated in the theorem.

For $\mathscr{L} \in\{\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{S I}, \mathcal{S F}, \mathcal{S I F}\}$. In what follows, let $\mathscr{L}^{\prime}$ be $\mathscr{L}$ without the transitive role constructor, e.g., if $\mathscr{L}=\mathcal{S I F}$, then $\mathscr{L}^{\prime}=\mathcal{A L C \mathcal { F I }}$. We know by now that $\mathscr{L}^{\prime}$ satisfies what is stated in the theorem. Suppose that $C_{1}, C_{2}$ are $\mathscr{L}$-concepts and $\mathcal{T}_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{2}$ are $\mathscr{L}$-TBoxes such that $\mathcal{T}_{1} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2} \models C_{1} \sqsubseteq C_{2}$. The proof proceeds analogously to the inverse role case, except of course we use Lemma 3.14.

To conclude, we have shown for each logic $\mathscr{L}$ stated in the theorem a constructive way to compute an interpolant, if one exists, in time double exponential in the size of the input. Hence the theorem follows.

### 3.3 Shorter First-Order Interpolants

We will now show that our interpolation algorithm can be adapted to compute first-order interpolants in single exponential time. The proof will proceed along the following lines. First we will show that the double exponential size of the interpolants is only due to the repeated occurrence of subformulas and that our algorithm yields single exponential size interpolants using a succinct (DAG-shaped as opposed to tree-shaped) concept representation. Next we apply an idea implicit in the work of Avigad (2003), namely that succinctly represented first-order formulas can be transformed in polynomial time into equivalent ordinary tree-shaped first-order formulas over structures with at least two elements. This allows us to compute single exponential first-order interpolants over structures with at least two elements. After that, we show that single exponential interpolants over structures with one element can be constructed by a reduction to propositional logic. By combining the interpolants obtained via these two methods, we finally obtain the desired single exponential first-order interpolant over arbitrary structures.

Step 1: Singly-exponential interpolants via succinct representation We start by defining the notions that will allow us to represent DAG-shaped concepts.

Definition 3.23. Fix a description logic $\mathscr{L}$. An axiom of the form $A \equiv C$, where $A \in N_{C}$ and $C$ is an $\mathscr{L}$-concept, is called a concept definition axiom in $\mathscr{L}$ (or, an $\mathscr{L}$-CDA). Let $\Sigma$
be a signature. An acyclic terminology over $\Sigma$ in $\mathscr{L}$ is a set of $\mathscr{L}$-CDAs

$$
\mathcal{T}=\left\{A_{1} \equiv C_{1}, \ldots, A_{n} \equiv C_{n}\right\}
$$

where $\left\{A_{1}, \ldots, A_{n}\right\} \cap \Sigma=\emptyset$ and $\operatorname{sig}\left(C_{i}\right) \subseteq \Sigma \cup\left\{A_{1}, \ldots, A_{i-1}\right\}$ for $i \in\{1, \ldots, n\}$.
$A$ succinct- $\mathscr{L}$-concept over $\Sigma$ is a pair $\langle A, \mathcal{T}\rangle$, where $\mathcal{T}$ is an acyclic terminology over $\Sigma$ in $\mathscr{L}$ and $A$ is a concept name belonging to $\operatorname{sig}(\mathcal{T}) \backslash \Sigma$. The unfolding of a succinct- $\mathscr{L}$ concept $\langle A, \mathcal{T}\rangle$ is the $\mathscr{L}$-concept over $\Sigma$ that is obtained from $A$ by repeatedly"applying" the CDAs in $\mathcal{T}$, i.e., replacing occurrences of their left-hand side by their right-hand side, until no more CDA can be applied.

Note that acyclic terminologies are well-known in the DL literature (Baader \& Nutt, 2003).

Example 3.24. Let $\mathcal{T}$ consist of the following.

$$
\begin{aligned}
\text { Woman } & \equiv \text { Person } \sqcap \text { Female } \\
\text { Man } & \equiv \text { Person } \sqcap \text { Male } \\
\text { Human } & \equiv \text { Woman } \sqcup \text { Man }
\end{aligned}
$$

Then $\mathcal{T}$ is an acyclic terminology over $\{$ Person, Female, Male $\}$. The unfolding of the succinctconcept $\langle$ Human, $\mathcal{T}\rangle$ is

$$
\text { (Person } \sqcap \text { Female) } \sqcup(\text { Person } \sqcap \text { Male). }
$$

The unfolding of a succinct-concept is in general exponentially longer.
Proposition 3.25. Let $\mathscr{L}$ be any description logic. For each succinct- $\mathscr{L}$-concept $\langle A, \mathcal{T}\rangle$ with unfolding $C,|C| \in 2^{|\mathcal{T}|^{O(1)}}$.

Theorem 3.26. Let $\mathscr{L}$ be $\mathcal{A L C}$ or any of its extensions with constructors from $\{\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{I}, \mathcal{F}\}$. For all $\mathscr{L}$-concepts $C_{1}, C_{2}$ and all $\mathscr{L}$-TBoxes $\mathcal{T}_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{2}$, if $\mathcal{T}_{1} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2} \models C_{1} \sqsubseteq C_{2}$, then there exists a succinct- $\mathscr{L}$-concept $\langle A, \mathcal{T}\rangle$ over $\operatorname{sig}\left(C_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{1}\right) \cap \operatorname{sig}\left(C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right)$ such that

- the unfolding of $\langle A, \mathcal{T}\rangle$ is an interpolant of $C_{1}$ and $C_{2}$ under $\left\langle\mathcal{T}_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right\rangle$, and
- $\langle A, \mathcal{T}\rangle$ can be computed in time single exponential in $\left|\mathcal{T}_{1}\right|+\left|\mathcal{T}_{2}\right|+\left|C_{1}\right|+\left|C_{2}\right|$.

Proof. Let $\mathscr{L}$ be one of the DLs mentioned in the theorem, let $\mathcal{T}_{1} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2} \models C_{1} \sqsubseteq C_{2}$, where $\mathcal{T}_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{2}$ are $\mathscr{L}$-TBoxes and $C_{1}, C_{2}$ are $\mathscr{L}$-concepts, and let $m=\left|\mathcal{T}_{1}\right|+\left|\mathcal{T}_{2}\right|+\left|C_{1}\right|+\left|C_{2}\right|$. As in the proof of Theorem 3.22, we first reduce $\mathcal{T}_{1} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2} \models C_{1} \sqsubseteq C_{2}$ to $\mathcal{T}_{1}^{\prime} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2}^{\prime} \models D_{1} \sqsubseteq D_{2}$, where $\mathcal{T}_{1}^{\prime}, \mathcal{T}_{2}^{\prime}$ are $\mathcal{A L C}$-TBoxes ( $\mathcal{A L C \mathcal { F }}$-TBoxes) and $D_{1}, D_{2}$ are $\mathcal{A L C}$-concepts (resp. $\mathcal{A L C} \mathcal{F}$ concepts).

We show that the interpolant calculation step in Algorithm 1 for $\mathcal{A L C} \mathcal{F}$ (and thus $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}$, see Figures 2, 3, 4) can be modified to compute a succinct-concept of single exponential size as an interpolant, instead of a concept.

We associate to every node $g$ in the tableau a distinct fresh concept name $X_{g}$. The new algorithm still uses the same interpolation calculation rules but instead of directly assigning an interpolant to every node $g$ with $g$.status $=$ unsat, we construct an acyclic terminology $\mathcal{T}^{\prime}$ over $\operatorname{sig}\left(D_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{1}^{\prime}\right) \cap \operatorname{sig}\left(D_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}^{\prime}\right)$, where the acyclic terminology makes use of
the new concept names $X_{g}$, and such that the unfolding of the succinct-concept $\left\langle X_{g}, \mathcal{T}^{\prime}\right\rangle$ is an interpolant for $g$.content whenever $g$.status = unsat. The set $\mathcal{T}^{\prime}$ is initialized as an empty set, and throughout the computation of the algorithm, $\mathcal{T}^{\prime}$ is extended in the natural way. For instance, suppose $\mathrm{C}_{\sqcup}^{1}$ is applied to $g$. Then $\mathrm{C}_{\sqcup}^{1}$ adds to $\mathcal{T}^{\prime}$ the CDA $X_{g} \equiv X_{g_{1}} \sqcup X_{g_{2}}$, where $g_{1}$ and $g_{2}$ are the successors of the node $g$ in the tableau. Another example is a clash rule. Suppose $C_{\neg}^{\text {lr }}$ is applied to $g$ for some $\left\{C^{\mathbf{1}},(\neg C)^{\mathbf{r}}\right\} \subseteq g$.content. Then $C_{\neg}^{\text {lr }}$ adds to $\mathcal{T}^{\prime}$ the CDA $X_{g} \equiv C$. By Lemma 3.5 , it follows that $\left|\mathcal{T}^{\prime}\right| \leq 2^{O(m)}$; and by the definition of Algorithm 1, it follows that $\mathcal{T}^{\prime}$ is an acyclic terminology over $\operatorname{sig}\left(D_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{1}^{\prime}\right) \cap \operatorname{sig}\left(D_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}^{\prime}\right)$. Moreover, by $\mathcal{T}_{1}^{\prime} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2}^{\prime} \models D_{1} \sqsubseteq D_{2}$, there is some $X_{g_{0}} \equiv C \in \mathcal{T}^{\prime}$. Then $\left\langle X_{g_{0}}, \mathcal{T}^{\prime}\right\rangle$ is a succinct-concept over $\operatorname{sig}\left(D_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{1}^{\prime}\right) \cap \operatorname{sig}\left(D_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}^{\prime}\right)$ and its unfolding can easily be shown to be an interpolant of $D_{1}$ and $D_{2}$ under $\mathcal{T}_{1}^{\prime} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2}^{\prime}$.

In a way similar to the proof of Theorem 3.22 , i.e., by replacing back the newly introduced role names for inverse and transitive roles in $\mathcal{T}^{\prime}$ with the originals, we obtain a new terminology $\mathcal{T}^{\prime \prime}$. Then the unfolding of $\left\langle X_{g_{0}}, \mathcal{T}^{\prime \prime}\right\rangle$ is guaranteed to be an interpolant of $C_{1}$ and $C_{2}$ under $\left\langle\mathcal{T}_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right\rangle$. Moreover, $\left\langle X_{g_{0}}, \mathcal{T}^{\prime \prime}\right\rangle$ is of size single exponential in $m$.

For the rest of the section, our purpose is to obtain an equivalent first-order formula from a given succinct-concept in polynomial time. We will make use of the standard translation (see Definition 2.2). In the following, we will not distinguish between DL interpretations and first-order structures (we choose the unary and binary predicates of our first-order language to be the symbols in $N_{C}$ and $N_{R}$, respectively).

Step 2: Singly-exponential FO interpolants for interpretations with two elements For a first-order formula $\varphi(x)$ and an interpretation $\mathcal{I}=\left\langle\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}, .^{\mathcal{I}}\right\rangle$ with $s \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$, we write $\mathcal{I}$, $s \models \varphi(x)$ if and only if there is some first-order assignment $\alpha$ such that $\alpha(x)=s$ and $\mathcal{I}, \alpha \models \varphi(x)$. By $\models \geq 2$, we denote the restriction of the relation $\vDash$ that only considers interpretations $\mathcal{I}=\left\langle\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}, \cdot \mathcal{I}\right\rangle$ where $\left|\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}\right| \geq 2$. Similarly, by $\models_{=1}$, we denote the restriction of the relation $\vDash$ that only considers interpretations $\mathcal{I}=\left\langle\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}, \cdot^{\mathcal{I}}\right\rangle$ where $\left|\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}\right|=1$.

The proof of the following theorem is inspired by a result of Avigad (2003), which states that, over structures with at least two elements, one can efficiently eliminate acyclic definitions from proofs. Theorem 3.27 can be viewed as an adaptation of this result to the first-order translation of succinct-concepts in description logic.

Theorem 3.27. Given a succinct-SHIF-concept $\langle B, \mathcal{T}\rangle$ over a signature $\Sigma$, we can construct in polynomial time a first-order formula $\psi(x)$ over $\Sigma$, such that $\models \geq 2 \psi(x) \leftrightarrow \pi_{x}(C)$, where $C$ is the unfolding of $\langle B, \mathcal{T}\rangle$.

Our proof of Theorem 3.27 will be based on a lemma that we state next. For expository reasons, it is more convenient to state the lemma in terms of structures with constant symbols. These constant symbols are not needed for Theorem 3.27. They are only used to make the statement and proof of the following lemma more readable.

Lemma 3.28. Given an acyclic terminology $\mathcal{T}=\left\{A_{1} \equiv C_{1}, \ldots, A_{n} \equiv C_{n}\right\}$ in $\mathcal{S H} \mathcal{I F}$, we can construct in polynomial time a first-order formula $\varphi_{\mathcal{T}}\left(x, y_{1}, \ldots, y_{n}, z\right)$ with additional constant symbols $\mathbf{0}$ and $\mathbf{1}$, such that, for all interpretations $\mathcal{I}$ satisfying $\mathbf{0}^{\mathcal{I}} \neq \mathbf{1}^{\mathcal{I}}$, and for all elements $a, \vec{b}, c \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$ (where $\vec{b}=b_{1}, \ldots, b_{n}$ ),

$$
\mathcal{I} \models \varphi_{\mathcal{T}}[a, \vec{b}, c] \text { if and only if } \vec{b}=\underline{k} \text { for some } k \in\{1, \ldots, n\}, \text { and } c= \begin{cases}\mathbf{1}^{\mathcal{I}} & \text { if } a \in C_{k}^{\mathcal{I}} \\ \mathbf{0}^{\mathcal{I}} & \text { otherwise }\end{cases}
$$

where $\underline{k}=\underbrace{0^{\mathcal{I}} \cdots 0^{\mathcal{I}}}_{k-1 \text { times }} \mathbf{1}^{\mathcal{I}} \underbrace{0^{\mathcal{I}} \cdots 0^{\mathcal{I}}}_{n-k \text { times }}$ and $C_{k}$ is the unfolding of the succinct-concept $\left\langle A_{k}, \mathcal{T}\right\rangle$.
Proof. We define $\varphi_{\mathcal{T}}$ by induction on the number $n$ of CDAs in $\mathcal{T}$. If $n=1$, then we can simply define $\varphi_{\mathcal{T}}(x, y, z)$ as

$$
\varphi_{\mathcal{T}}(x, y, z)=(y=\mathbf{1}) \wedge\left(\left(\pi_{x}\left(C_{1}\right) \wedge z=\mathbf{1}\right) \vee\left(\neg \pi_{x}\left(C_{1}\right) \wedge z=\mathbf{0}\right)\right)
$$

Now, let $n>1$ and let $\mathcal{T}^{\prime}$ be obtained from $\mathcal{T}$ by removing the last CDA. In other words, let $\mathcal{T}=\mathcal{T}^{\prime} \cup\left\{A_{n} \equiv C_{n}\right\}$. By induction hypothesis, there is a formula $\varphi_{\mathcal{T}^{\prime}}(u, \vec{v}, w)$ satisfying the required conditions w.r.t. $\mathcal{T}^{\prime}$ (where $\vec{v}=v_{1}, \ldots, v_{n-1}$ ). We can distinguish the following cases:

1. $C_{n}$ is an atomic concept or functionality restriction over the signature $\Sigma$. In this case, we can define $\varphi_{\mathcal{T}}$ as follows, where $\vec{y}=y_{1} \ldots y_{n}$ and $\vec{v}=v_{1} \ldots v_{n-1}$.

$$
\begin{aligned}
\varphi_{\mathcal{T}}(x, \vec{y}, z)= & \exists u, \vec{v}, w\left(\varphi_{\mathcal{T}^{\prime}}(u, \vec{v}, w) \wedge x=u \wedge \vec{y}=\vec{v} \mathbf{0} \wedge z=w\right) \vee \\
& \left.\left(\vec{y}=\mathbf{0} \cdots \mathbf{0 1} \wedge\left(\left(\pi_{x}\left(C_{n}\right) \wedge z=\mathbf{1}\right) \vee\left(\neg \pi_{x}\left(C_{n}\right) \wedge z=\mathbf{0}\right)\right)\right)\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

Here, $\vec{y}=\vec{v} \mathbf{0}$ is a shorthand for the formula $\bigwedge_{i<n} y_{i}=v_{i} \wedge y_{n}=\mathbf{0}$, and, similarly, $\vec{y}=\mathbf{0} \cdots \mathbf{0 1}$ is shorthand for the formula $\bigwedge_{i<n} y_{i}=\mathbf{0} \wedge y_{n}=\mathbf{1}$.
2. $C_{n}$ is of the form $\neg A_{i}$ with $i<n$. In this case, we can define $\varphi_{\mathcal{T}}$ as follows:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\varphi_{\mathcal{T}}(x, \vec{y}, z)= & \exists u, \vec{v}, w\left(\varphi_{\mathcal{T}^{\prime}}(u, \vec{v}, w) \wedge\right. \\
& ((x=u \wedge \vec{y}=\vec{v} \mathbf{0} \wedge z=w) \vee \\
& (\vec{y}=\mathbf{0} \cdots \mathbf{0 1} \wedge u=x \wedge \vec{v}=\underline{i} \wedge((w=\mathbf{1} \wedge z=\mathbf{0}) \vee(w=\mathbf{0} \wedge z=\mathbf{1})))))
\end{aligned}
$$

Here, the same notation conventions apply as in the previous item. In addition, $\vec{v}=\underline{i}$ is used as a shorthand for the formula $v_{i}=\mathbf{1} \wedge \bigwedge_{j \neq i} v_{j}=\mathbf{0}$. The notations will also be used in the following items.
3. $C_{n}$ is of the form $A_{i} \sqcap A_{j}$ with $i, j<n$. As a first attempt, define $\varphi_{\mathcal{T}}(x, \vec{y}, z)$ as follows:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\varphi_{\mathcal{T}}(x, \vec{y}, z)= & \exists u, \vec{v}, w \exists u^{\prime}, \vec{v}^{\prime}, w^{\prime}\left(\varphi_{\mathcal{T}^{\prime}}(u, \vec{v}, w) \wedge \varphi_{\mathcal{T}^{\prime}}\left(u^{\prime}, \vec{v}^{\prime}, w^{\prime}\right) \wedge\right. \\
& ((x=u \wedge \vec{y}=\vec{v} \mathbf{0} \wedge=w) \vee \\
& \left(\vec{y}=\mathbf{0} \cdots \mathbf{0 1} \wedge u=u^{\prime}=x \wedge \vec{v}=\underline{i} \wedge \vec{v}^{\prime}=\underline{j} \wedge\right. \\
& \left.\left.\left.\left(w=w^{\prime}=z=\mathbf{1} \vee\left(\left(w=\mathbf{0} \vee w^{\prime}=\mathbf{0}\right) \wedge z=\mathbf{0}\right)\right)\right)\right)\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

This works, except for the fact that $\varphi_{\mathcal{T}^{\prime}}$ occurs twice in the formula, which may result in an exponential blowup. We solve this problem by replacing the conjunction $\varphi_{\mathcal{T}^{\prime}}(u, \vec{v}, w) \wedge \varphi_{\mathcal{T}^{\prime}}\left(u^{\prime}, \vec{v}^{\prime}, w^{\prime}\right)$ by
$\forall u^{\prime \prime}, \vec{v}^{\prime \prime}, w^{\prime \prime}\left(\left(u^{\prime \prime}=u \wedge \vec{v}^{\prime \prime}=v \wedge w^{\prime \prime}=w\right) \vee\left(u^{\prime \prime}=u^{\prime} \wedge \vec{v}^{\prime \prime}=v^{\prime} \wedge w^{\prime \prime}=w^{\prime}\right) \rightarrow \varphi_{\mathcal{T}^{\prime}}\left(u^{\prime \prime}, \vec{v}^{\prime \prime}, w^{\prime \prime}\right)\right)$
4. $C_{n}$ is of the form $\exists P . A_{i}$ with $i<n$. This is the most difficult case. The following formula expresses the required property:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \varphi_{\mathcal{T}}(x, \vec{y}, z)= \exists u, \vec{v}, w\left(\varphi_{\mathcal{T}^{\prime}}(u, \vec{v}, w) \wedge\right. \\
&((x=u \wedge \vec{y}=\vec{v} \mathbf{0} \wedge z=w) \vee \\
&(\vec{y}=\mathbf{0} \cdots \mathbf{0 1} \wedge z=\mathbf{1} \wedge P x u \wedge \vec{v}=\underline{i} \wedge w=\mathbf{1}) \vee \\
&(\vec{y}=\mathbf{0} \cdots \mathbf{0 1} \wedge z=\mathbf{0} \wedge \\
&\left.\left.\left.\forall u^{\prime}, \vec{v}^{\prime}, w^{\prime}\left(\varphi_{\mathcal{T}^{\prime}}\left(u^{\prime}, \vec{v}^{\prime}, w^{\prime}\right) \wedge P x u^{\prime} \wedge \vec{v}^{\prime}=\underline{i} \rightarrow w^{\prime}=\mathbf{0}\right)\right)\right)\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

However, as before, this formula still has the problem that it contains two copies of $\varphi_{\mathcal{T}^{\prime}}$. We fix this in two steps. First, we bring the universal quantifiers to the front, and transform the above formula into the following equivalent formula:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \exists u, \vec{v}, w \forall u^{\prime}, \vec{v}^{\prime}, w^{\prime}\left(\varphi_{\mathcal{T}^{\prime}}(u, \vec{v}, w) \wedge \varphi_{\mathcal{T}^{\prime}}\left(u^{\prime}, \vec{v}^{\prime}, w^{\prime}\right) \rightarrow\right. \\
& ((x=u \wedge \vec{y}=\vec{v} \wedge \wedge z=w) \vee \\
& (\vec{y}=\mathbf{0} \cdots \mathbf{0 1} \wedge z=\mathbf{1} \wedge P x u \wedge \vec{v}=\underline{i} \wedge w=\mathbf{1}) \vee \\
& \left.\left.\left(\vec{y}=\mathbf{0} \cdots \mathbf{0 1} \wedge z=\mathbf{0} \wedge\left(P x u^{\prime} \wedge \vec{v}^{\prime}=\underline{i} \rightarrow w^{\prime}=\mathbf{0}\right)\right)\right)\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

Finally, as before, we replace the conjunction $\varphi_{\mathcal{T}^{\prime}}(u, \vec{v}, w) \wedge \varphi_{\mathcal{T}^{\prime}}\left(u^{\prime}, \vec{v}^{\prime \prime}, w^{\prime}\right)$ by
$\forall u^{\prime \prime}, \vec{v}^{\prime \prime}, w^{\prime \prime}\left(\left(u^{\prime \prime}=u \wedge \vec{v}^{\prime \prime}=v \wedge w^{\prime \prime}=w\right) \vee\left(u^{\prime \prime}=u^{\prime} \wedge \vec{v}^{\prime \prime}=v^{\prime} \wedge w^{\prime \prime}=w^{\prime}\right) \rightarrow \varphi_{\mathcal{T}^{\prime}}\left(u^{\prime \prime}, \vec{v}^{\prime \prime}, w^{\prime \prime}\right)\right)$
5. $C_{n}$ is of the form $\exists P^{-} . A_{i}$ with $i<n$. This case is handled like the previous one.

Note that, in general, $C_{n}$ could be a complex concept in which various $A_{i}$ with $i<n$ occur. However, such complex CDAs can always be decomposed into multiple simpler CDAs of the above kinds, at the cost of a polynomial increase in the size of the terminology.

It is clear from the construction that the formula $\varphi_{\mathcal{T}}$ obtained as above satisfies the conditions stated in the lemma. That $\varphi_{\mathcal{T}}$ is obtained from $\mathcal{T}$ in polynomial-time follows from the fact that, in the above inductive definition of $\varphi_{\mathcal{T}}$, the previously constructed formula $\varphi_{\mathcal{T}^{\prime}}$ occurs only once.

We are now ready for the proof of Theorem 3.27 .
Proof of Theorem 3.27. Let a succinct-concept $\left\langle A_{i}, \mathcal{T}\right\rangle$ be given, where $\mathcal{T}=\left\{A_{1} \equiv C_{1}, \ldots\right.$, $\left.A_{n} \equiv C_{n}\right\}$. Let $\varphi(x)=\varphi_{\mathcal{T}}(x, \underline{i}, \mathbf{1})$ and let $\psi(x)=\exists u, v\left(u \neq v \wedge \varphi^{\prime}(x)\right)$, where $\varphi^{\prime}(x)$ is obtained from $\varphi(x)$ by replacing $\mathbf{0}$ and $\mathbf{1}$ by $u$ and $v$, respectively. Then we have that, for every interpretation $\mathcal{I}$ with a domain of at least two elements, and for every $a \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$, the following conditions are all equivalent:

1. $\mathcal{I}, a \mid=\psi(x)$
2. $\mathcal{I}^{\prime}, a \models \varphi(x)$, for some interpretation $\mathcal{I}^{\prime}$ that extends $\mathcal{I}$ by mapping the constant symbols $\mathbf{0}$ and $\mathbf{1}$ to distinct elements of $\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$.
3. $\mathcal{I}^{\prime}, a \vDash C$, where $C$ is the unfolding of $\left\langle A_{i}, \mathcal{T}\right\rangle$.
4. $\mathcal{I}, a \mid=C$, where $C$ is the unfolding of $\left\langle A_{i}, \mathcal{T}\right\rangle$.

The equivalence of 1 and 2 is immediate from the construction of $\psi$. The equivalence of 2 and 3 follows from Lemma 3.28. The equivalence of 3 and 4 is immediate, since $\mathbf{0}$ and $\mathbf{1}$ do not occur in $C$. This concludes the proof.

Definition 3.29. Let $C, D$ be $\mathscr{L}$-concepts and let $\mathcal{T}_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{2}$ be $\mathscr{L}$-TBoxes such that $\mathcal{T}_{1} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2} \models$ $C \sqsubseteq D$. A first-order formula $\varphi(x)$ is called a FO interpolant of $C$ and $D$ under $\left\langle\mathcal{T}_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right\rangle$ if the following conditions hold:

- $\operatorname{sig}(\varphi(x)) \subseteq \operatorname{sig}\left(C, \mathcal{T}_{1}\right) \cap \operatorname{sig}\left(D, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right)$,
- $\pi\left(\mathcal{T}_{1}\right) \cup \pi\left(\mathcal{T}_{2}\right) \models \forall x . \pi_{x}(C) \rightarrow \varphi(x)$, and
- $\pi\left(\mathcal{T}_{1}\right) \cup \pi\left(\mathcal{T}_{2}\right) \models \forall x . \varphi(x) \rightarrow \pi_{x}(D)$.
$F O \models \geq 2$-interpolant and $F O \models_{=1}$-interpolant are defined in the same way as above, except that we replace all occurrences of $\models b y \models_{\geq 2}$ and $\models_{=1}$, respectively.
Proposition 3.30. Let $\mathscr{L}$ be $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}$ or any of its extensions with constructors from $\{\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{I}, \mathcal{F}\}$. For all $\mathscr{L}$-concepts $C_{1}, C_{2}$ and all $\mathscr{L}$-TBoxes $\mathcal{T}_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{2}$, if $\mathcal{T}_{1} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2} \models C_{1} \sqsubseteq C_{2}$, then there exists a $F O \models \geq 2$-interpolant of $C_{1}$ and $C_{2}$ under $\left\langle\mathcal{T}_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right\rangle$ that can be computed in time single exponential in $\left|\mathcal{T}_{1}\right|+\left|\mathcal{T}_{2}\right|+\left|C_{1}\right|+\left|C_{2}\right|$.
Proof. Suppose $\mathcal{T}_{1} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2} \models C_{1} \sqsubseteq C_{2}$. By Theorem 3.26, there is some succinct-concept $\langle A, \mathcal{T}\rangle$ over $\operatorname{sig}\left(C_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{1}\right) \cap \operatorname{sig}\left(C_{2}, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right)$ such that the unfolding $I$ of $\langle A, \mathcal{T}\rangle$ is an interpolant of $C_{1}$ and $C_{2}$ under $\left\langle\mathcal{T}_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right\rangle$, and $\langle A, \mathcal{T}\rangle$ can be computed in time single exponential in $\left|\mathcal{T}_{1}\right|+\left|\mathcal{T}_{2}\right|+\left|C_{1}\right|+\left|C_{2}\right|$. Then by Theorem 3.27 , there is some first-order formula $\varphi(x)$ that can be constructed in time polynomial in $|\mathcal{T}|$ (hence single exponential in $\left|\mathcal{T}_{1}\right|+\left|\mathcal{T}_{2}\right|+\left|C_{1}\right|+\left|C_{2}\right|$ ) such that
- $\operatorname{sig}(\varphi(x)) \subseteq \operatorname{sig}(I)$,
- $\models \geq 2 \varphi(x) \leftrightarrow \pi_{x}(I)$.

It follows that $\varphi(x)$ is a $\mathrm{FO} \models \geq 2$-interpolant of $C_{1}$ and $C_{2}$ under $\left\langle\mathcal{T}_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right\rangle$ whose size is single exponential in $\left|\mathcal{T}_{1}\right|+\left|\mathcal{T}_{2}\right|+\left|C_{1}\right|+\left|C_{2}\right|$.

Step 3: Singly-exponential FO interpolants for interpretations with one element We still have to obtain interpolants over structures with only one element. We will show how to do this in Proposition 3.35. The essential idea is that interpolants over structures with singleton domains are not much different from propositional interpolants. First, we give a reduction from concept subsumption w.r.t. TBoxes over interpretations with singleton domains to entailment in propositional logic.
Definition 3.31. Let $C$ be a $\mathcal{S H} \mathcal{H} \mathcal{F}$-concept. Then the mapping $\tau_{\mathrm{PL}}(C)$ is defined inductively as follows.

$$
\begin{aligned}
\tau_{\mathrm{PL}}(\top) & =\top \\
\tau_{\mathrm{PL}}(A) & =A \\
\tau_{\mathrm{PL}}(\neg C) & =\neg \tau_{\mathrm{PL}}(C), \\
\tau_{\mathrm{PL}}(C \sqcap D) & =\tau_{\mathrm{PL}}(C) \sqcap \tau_{\mathrm{PL}}(D), \\
\tau_{\mathrm{PL}}(\exists R . C) & =A_{R} \sqcap \tau_{\mathrm{PL}}(C), \\
\tau_{\mathrm{PL}}(\leq 1 R) & =\top
\end{aligned}
$$

where $A_{P}=A_{P^{-}}$is a fresh concept name for every role name $P \in N_{R}$. For a SHIF-TBox $\mathcal{T}$, we define

$$
\tau_{\mathrm{PL}}(\mathcal{T})=\left\{\tau_{\mathrm{PL}}(C) \sqsubseteq \tau_{\mathrm{PL}}(D) \mid C \sqsubseteq D \in \mathcal{T}\right\} \cup\left\{A_{R} \sqsubseteq A_{S} \mid R \sqsubseteq S \in \mathcal{T}\right\} .
$$

Here, the concept name $A_{P}$, intuitively, expresses the non-emptiness of the role $P$. Note that all transitive roles are ignored in the above translation, as their semantics is trivially satisfied in interpretations whose domain is a singleton set. For a $\mathcal{S H} \mathcal{I F}$-concept $C, \tau_{\mathrm{PL}}(C)$ is an $\mathcal{A L C}$-concept without role constructors. We view $\tau_{\mathrm{PL}}(C)$ as a propositional formula (where the concept names are the propositions, and we identify $\sqcap$ and $\sqcup$ with the propositional connectives $\wedge$ and $\vee$, respectively). Similarly, for a $\mathcal{S H} \mathcal{H} \mathcal{F}$-TBox $\mathcal{T}, \tau_{\mathrm{PL}}(\mathcal{T})$ is a set of $\mathcal{A L C}$ CIAs without role constructors, which we view as a set of propositional formulae.

Proposition 3.32. Let $\mathcal{T}$ be a $\mathcal{S H I F}$-TBox and let $C, D$ be $\mathcal{S H I F}$-concepts. Then

$$
\mathcal{T} \models_{=1} C \sqsubseteq D \quad \text { if and only if } \quad \tau_{\mathrm{PL}}(\mathcal{T}) \models \tau_{\mathrm{PL}}(C) \sqsubseteq \tau_{\mathrm{PL}}(D) .
$$

Proof. $(\Rightarrow)$ Let $\mathcal{T} \models_{=1} C \sqsubseteq D$, and suppose $\mathcal{I} \models \tau_{\mathrm{PL}}(\mathcal{T})$, and $s \in \tau_{\mathrm{PL}}(C)^{\mathcal{I}}$. We need to show that $s \in \tau_{\mathrm{PL}}(D)^{\mathcal{I}}$. Let $\mathcal{J}$ be obtained by restricting the domain of $\mathcal{I}$ to the element $s$ and "reading off" the interpretation of each role name $P$ from the concept name $A_{P}$. Formally,

- $\Delta^{\mathcal{J}}=\{s\} ;$
- for all $A \in N_{C}, s \in A^{\mathcal{J}}$ iff $s \in A^{\mathcal{I}}$;
- for all $P \in N_{R}, P^{\mathcal{J}}=\{\langle s, s\rangle\}$ if $s \in A_{P}^{\mathcal{I}}$, and $P^{\mathcal{J}}=\emptyset$, otherwise.

By the definition above, it trivially follows for every $P \in N_{R^{+}}$that $P^{\mathcal{J}}$ is transitive. Moreover, for every role $R$, we have

$$
\begin{equation*}
\langle s, s\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{J}} \text { if and only if } s \in A_{R}^{\mathcal{I}} . \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

To see this, suppose first $\langle s, s\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{J}}$. If $R=P$ for some $P \in N_{R}$, then $s \in A_{P}^{\mathcal{I}}$, i.e., $s \in A_{R}^{\mathcal{I}}$; and if $R=P^{-}$for some $P \in N_{R}$, then again $s \in A_{P}^{\mathcal{I}}$ and by the fact that $A_{P}=A_{P-}$ (see Definition 3.31), we obtain $s \in A_{R}^{\mathcal{I}}$. Hence $s \in A_{R}^{\mathcal{I}}$. For the other direction, suppose $s \in A_{R}^{\mathcal{I}}$. If $R=P$ for some $P \in N_{R}$, then $\langle s, s\rangle \in P^{\mathcal{J}}$, i.e., $\langle s, s\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{J}}$; and if $R=P^{-}$for some $P \in N_{R}$, then by the fact that $A_{P}=A_{P^{-}}$, we have $\langle s, s\rangle \in P^{\mathcal{J}}$ and thus, $\langle s, s\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{J}}$. Hence (1) follows.

Claim 3.33. For every $\mathcal{S H} \mathcal{I F}$-concept $C^{\prime}$, we have $s \in \tau_{\mathrm{PL}}\left(C^{\prime}\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$ if and only if $s \in\left(C^{\prime}\right)^{\mathcal{J}}$.
Proof of claim. The proof is by induction on the structure of $C^{\prime}$. The base case, where $C^{\prime}=A$ or $C^{\prime}=\top$, is trivial, and the boolean cases follow immediately by the inductive hypothesis. For $C^{\prime}=\exists R . D^{\prime}$, we have the following equivalences:

- $s \in \tau_{\mathrm{PL}}\left(C^{\prime}\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$;
- $s \in A_{R}^{\mathcal{I}}$ and $s \in \tau_{\mathrm{PL}}\left(D^{\prime}\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$ (by semantics);
- $\langle s, s\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{J}}$ and $s \in\left(D^{\prime}\right)^{\mathcal{J}}$ (by (1) and the inductive hypothesis);
- $s \in\left(C^{\prime}\right)^{\mathcal{J}}$ (by semantics).

Finally, for $C^{\prime}=\leq 1 R$, since $\tau_{\mathrm{PL}}\left(C^{\prime}\right)=\top$ and $s \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$, we have $s \in \tau_{\mathrm{PL}}\left(C^{\prime}\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$. Moreover, by the definition of $\mathcal{J}$, we have $s \in\left(C^{\prime}\right)^{\mathcal{J}}$. But then $s \in \tau_{\mathrm{PL}}\left(C^{\prime}\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$ iff $s \in\left(C^{\prime}\right)^{\mathcal{J}}$, which is what we wanted to show.

We now show that $\mathcal{J} \vDash \mathcal{T}$, i.e., $\mathcal{J}$ satisfies every CIA and RIA in $\mathcal{T}$. That $\mathcal{J}$ satisfies every CIA in $\mathcal{T}$ is a direct consequence of the previous claim; so we proceed with the case for RIAs. Let $R \sqsubseteq S \in \mathcal{T}$ and $\langle s, t\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{J}}$. By the definition of $\mathcal{J}$, we have $s=t$. Hence w.l.o.g. suppose that $\langle s, s\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{J}}$. Then by $(1), s \in A_{R}^{\mathcal{I}}$. Since $A_{R} \sqsubseteq A_{S} \in \tau_{\mathrm{PL}}(\mathcal{T})$ and $\mathcal{I} \models \tau_{\mathrm{PL}}(\mathcal{T})$, we then have $s \in A_{S}^{\mathcal{I}}$. By (11) again, this implies $\langle s, s\rangle \in S^{\mathcal{J}}$. Hence $\mathcal{J}$ satisfies $R \sqsubseteq S$.

Now we proceed towards our goal $s \in \tau_{\mathrm{PL}}(D)^{\mathcal{I}}$ as follows. By $\mathcal{I} \models \tau_{\mathrm{PL}}(\mathcal{T}), s \in \tau_{\mathrm{PL}}(C)^{\mathcal{I}}$, and the previous claim, we obtain $s \in C^{\mathcal{J}}$. Since $\mathcal{J} \models \mathcal{T}$, it follows by $\mathcal{T} \models C \sqsubseteq D$ that $s \in D^{\mathcal{J}}$. Then using the previous claim, we conclude that $s \in \tau_{\mathrm{PL}}(D)^{\mathcal{I}}$.
$(\Leftarrow)$ Let $\tau_{\mathrm{PL}}(\mathcal{T}) \models \tau_{\mathrm{PL}}(C) \sqsubseteq \tau_{\mathrm{PL}}(D)$, and suppose $\mathcal{I} \models \mathcal{T}$, and $s \in C^{\mathcal{I}}$, where $\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}=\{s\}$. We need to show that $s \in D^{\mathcal{I}}$. Define the interpretation $\mathcal{J}$ as follows:

- $\Delta^{\mathcal{J}}=\{s\} ;$
- for all $A \in N_{C}, A^{\mathcal{J}}=A^{\mathcal{I}}$
- for all $P \in N_{R},\left(A_{P}\right)^{\mathcal{J}}=\{s\}$ if $P^{\mathcal{I}}=\{\langle s, s\rangle\}$, and $\left(A_{P}\right)^{\mathcal{J}}=\emptyset$ otherwise

We first show for every role $R$ that

$$
\begin{equation*}
s \in A_{R}^{\mathcal{J}} \text { if and only if }\langle s, s\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{I}} . \tag{2}
\end{equation*}
$$

For left-to-right, suppose $s \in A_{R}^{\mathcal{J}}$. If $R=P$ for some $P \in N_{R}$, then $\langle s, s\rangle \in P^{\mathcal{I}}$, i.e., $\langle s, s\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{I}}$; and if $R=P^{-}$for some $P \in N_{R}$, then by the fact that $A_{P}=A_{P^{-}}$, we have $s \in A_{P}^{\mathcal{J}}$, which implies $\langle s, s\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{I}}$. Hence $\langle s, s\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{I}}$. For the other direction, suppose $\langle s, s\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{I}}$. If $R=P$ for some $P \in N_{R}$, then $s \in A_{P}^{\mathcal{J}}$, i.e., $s \in A_{R}^{\mathcal{J}}$; and if $R=P^{-}$for some $P \in N_{R}$, then $\langle s, s\rangle \in P^{\mathcal{I}}$, which implies by $A_{P}=A_{P^{-}}$that $s \in A_{R}^{\mathcal{J}}$. Hence (2) follows.
Claim 3.34. For every $\mathcal{S H} \mathcal{I F}$-concept $C^{\prime}$, we have $s \in\left(C^{\prime}\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$ if and only if $s \in \tau_{\mathrm{PL}}\left(C^{\prime}\right)^{\mathcal{J}}$.
Proof of claim. The proof is by induction on the structure of $C^{\prime}$. The base case, where $C^{\prime}=A$ or $C^{\prime}=\top$, is trivial, and the boolean cases follow immediately by the inductive hypothesis. For $C^{\prime}=\exists R . D^{\prime}$, we have the following equivalences

- $s \in\left(C^{\prime}\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$;
- $\langle s, s\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{I}}$ and $s \in\left(D^{\prime}\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$ (by semantics and $\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}=\{s\}$ );
- $s \in A_{R}^{\mathcal{J}}$ and $s \in \tau_{\mathrm{PL}}\left(D^{\prime}\right)^{\mathcal{J}}$ (by $\sqrt[2]{ }$ ) and the inductive hypothesis).
- $s \in \tau_{\mathrm{PL}}\left(C^{\prime}\right)^{\mathcal{J}}$ (by semantics).

Finally, for $C^{\prime}=\leq 1 R$, since $\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}=\{s\}$, we have $\mathcal{I} \models \top \sqsubseteq \leq 1 R$, and thus, $s \in\left(C^{\prime}\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$. Moreover, by $\tau_{\mathrm{PL}}\left(C^{\prime}\right)=\top$, we have $s \in \tau_{\mathrm{PL}}\left(C^{\prime}\right)^{\mathcal{J}}$. But then $s \in\left(C^{\prime}\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$ iff $s \in \tau_{\mathrm{PL}}\left(C^{\prime}\right)^{\mathcal{J}}$.

We now show that $\mathcal{J} \models \tau_{\mathrm{PL}}(\mathcal{T})$. By definition, every CIA in $\tau_{\mathrm{PL}}(\mathcal{T})$ is of the form (i) $\tau_{\mathrm{PL}}\left(C^{\prime}\right) \sqsubseteq \tau_{\mathrm{PL}}\left(D^{\prime}\right)$, where $C^{\prime} \sqsubseteq D^{\prime} \in \mathcal{T}$; or of the form (ii) $A_{R} \sqsubseteq A_{S}$, where $R \sqsubseteq S \in \mathcal{T}$. That $\mathcal{J}$ satisfies CIAs of the form (i) is a direct consequence of the previous claim; so we focus on CIAs of the form (ii). Let $A_{R} \sqsubseteq A_{S} \in \tau_{\mathrm{PL}}(\mathcal{T})$ and $s \in A_{R}^{\mathcal{J}}$. Then by (2), $\langle s, s\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{I}}$. Since $\mathcal{I} \vDash \mathcal{T}$ and $R \sqsubseteq S \in \mathcal{T}$, we then have $\langle s, s\rangle \in S^{\mathcal{I}}$. Then by (22) again, $s \in A_{S}^{\mathcal{J}}$. Hence $\mathcal{J}$ satisfies $A_{R} \sqsubseteq A_{S}$.

Now we proceed towards our goal $s \in D^{\mathcal{I}}$ as follows. By $s \in C^{\mathcal{I}}$ and the previous claim, we have $s \in \tau_{\mathrm{PL}}(C)^{\mathcal{J}}$. Then by $\mathcal{J} \models \tau_{\mathrm{PL}}(\mathcal{T})$ and $\tau_{\mathrm{PL}}(\mathcal{T}) \models \tau_{\mathrm{PL}}(C) \sqsubseteq \tau_{\mathrm{PL}}(D)$, we obtain $s \in \tau_{\mathrm{PL}}(D)^{\mathcal{J}}$. Using the previous claim again, we conclude that $s \in D^{\overline{\mathcal{I}}}$.

Proposition 3.35. Let $\mathscr{L}$ be $\mathcal{A L C}$ or any of its extensions with constructors from $\{\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{I}, \mathcal{F}\}$. For all $\mathscr{L}$-concepts $C_{1}, C_{2}$ and all $\mathscr{L}$-TBoxes $\mathcal{T}_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{2}$, if $\mathcal{T}_{1} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2} \models C_{1} \sqsubseteq C_{2}$, then there exists a $F O==1$-interpolant of $C_{1}$ and $C_{2}$ under $\left\langle\mathcal{T}_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right\rangle$ that can be computed in time single exponential in $\left|\mathcal{T}_{1}\right|+\left|\mathcal{T}_{2}\right|+\left|C_{1}\right|+\left|C_{2}\right|$.

Proof. Let $\mathscr{L}$ be one of the DLs mentioned in the theorem and let $C_{1}, C_{2}$ be $\mathscr{L}$-concepts and let $\mathcal{T}_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{2}$ be $\mathscr{L}$-TBoxes such that $\mathcal{T}_{1} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2} \models C_{1} \sqsubseteq C_{2}$. Then it immediately follows that $\mathcal{T}_{1} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2}=_{=1} C_{1} \sqsubseteq C_{2}$. By Proposition $3.32, \mathcal{T}_{1} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2} \models_{=1} C_{1} \sqsubseteq C_{2}$ implies $\tau_{\mathrm{PL}}\left(\mathcal{T}_{1}\right) \cup$ $\tau_{\mathrm{PL}}\left(\mathcal{T}_{2}\right) \models \tau_{\mathrm{PL}}\left(C_{1}\right) \sqsubseteq \tau_{\mathrm{PL}}\left(C_{2}\right)$. Now by Theorem 3.10, there is some interpolant $I$ of $\tau_{\mathrm{PL}}\left(C_{1}\right)$ and $\tau_{\mathrm{PL}}\left(C_{2}\right)$ under $\left\langle\tau_{\mathrm{PL}}\left(\mathcal{T}_{1}\right), \tau_{\mathrm{PL}}\left(\mathcal{T}_{2}\right)\right\rangle$ that can be computed in time double exponential in $\left|\mathcal{T}_{1}\right|+\left|\mathcal{T}_{2}\right|+\left|C_{1}\right|+\left|C_{2}\right|$. However, in this case we are only dealing with propositional formulae and the tableau algorithm can easily be modified to construct a tree-shaped proof instead of a general graph-shaped one by eliminating the use of proxies. In fact, we have just described a standard tableau algorithm for propositional logic. It is well-known that each node in the tree has a polynomial out-degree in the size of the input and the height of the tree is polynominal in the size of the input. By inspecting the proof of Theorem 3.10, one can easily see that in this case $I$ can be computed in time single exponential in $\left|\mathcal{T}_{1}\right|+\left|\mathcal{T}_{2}\right|+\left|C_{1}\right|+\left|C_{2}\right|$. Finally let $D$ be the concept obtained from $I$ by replacing each occurrence of a concept name $A_{R}$ by $\exists R$. T. We have that $\pi_{x}(D)$ is a $\mathrm{FO} \models=1$-interpolant of $C_{1}$ and $C_{2}$ under $\left\langle\mathcal{T}_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right\rangle$. It is easy to see that the time required to compute $\pi_{x}(D)$ is as stated in the proposition.

Step 4: Putting it all together The result that we were after now follows, by putting the FO $\models_{=1}$-interpolants and the FO $\models \geq 2$-interpolants together:

Theorem 3.36. Let $\mathscr{L}$ be $\mathcal{A L C}$ or any of its extensions with constructors from $\{\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{I}, \mathcal{F}\}$. For all $\mathscr{L}$-concepts $C, D$ and $\mathscr{L}$-TBoxes $\mathcal{T}_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{2}$, if $\mathcal{T}_{1} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2} \models C \sqsubseteq D$, then there exists an FO interpolant $\varphi(x)$ of $C$ and $D$ under $\left\langle\mathcal{T}_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right\rangle$ and $\varphi(x)$ can be computed in time single exponential in $\left|\mathcal{T}_{1}\right|+\left|\mathcal{T}_{2}\right|+|C|+|D|$.

Proof. Let $\mathscr{L}$ be one of the DLs mentioned in the theorem, let $C, D$ be $\mathscr{L}$-concepts, and let $\mathcal{T}_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{2}$ be $\mathscr{L}$-TBoxes such that $\mathcal{T}_{1} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2} \models C \sqsubseteq D$. By Proposition 3.35, there is some FO $\models_{=1}$-interpolant $\psi(x)$ of $C$ and $D$ under $\left\langle\mathcal{T}_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right\rangle$ that can be computed in time single exponential in $\left|\mathcal{T}_{1}\right|+\left|\mathcal{T}_{2}\right|+|C|+|D|$; and by Proposition 3.30, there is some FO $\vDash \geq^{2}$ interpolant $\varphi(x)$ of $C$ and $D$ under $\left\langle\mathcal{T}_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right\rangle$ that can be computed in time single exponential
in $\left|\mathcal{T}_{1}\right|+\left|\mathcal{T}_{2}\right|+|C|+|D|$. Let

$$
\vartheta(x)=(\exists y \exists z(y \neq z) \rightarrow \varphi(x)) \wedge(\forall y \forall z(y=z) \rightarrow \psi(x)) .
$$

Claim 3.37. $\pi\left(\mathcal{T}_{1}\right) \cup \pi\left(\mathcal{T}_{2}\right) \models \forall x . \pi_{x}(C) \rightarrow \vartheta(x) \quad$ and $\quad \pi\left(\mathcal{T}_{1}\right) \cup \pi\left(\mathcal{T}_{2}\right) \models \forall x . \vartheta(x) \rightarrow \pi_{x}(D)$.
Proof of claim. We prove the first part. The proof of the second part is analogous.
Let $\mathcal{I}=\left\langle\Delta^{\mathcal{I}},{ }^{\mathcal{I}}\right\rangle$ be a model of $\mathcal{T}_{1} \cup \mathcal{T}_{2}$, i.e., of $\pi\left(\mathcal{T}_{1}\right) \cup \pi\left(\mathcal{T}_{2}\right)$, and $\alpha$ be a first-order variable assignment with $\mathcal{I}$, $\alpha \models \pi_{x}(C)$. We need to show that $\mathcal{I}, \alpha \models \vartheta(x)$. To this aim, we show $\mathcal{I}, \alpha \models(\exists y \exists z(y \neq z) \rightarrow \varphi(x))$ and $\mathcal{I}, \alpha \models(\forall y \forall z(y=z) \rightarrow \psi(x))$.

First suppose that $\mathcal{I}$, $\alpha \models \exists y \exists z(y \neq z)$. We are done if we prove that $\mathcal{I}, \alpha \models \varphi(x)$. $\mathcal{I}, \alpha \models \exists y \exists z(y \neq z)$ implies $\left|\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}\right| \geq 2$. Then by $\mathcal{I}, \alpha \models \pi_{x}(C)$ and $\pi\left(\mathcal{T}_{1}\right) \cup \pi\left(\mathcal{T}_{2}\right) \models_{\geq 2}$ $\forall x . \pi_{x}(C) \rightarrow \varphi(x)$, we obtain $\mathcal{I}, \alpha \models \varphi(x)$, and we are done.

Now suppose that $\mathcal{I}, \alpha \models \forall y \forall z(y=z)$. We are done if we prove that $\mathcal{I}$, $\alpha \models \psi(x)$. $\mathcal{I}, \alpha \models \forall y \forall z(y=z)$ implies $\left|\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}\right|=1$. Then by $\mathcal{I}, \alpha \models \pi_{x}(C)$ and $\pi\left(\mathcal{T}_{1}\right) \cup \pi\left(\mathcal{T}_{2}\right) \models_{=1}$ $\forall x . \pi_{x}(C) \rightarrow \psi(x)$, we obtain $\mathcal{I}, \alpha \models \psi(x)$, and we are done.

Thus, both of the conjuncts of $\vartheta(x)$ are satisfied by $\mathcal{I}, \alpha$. But then $\mathcal{I}, \alpha \models \vartheta(x)$.
By assumption we have that $\operatorname{sig}(\varphi(x)), \operatorname{sig}(\psi(x)) \subseteq \operatorname{sig}\left(C, \mathcal{T}_{1}\right) \cap \operatorname{sig}\left(D, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right)$. Since the formulas $\exists y \exists z(y \neq z)$ and $\forall y \forall z(y=z)$ do not introduce new predicates, we have that $\operatorname{sig}(\vartheta(x)) \subseteq \operatorname{sig}\left(C, \mathcal{T}_{1}\right) \cap \operatorname{sig}\left(D, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right)$. Therefore, $\vartheta(x)$ is a FO interpolant for $C$ and $D$ under $\left\langle\mathcal{T}_{1}, \mathcal{T}_{2}\right\rangle$. Moreover, since both of its conjuncts can be computed in single exponential time, so can $\vartheta(x)$. Hence the theorem follows.

## 4. Results on Beth Definability

In this section, we present the main technical contributions of the paper. We first introduce the notions of implicit and explicit definability for concepts and define the (projective) Beth definability property, which are in fact the primary notions of interest in this paper. In what follows, $\mathscr{L}$ denotes any of the description logics $\mathcal{A L C} X$ with $X \subseteq\{\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{I}, \mathcal{F}\}$.

Definition 4.1 (Implicit definability). Let $C$ be an $\mathscr{L}$-concept, $\mathcal{T}$ an $\mathscr{L}$-TBox, and $\Sigma \subseteq$ $\operatorname{sig}(C, \mathcal{T})$. $C$ is implicitly definable from $\Sigma$ under $\mathcal{T}$ if, for every two models $\mathcal{I}$ and $\mathcal{J}$ of $\mathcal{T}$ satisfying $\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}=\Delta^{\mathcal{J}}$ and, for all $P \in \Sigma, P^{\mathcal{I}}=P^{\mathcal{J}}$, it holds that $C^{\mathcal{I}}=C^{\mathcal{J}}$.

In other words, given a TBox, a concept $C$ is implicitly definable if the set of all its instances depends only on the extension of the predicates in $\Sigma$ and the domain of discourse. Deciding implicit definability in $\mathscr{L}$ means, given an $\mathscr{L}$-concept $C, \mathscr{L}$-TBox $\mathcal{T}$, and a set of predicates $\Sigma \subseteq \operatorname{sig}(C, \mathcal{T})$, to check whether $C$ is implicitly definable from $\Sigma$ under $\mathcal{T}$. For every predicate $P \in \operatorname{sig}(C, \mathcal{T}) \backslash \Sigma$, introduce a new predicate $P^{\prime}$ which is not in $\operatorname{sig}(C, \mathcal{T})$. Now let $\widetilde{C}$ (respectively, $\widetilde{\mathcal{T}}$ ) be the concept (respectively, TBox) obtained by replacing every occurrence of a predicate $P \notin \Sigma$ in $C$ (respectively, in $\mathcal{T}$ ) by $P^{\prime}$. Lemma 4.2, whose proof is a routine adaptation of an analogous result for first-order logic (Boolos, Burgess, \& Jeffrey, 2007), provides a characterization of implicit definability in terms of entailment. This wellknown characterization is often used as a definition of implicit definability (Hoogland \& Marx, 2002; Conradie, 2002).

Lemma 4.2. Let $C$ be an $\mathscr{L}$-concept, $\mathcal{T}$ be an $\mathscr{L}$-TBox, and $\Sigma \subseteq \operatorname{sig}(C, \mathcal{T})$. Then $C$ is implicitly definable from $\Sigma$ under $\mathcal{T}$ if and only if $\mathcal{T} \cup \widetilde{\mathcal{T}} \models C \equiv \widetilde{C}$.

In particular, Lemma 4.2 reduces implicit definability in $\mathscr{L}$ to the concept subsumption problem in $\mathscr{L}$ w.r.t. TBoxes. It is also possible to reduce the concept subsumption problem in $\mathscr{L}$ w.r.t. TBoxes to the problem of deciding implicit definability in $\mathscr{L}$.

Lemma 4.3. Let $C \sqsubseteq D$ be an $\mathscr{L}$-CIA, $\mathcal{T}$ be an $\mathscr{L}$-TBox, $\Sigma=\operatorname{sig}(C \sqcap D, \mathcal{T})$, and $A_{0} \in N_{C} \backslash \Sigma$. Then $\mathcal{T} \models C \sqsubseteq D$ if and only if $A_{0}$ is implicitly definable from $\Sigma$ under $\mathcal{T} \cup\left\{A_{0} \sqsubseteq C \sqcap \neg D\right\}$.

Proof. $(\Rightarrow)$ Suppose $\mathcal{T} \models C \sqsubseteq D$. Let $\mathcal{I}$ and $\mathcal{J}$ be models of $\mathcal{T} \cup\left\{A_{0} \sqsubseteq C \sqcap \neg D\right\}$ such that $\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}=\Delta^{\mathcal{J}}$ and for all $P \in \Sigma$, we have $P^{\mathcal{I}}=P^{\mathcal{J}}$. Obviously, $\mathcal{I}$ and $\mathcal{J}$ are also models of $\mathcal{T}$. Then by $\mathcal{T} \models C \sqsubseteq D$, we have that $(C \sqcap \neg D)^{\mathcal{I}}=(C \sqcap \neg D)^{\mathcal{J}}=\emptyset$. But then $A_{0}^{\mathcal{I}}=A_{0}^{\mathcal{J}}=\emptyset$. Hence, $A_{0}$ is implicitly definable from $\Sigma$ under $\mathcal{T} \cup\left\{A_{0} \sqsubseteq C \sqcap \neg D\right\}$.
$(\Leftarrow)$ We show the contrapositive, i.e., if $\mathcal{T} \not \models C \sqsubseteq D$, then $A_{0}$ is not implicitly definable from $\Sigma$ under $\mathcal{T} \cup\left\{A_{0} \sqsubseteq C \sqcap \neg D\right\}$. Suppose $\mathcal{T} \not \vDash C \sqsubseteq D$. Then there is some model $\mathcal{I}$ of $\mathcal{T}$ and some $s \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$ such that $s \in(C \sqcap \neg D)^{\mathcal{I}}$. Let $\mathcal{I}_{1}=\left\langle\Delta^{\mathcal{I}_{1}}, \mathcal{I}_{1}\right\rangle$ and $\mathcal{I}_{2}=\left\langle\Delta^{\mathcal{I}_{2}}, \mathcal{I}_{2}\right\rangle$ be such that

- $\Delta^{\mathcal{I}_{1}}=\Delta^{\mathcal{I}_{2}}=\Delta^{\mathcal{I}} ;$
- $A^{\mathcal{I}_{1}}=A^{\mathcal{I}_{2}}=A^{\mathcal{I}}$, for all $A \in\left(N_{C} \backslash A_{0}\right)$;
- $R^{\mathcal{I}_{1}}=R^{\mathcal{I}_{2}}=R^{\mathcal{I}}$, for all $R \in N_{R}$;
- $A_{0}^{\mathcal{I}_{1}}=\{s\}$ and $A_{0}^{\mathcal{I}_{2}}=\emptyset$.

It is easy to see that $\mathcal{I}_{1}$ and $\mathcal{I}_{2}$ are models of $\mathcal{T} \cup\left\{A_{0} \sqsubseteq C \sqcap \neg D\right\}$. Also observe that $\mathcal{I}_{1}$ and $\mathcal{I}_{2}$ are two interpretations with the same domain and they agree on what they assign to predicates in $\Sigma$. But $A_{0}^{\mathcal{I}_{1}} \neq A_{0}^{\mathcal{I}_{2}}$. Hence $A_{0}$ is not implicitly definable from $\Sigma$ under $\mathcal{T} \cup\left\{A_{0} \sqsubseteq C \sqcap \neg D\right\}$.

Using Lemma 4.2 (for the upper bound) and Lemma 4.3 (for the lower bound), the following theorem follows immediately, since the concept subsumption problem w.r.t. TBoxes is ExpTime-complete for the description logics in question (Tobies, 2001).

Theorem 4.4. In $\mathcal{A L C}$ and any of its extensions with constructors from $\{\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{I}, \mathcal{F}\}$, implicit definability is ExpTime-complete.

Explicit definability is the syntactic counterpart of implicit definability. Given a concept $C$, signature $\Sigma$, and TBox $\mathcal{T}$, it asks for the existence of a concept $D$ formulated over $\Sigma$ such that the $C$ and $D$ denote the same set in every model of $\mathcal{T}$.

Definition 4.5 (Explicit definability). Let $C$ be an $\mathscr{L}$-concept, $\mathcal{T}$ a $\mathscr{L}$-TBox, and $\Sigma \subseteq$ $\operatorname{sig}(C, \mathcal{T})$. We say that $C$ is explicitly definable from $\Sigma$ under $\mathcal{T}$ if there is some $\mathscr{L}$-concept $D$ such that $\mathcal{T} \models C \equiv D$ and $\operatorname{sig}(D) \subseteq \Sigma$. Such a concept $D$ is called an explicit definition of $C$ from $\Sigma$ under $\mathcal{T}$.

Proposition 4.6. Let $C$ be an $\mathscr{L}$-concept, $\mathcal{T}$ an $\mathscr{L}$-TBox, and $\Sigma \subseteq \operatorname{sig}(C, \mathcal{T})$. If $C$ is explicitly definable from $\Sigma$ under $\mathcal{T}$, then $C$ is implicitly definable from $\Sigma$ under $\mathcal{T}$.

Proof. Suppose $C$ is explicitly definable from $\Sigma$ under $\mathcal{T}$. Then there is some concept $D$ such that $\mathcal{T} \models C \equiv D$. This implies by the definition of $\widetilde{\mathcal{T}}$ and $\widetilde{C}$, and $\operatorname{sig}(D) \subseteq \Sigma$ that $\widetilde{\mathcal{T}} \equiv \widetilde{C} \equiv D$. Then we have $\mathcal{T} \cup \widetilde{\mathcal{T}} \models C \equiv D$ and $\mathcal{T} \cup \widetilde{\mathcal{T}} \models \widetilde{C} \equiv D$ by the monotonicity of $\models$. These yield $\mathcal{T} \cup \widetilde{\mathcal{T}} \models C \equiv \widetilde{C}$. Then by Lemma 4.2, $C$ is implicitly definable from $\Sigma$ under $\mathcal{T}$.

Definition 4.7 (Beth definability property). $\mathscr{L}$ has the Beth definability property (BP) if for all $\mathscr{L}$-concepts $C$, all $\mathscr{L}$-TBoxes $\mathcal{T}$, and all signatures $\Sigma \subseteq \operatorname{sig}(C, \mathcal{T})$, if $C$ is implicitly definable from $\Sigma$ under $\mathcal{T}$, then $C$ is explicitly definable from $\Sigma$ under $\mathcal{T}$.

Observe that, in the above definition, $\Sigma$ restricts the concept names and the role names that are allowed to appear in the explicit definition. We can obtain a weaker version of the Beth definability property by restricting only the concept names occurring in the explicit definition. This is called the concept-name Beth definability property (CBP). In other words, the CBP refers to the existence of explicit definitions over signatures of the form $\Sigma \cup N_{R}$.

As we will explain later, we also have reasons to be interested in whether description logics satisfy the Beth definability property over the restricted class of finite interpretations. It is known that the Beth definability property, when restricted to finite structures, fails for first-order logic (see e.g., Hoogland, 2001), in spite of the fact that it holds in the unrestricted case. We will specifically investigate Beth definability for description logics restricted to finite interpretations. We call this the Beth definability property in the finite (BPF). Formally, BPF is defined in the same way as BP, except that we replace, in the definition, all occurrences of the word 'interpretation' or 'model' by 'finite interpretation' or 'finite model', and we replace the symbol $\models$ by $\models_{f}$, where $\models_{f}$ considers only finite interpretations. In addition, we will speak about f-implicit definability and f-explicit definability. It follows from Lemma 4.2 that, if $\mathscr{L}$ has FMP, then BP are BPF are equivalent for $\mathscr{L}$. Hence it only makes sense to specifically study BPF for logics without FMP.

### 4.1 Bounds on the Size of Explicit Definitions

We start by a positive result on BP which is a direct application of the interpolation theorem, i.e., Theorem 3.22

Theorem 4.8 (BP). Let $\mathscr{L}$ be $\mathcal{A L C}$ or any of its extensions with constructors from $\{\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{I}, \mathcal{F}\}$. Then for all $\mathscr{L}$-concepts $C$, all $\mathscr{L}$-TBoxes $\mathcal{T}$, and all signatures $\Sigma \subseteq \operatorname{sig}(C, \mathcal{T})$, if $C$ is implicitly definable from $\Sigma$ under $\mathcal{T}$, then $C$ is explicitly definable from $\Sigma$ under $\mathcal{T}$, and the explicit definition of $C$ can be computed in time double exponential in $|\mathcal{T}|+|C|$.
Proof. Let $\mathscr{L}$ be one of the DLs stated in the theorem, $C$ be an $\mathscr{L}$-concept, $\mathcal{T}$ be an $\mathscr{L}$-TBox, and $\Sigma \subseteq \operatorname{sig}(C, \mathcal{T})$ such that $C$ is implicitly definable from $\Sigma$ under $\mathcal{T}$. By Lemma 4.2, we have that $\mathcal{T} \cup \widetilde{\mathcal{T}} \models C \equiv \widetilde{C}$ (where $\widetilde{\mathcal{T}}$ and $\widetilde{C}$ are obtained from $\mathcal{T}$ and $C$, respectively, by replacing all occurrences of predicates $P \notin \Sigma$ by fresh predicates $P^{\prime}$ that are not in $\operatorname{sig}(C, \mathcal{T}))$. Now by Theorem 3.22, there is an interpolant $I$ of $C$ and $\widetilde{C}$ under $\langle\mathcal{T}, \widetilde{\mathcal{T}}\rangle$ that can be computed in time double exponential in $|\mathcal{T}|+|\widetilde{\mathcal{T}}|+|C|+|\widetilde{C}|$. Since it is an interpolant, $\operatorname{sig}(I) \subseteq \operatorname{sig}(C, \mathcal{T}) \cap \operatorname{sig}(\widetilde{C}, \widetilde{\mathcal{T}})=\Sigma$, and both (a) $\mathcal{T} \cup \widetilde{\mathcal{T}} \models C \sqsubseteq I$ and (b) $\mathcal{T} \cup \widetilde{\mathcal{T}} \models I \sqsubseteq \widetilde{C}$. By (b) and $\mathcal{T} \cup \widetilde{\mathcal{T}} \models \widetilde{C} \sqsubseteq C$, we have $\mathcal{T} \cup \widetilde{\mathcal{T}} \models I \sqsubseteq C$, from which $\mathcal{T} \cup \widetilde{\mathcal{T}} \models C \equiv I$ follows by (a). From the structure of $\widetilde{\mathcal{T}}$, it now straightforwardly follows that $\mathcal{T} \models C \equiv I$.

As for the time needed to compute $I$, observe that $|\mathcal{T}|+|\widetilde{\mathcal{T}}|+|C|+|\widetilde{C}|=2 \cdot(|\mathcal{T}|+|C|)$. Hence $I$ can be computed in time double exponential in $|\mathcal{T}|+|C|$.

The proof of Theorem 4.8 uses Theorem 3.22. Similarly, if we use Theorem 3.36 instead, we can show that first-order explicit definitions of implicitly defined concepts can be computed in single exponential time. Note that Theorem 4.8 also establishes a double exponential upper bound on the size explicit definitions in the considered logics. This upper bound is optimal because we show in Theorem 4.11 below that explicit definitions in $\mathscr{L}$ may need to be double exponentially big.

An essential tool in the proof of Theorem 4.11, will be the path-set construction that was previously used by Lutz (2006) to characterize the succinctness of public announcement logic compared to epistemic logic. The path-set construction has also been used by Ghilardi et al. (2006) to establish a lower bound on the size of concepts 'witnessing' that a TBox is not a conservative extension of another TBox.
Definition 4.9. If $C$ is an $\mathcal{A L C}$-concept, then the path-set $P_{C}$ of $C$ is defined by structural induction as follows, where $\varepsilon$ denotes the empty sequence and $\cdot$ denotes concatenation of finite sequences:

- $P_{\mathrm{T}}=P_{A}=\{\varepsilon\}$, for $A \in N_{C}$;
- $P_{\neg C}=P_{C}$;
- $P_{C \sqcap D}=P_{C} \cup P_{D}$;
- $P_{\exists R . C}=\{\varepsilon\} \cup\left\{R \cdot p \mid p \in P_{C}\right\}$.

Intuitively, $P_{C}$ describes the nestings of role constructors in $C$. We will use $P_{C}$ as a tool for establishing lower bounds on the size of concepts.

Lemma 4.10. For every $\mathcal{A L C}$-concept $C$, we have $|C| \geq\left|P_{C}\right|$.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of $C$.
If $C$ is an atomic concept of the form $\top$ or $A$ (with $A \in N_{C}$ ), then, by definition, $|C|=1$ and $\left|P_{C}\right|=1$ since $P_{C}=\{\varepsilon\}$. Hence $|C| \geq\left|P_{C}\right|$.

Next, let $C=\neg D$. By the inductive hypothesis, we have $|D| \geq\left|P_{D}\right|$. Then by $\left|P_{\neg D}\right|=$ $\left|P_{D}\right|$, we obtain $|D| \geq\left|P_{\neg D}\right|$. Finally, by the fact that $|\neg D|=|D|+1$, we obtain $|\neg D| \geq$ $\left|P_{\neg D}\right|$. Hence $|C| \geq\left|P_{C}\right|$.

Next, let $C=C_{1} \sqcap C_{2}$. By the inductive hypothesis, we have $\left|C_{1}\right| \geq\left|P_{C_{1}}\right|$ and $\left|C_{2}\right| \geq$ $\left|P_{C_{2}}\right|$. This implies $\left|C_{1}\right|+\left|C_{2}\right| \geq\left|P_{C_{1}}\right|+\left|P_{C_{2}}\right|$. Then by the fact that $\left|C_{1} \sqcap C_{2}\right|=\left|C_{1}\right|+\left|C_{2}\right|+1$, we obtain $\left|C_{1} \sqcap C_{2}\right| \geq\left|P_{C_{1}}\right|+\left|P_{C_{2}}\right|$. Finally, by $\left|P_{C_{1}}\right|+\left|P_{C_{2}}\right| \geq\left|P_{C_{1} \sqcap C_{2}}\right|$, we have $\left|C_{1} \sqcap C_{2}\right| \geq$ $\left|P_{C_{1} \sqcap C_{2}}\right|$. Hence $|C| \geq\left|P_{C}\right|$.

Finally, let $C=\exists R . D$. By the inductive hypothesis, we have $|D| \geq\left|P_{D}\right|$. This implies $|D|+2 \geq\left|P_{D}\right|+2$. Then by the fact that $|\exists R . D|=|D|+2$, we obtain $|\exists R . D| \geq\left|P_{D}\right|+2$. Finally, by $\left|P_{D}\right|+1=\left|P_{\exists R . D}\right|$, we have $|\exists R . D| \geq\left|P_{\exists R . D}\right|$. Hence $|C| \geq\left|P_{C}\right|$.

Theorem 4.11 (Explicit definition lower bound). Let $\Sigma=\{R, S\} \subseteq N_{R}$. Then for every $n \in \mathbb{N}$, there is an $\mathcal{A L C}$-concept $C_{n}$ and an $\mathcal{A L C}$-TBox $\mathcal{T}_{n}$ such that $\Sigma \subseteq \operatorname{sig}\left(C_{n}, \mathcal{T}_{n}\right),\left|\mathcal{T}_{n}\right|$ and $\left|C_{n}\right|$ are polynomial in $n, C_{n}$ is implicitly definable from $\Sigma$ under $\mathcal{T}_{n}$, and the smallest explicit definition of $C_{n}$ from $\Sigma$ under $\mathcal{T}_{n}$ is double exponentially long in $n$.

Proof. Fix an $n \in \mathbb{N}$. Let $A_{1}, \ldots, A_{n}$ be pairwise distinct concept names. We use these concept names and their negations to represent in binary format a number in $\left\{0, \ldots, 2^{n}-1\right\}$. More precisely, $\neg A_{n} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap \neg A_{1}$ represents $0, \neg A_{n} \sqcap \neg A_{n-1} \ldots \sqcap A_{1}$ represents 1 , and so on. Obviously, this implies that the least significant bit is at position 1. For every $i \in\left\{0, \ldots, 2^{n}-1\right\}$, we denote the concept that represents $i$ by $C_{i}$. Note that in each $C_{i}$, either $A_{j}$ or $\neg A_{j}$ is a conjunct of $C_{i}$, for all $j \in\{1, \ldots, n\}$.

For $k \in\{1, \ldots, n\}$,

- let $X_{k}=\neg A_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap \neg A_{k-1} \sqcap A_{k}$ and
- let $Y_{k}=A_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap A_{k-1} \sqcap \neg A_{k}$.

Note that $X_{k}$ and $Y_{k}$ are not concept names and we will use them only to abbreviate our CIAs. We define $\mathcal{T}_{n}$ as the $\mathcal{A L C}$-TBox consisting of the following CIAs.

- $\neg A_{n} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap \neg A_{1} \sqsubseteq \forall R . \perp \sqcap \forall S . \perp$
- $A_{1} \sqcup \ldots \sqcup A_{n} \sqsubseteq \exists R$. $\lceil\sqcup \exists S . \top$
- For every $k \in\{1, \ldots, n\}$ and $\sigma \in \Sigma$,

$$
\begin{aligned}
X_{k} & \sqsubseteq \forall \sigma . Y_{k} \sqcap \\
& \prod_{k<l \leq n}\left(\left(A_{l} \sqcap \forall \sigma . A_{l}\right) \sqcup\left(\neg A_{l} \sqcap \forall \sigma . \neg A_{l}\right)\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

Intuitively, the last item above allows us to decrease the counter value by one by flipping the respective bits. Note that $\left|\mathcal{T}_{n}\right|$ is polynomial in $n$ and that $\mathcal{T}_{n}$ is satisfiable. In fact, we present models of $\mathcal{T}_{n}$ in Claim 4.14. If $\mathcal{I}$ is a model of $\mathcal{T}_{n}$, we have for every $s \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$ and every $i \in\{1, \ldots, n\}$, either $s \in A_{i}^{\mathcal{I}}$ or $s \in\left(\neg A_{i}\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$ by the virtue of $\mathcal{I}$ being an interpretation. Therefore, for every $s \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$ there is exactly one $i \in\left\{0, \ldots, 2^{n}-1\right\}$ such that $s \in C_{i}^{\mathcal{I}}$.

Claim 4.12. Let $i \in\left\{1, \ldots, 2^{n}-1\right\}$. Then

1. $\mathcal{T}_{n} \equiv C_{i} \sqsubseteq \forall R . C_{i-1} \sqcap \forall S . C_{i-1}$
2. $\mathcal{T}_{n} \models C_{i} \equiv \exists R . C_{i-1} \sqcup \exists S . C_{i-1}$

Proof of claim. For 1 , suppose $\mathcal{I}=\left\langle\Delta^{\mathcal{I}},{ }^{\mathcal{I}}\right\rangle$ is a model of $\mathcal{T}_{n}, s \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$ with $s \in C_{i}^{\mathcal{I}}$, and $\sigma \in\{R, S\}=\Sigma$. It suffices to show that $s \in\left(\forall \sigma \cdot C_{i-1}\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$. If there is no $t \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$ such that $\langle s, t\rangle \in \sigma^{\mathcal{I}}$ then we are done immediately; therefore, suppose $\langle s, t\rangle \in \sigma^{\mathcal{I}}$. We need to show $t \in C_{i-1}^{\mathcal{I}}$.

We have that $C_{i}=B_{n} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap B_{1}$, where $B_{j}=A_{j}$ or $B_{j}=\neg A_{j}$, for each $j \in\{1, \ldots, n\}$. Denote by $\bar{B}_{j}$ the concept $\neg A_{j}$ if $B_{j}=A_{j}$, or else the concept $A_{j}$ if $B_{j}=\neg A_{j}$. Since $s \in C_{i}^{\mathcal{I}}$, there is exactly one $k \in\{1, \ldots, n\}$ such that $s \in X_{k}^{\mathcal{I}}$. Then by the CIA

$$
\begin{aligned}
X_{k} & \sqsubseteq \forall \sigma . Y_{k} \sqcap \\
& \prod_{k<l \leq n}\left(\left(A_{l} \sqcap \forall \sigma . A_{l}\right) \sqcup\left(\neg A_{l} \sqcap \forall \sigma . \neg A_{l}\right)\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

in $\mathcal{T}_{n}$, we have that $t \in\left(B_{n} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap B_{k+1} \sqcap \bar{B}_{k} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap \bar{B}_{1}\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$. It is not hard to see that

$$
C_{i-1}=B_{n} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap B_{k+1} \sqcap \bar{B}_{k} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap \bar{B}_{1} .
$$

Hence we conclude that $t \in C_{i-1}^{\mathcal{I}}$, which is what we wanted to show.
For 2. $(\Rightarrow)$ Suppose $\mathcal{I}=\left\langle\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}, \mathcal{I}^{\mathcal{I}}\right\rangle$ is a model of $\mathcal{T}_{n}$ and $s \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$ with $s \in C_{i}^{\mathcal{I}}$. Since $i \neq 0$, by $A_{1} \sqcup \ldots \sqcup A_{n} \sqsubseteq \exists R$. $\top \sqcup \exists S . \top \in \mathcal{T}_{n}, C_{i} \in(\exists R . \top)^{\mathcal{I}}$ or $C_{i} \in(\exists S . \top)^{\mathcal{I}}$. That is, there is some $t \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$ such that either $\langle s, t\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{I}}$ or $\langle s, t\rangle \in S^{\mathcal{I}}$. In both cases, $t \in C_{i-1}^{\mathcal{I}}$ by 1 . Hence $s \in\left(\exists R . C_{i-1} \sqcup \exists S . C_{i-1}\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$.
$(\Leftarrow)$ Suppose $\mathcal{I}=\left\langle\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}, \mathcal{I}^{\mathcal{I}}\right\rangle$ is a model of $\mathcal{T}_{n}$ and $s \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$ with $s \in\left(\exists R . C_{i-1} \sqcup \exists S . C_{i-1}\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$. This means there is some $t \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$ such that $t \in C_{i-1}^{\mathcal{I}}$ and either $\langle s, t\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{I}}$ or $\langle s, t\rangle \in S^{\mathcal{I}}$. We proceed towards a contradiction so further suppose that $s \notin C_{i}^{\mathcal{I}}$, i.e., $s \in\left(\neg C_{i}\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$. Then by the definition of an interpretation, $s \in C_{j}^{\mathcal{I}}$, where $j \neq i$ and $j \in\left\{0, \ldots, 2^{n}-1\right\}$. If $j=0$, then by $\neg A_{n} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap \neg A_{1} \sqsubseteq \forall R . \perp \sqcap \forall S . \perp \in \mathcal{T}_{n}$, we immediately get a contradiction. If $j \neq 0$, then by $1, t \in C_{j-1}^{\mathcal{I}}$. Since $i \neq j$, we have $(i-1) \neq(j-1)$. Thus, the binary representation of $i-1$ and $j-1$ must differ in at least one bit. This implies by $t \in C_{j-1}^{\mathcal{I}}$ and $t \in C_{i-1}^{\mathcal{I}}$ that there is some $k \in\{1, \ldots, n\}$ such that $t \in A_{k}^{\mathcal{I}}$ and $t \notin A_{k}^{\mathcal{I}}$. Hence a contradiction.

Now define concepts $D_{0} \ldots D_{2^{n}-1}$ inductively as follows.

$$
\begin{aligned}
D_{0} & =\forall R \cdot \perp \sqcap \forall S \cdot \perp \\
D_{i} & =\exists R \cdot D_{i-1} \sqcup \exists S . D_{i-1}
\end{aligned}
$$

Intuitively, $D_{i}$ has the shape of a binary tree (due to role names $R, S$ ) and the height of the tree is $O(i)$. This implies $\left|C_{2^{n}-1}\right|$ is double exponential in $n$.

Claim 4.13. For every $i \in\left\{0, \ldots, 2^{n}-1\right\}$, we have $\mathcal{T}_{n} \models C_{i} \equiv D_{i}$.
Proof of claim. The proof is by induction on $i$. The base case is when $i=0$. Then by the axioms in $\mathcal{T}_{n}$, it trivially follows that $\mathcal{T}_{n} \models \neg A_{1} \sqcap \ldots \neg A_{n} \equiv \forall R . \perp \sqcap \forall S . \perp$. In other words, $\mathcal{T}_{n} \models C_{0} \equiv D_{0}$. Hence the claim holds in the base case.

For the inductive step, suppose $i>0$. By the previous claim, $\mathcal{T}_{n} \models C_{i} \equiv \exists R . C_{i-1} \sqcup$ $\exists S . C_{i-1}$; and by the inductive hypothesis, $\mathcal{T}_{n} \models C_{i-1} \equiv D_{i-1}$. But then $\mathcal{T}_{n} \vDash C_{i} \equiv$ $\exists R . D_{i-1} \sqcup \exists S . D_{i-1}$ which is what we wanted to show.

By the previous claim, we have that for all $i \in\left\{0, \ldots, 2^{n}-1\right\}, D_{i}$ is an explicit definition of $C_{i}$ from $\Sigma=\{R, S\}$ under $\mathcal{T}_{n}$. Then by Proposition 4.6, $C_{i}$ is implicitly definable from $\Sigma$ under $\mathcal{T}_{n}$. In the rest of the proof, we show that each explicit definition of $C_{i}$ from $\Sigma$ under $\mathcal{T}_{n}$ is at least double exponentially long. To this aim, we introduce interpretations that are based on some elements of $\Sigma^{*}$, where $\Sigma^{*}$ denotes the set of all strings over the symbols in $\Sigma$. More precisely, for every $p \in \Sigma^{*}$ with $0 \leq|p| \leq 2^{n}-1$, we define the interpretation $\mathcal{I}_{p}$ as follows.

- $\Delta^{\mathcal{I}_{p}}=\left\{p^{\prime} \in \Sigma^{*} \mid p^{\prime}\right.$ is a prefix of $\left.p\right\}$;
- for all $A \in N_{C}$,
- if $A=A_{j}$ for some $j \in\{1, \ldots, n\}$, then

$$
A^{\mathcal{I}_{p}}=\left\{p^{\prime} \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}_{p}} \mid A \text { is a conjunct of } C_{|p|-\left|p^{\prime}\right|}\right\}
$$

- if $A \neq A_{j}$ for all $j \in\{1, \ldots, n\}$, then $A^{\mathcal{I}_{p}}=\emptyset ;$
- for all $T \in N_{R}$,

$$
\begin{aligned}
& -T^{\mathcal{I}_{p}}=\left\{\left\langle p_{1}, p_{2}\right\rangle \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}_{p}} \times \Delta^{\mathcal{I}_{p}} \mid p_{2}=p_{1} \cdot T\right\}, \text { if } T \in \Sigma, \\
& -T^{\mathcal{I}_{p}}=\emptyset, \text { if } T \in N_{R} \backslash \Sigma .
\end{aligned}
$$

The following claim is easy to show.
Claim 4.14. For every $p \in \Sigma^{*}$ with $0 \leq|p| \leq 2^{n}-1$, we have

- $\mathcal{I}_{p} \models \mathcal{T}_{n}$, and
- $\varepsilon \in C_{|p|}^{\mathcal{I}_{p}}$.

Denote for every $i \in\left\{0, \ldots, 2^{n}-1\right\}$, the set of all $p \in \Sigma^{*}$ such that $|p|=i$ by $\Sigma^{i}$.
Claim 4.15. Let $i \in\left\{0, \ldots, 2^{n}-1\right\}$ and let $C$ be an $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C}$-concept such that $\operatorname{sig}(C) \subseteq \Sigma=$ $\{R, S\}$ and $\mathcal{T}_{n} \models C_{i} \equiv C$. Then $\Sigma^{i} \subseteq P_{C}$.
Proof of claim. Suppose first $i=0$. Then $\Sigma^{i}=\{\varepsilon\}$. Moreover, by definition we have $\varepsilon \in P_{C}$. Hence $\Sigma^{i} \subseteq P_{C}$, which is what we wanted to show.

Now suppose $i>0$. We proceed towards a contradiction. Suppose that there is some $p_{a} \in \Sigma^{i} \backslash P_{C}$. Let $p_{b}$ be the prefix of $p_{a}$ with $\left|p_{b}\right|=i-1$. Since $i>0, p_{b}$ is well-defined. We claim that for all $s \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}_{p_{b}}} \subseteq \Delta^{\mathcal{I}_{p a}}$ and $D \in \operatorname{sub}(C)$ such that $\left\{s \cdot p \mid p \in P_{D}\right\} \subseteq P_{C}$,

$$
\begin{equation*}
s \in D^{\mathcal{I}_{p_{b}}} \text { if and only if } s \in D^{\mathcal{I}_{p_{a}}} . \tag{3}
\end{equation*}
$$

The proof is by induction on the structure of $D$. Since the base and the boolean cases are trivial, we only treat the case $D=\exists \sigma . E$, where $\sigma \in \Sigma$.

- ( $\Rightarrow$ ). Suppose $s \in D^{\mathcal{I}_{p_{b}}}$. Then there is a $t \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}_{p_{b}}}$ such that $\langle s, t\rangle \in \sigma^{\mathcal{I}_{p_{b}}}$ and $t \in E^{\mathcal{I}_{p_{b}}}$. Since $t$ is in $\Delta^{\mathcal{I}_{p_{a}}}$ as well, the former yields $\langle s, t\rangle \in \sigma^{\mathcal{I}_{p_{a}}}$. It thus remains to show that $t \in E^{\mathcal{I}_{p a}}$. By definition, $t=s \cdot \sigma$ and $P_{D}=\{\varepsilon\} \cup\left\{\sigma \cdot p \mid p \in P_{E}\right\}$. Thus, our assumption $\left\{s \cdot p \mid p \in P_{D}\right\} \subseteq P_{C}$ yields $\{s\} \cup\left\{t \cdot p \mid p \in P_{E}\right\} \subseteq P_{C}$. This implies $\left\{t \cdot p \mid p \in P_{E}\right\} \subseteq P_{C}$. Then by the induction hypothesis and $t \in E^{\mathcal{I}_{p_{b}}}$, we obtain $t \in E^{\mathcal{I}_{p_{a}}}$, which is what we wanted to show for this direction of the proof.
- $(\Leftarrow)$. Suppose $s \in D^{\mathcal{I}_{p a}}$. Then there is a $t \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}_{p a}}$ such that $\langle s, t\rangle \in \sigma^{\mathcal{I}_{p a}}$ and $t \in E^{\mathcal{I}_{p a}}$. By definition, $t=s \cdot \sigma$ and $P_{D}=\{\varepsilon\} \cup\left\{\sigma \cdot p \mid p \in P_{E}\right\}$. Thus, our assumption $\left\{s \cdot p \mid p \in P_{D}\right\} \subseteq P_{C}$ yields $\{s\} \cup\left\{t \cdot p \mid p \in P_{E}\right\} \subseteq P_{C}$. This implies

$$
\begin{equation*}
\left\{t \cdot p \mid p \in P_{E}\right\} \subseteq P_{C} \tag{4}
\end{equation*}
$$

By (4) and $\varepsilon \in P_{E}$, we obtain $t \in P_{C}$. Since $p_{a} \notin P_{C}$, this means $t \neq p_{a}$. But then $t \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}_{p_{b}}}$ and $\langle s, t\rangle \in \sigma^{\mathcal{I}_{p_{b}}}$. By (4), $t \in E^{\mathcal{I}_{p a}}$, and the induction hypothesis, we have $t \in E^{\mathcal{I}_{p_{b}}}$. Hence $s \in(\exists \sigma . E)^{\mathcal{I}_{p_{b}}}$.

Thus, we have shown that (3) holds. Now we arrive at a contradiction as follows. By Claim 4.14, we have $\varepsilon \in C_{i}^{\mathcal{I}_{p a}}$ and $\varepsilon \in C_{i-1}^{\mathcal{I}_{b}}$, since $\left|p_{a}\right|=i$ and $\left|p_{b}\right|=i-1$, respectively. $\varepsilon \in C_{i-1}^{\mathcal{L}_{p_{b}}}$ implies by the definition of $C_{i}$ that $\varepsilon \notin C_{i}^{\mathcal{I}_{p_{b}}}$. Then by $\mathcal{T}_{n} \models C_{i} \equiv C$ and Claim4.14, we obtain $\varepsilon \in C^{\mathcal{I}_{p_{a}}}$ and $\varepsilon \notin C^{\mathcal{I}_{p_{b}}}$. But this contradicts with an immediate consequence of (3), namely $\varepsilon \in C^{\mathcal{I}_{p_{b}}}$ iff $\varepsilon \in C^{\mathcal{I}_{p_{a}}}$. Hence a contradiction. Thus, we conclude that $\Sigma^{i} \subseteq P_{C}$ for $i>0$.

To show the theorem, we argue as follows. Suppose that $C$ is an $\mathcal{A L C}$-concept such that $\mathcal{T}_{n} \models C_{2^{n}-1} \equiv C$ and $\operatorname{sig}(C) \subseteq \Sigma$. Then by the previous claim $\Sigma^{2^{n}-1} \subseteq P_{C}$. By its definition, $\left|\Sigma^{2^{n}-1}\right|=2^{2^{n}-1}$ and thus, $2^{2^{n}-1} \leq\left|P_{C}\right|$. Then by Lemma 4.10, $2^{2^{n}-1} \leq|C|$. Hence the theorem follows.

Remark 4.16. With the role disjunction constructor, which is not present in $\mathcal{A L C}, C_{n}$ would admit a single exponentially long explicit definition from $\Sigma$ under $\mathcal{T}_{n}$ in Theorem 4.11.

Remark 4.17. The lower bound argument in Theorem 4.11 works for CBP as well by just setting $\Sigma=\emptyset$.

Combined with Theorem 4.8, Theorem 4.11 implies that implicit definitions using general TBoxes are exactly double exponentially more succinct than explicit definitions using acyclic terminologies. This closes the open problem of ten Cate et al. (2006) about the size of explicit definitions. Moreover, the same theorems establish an exact bound on the size of equivalent rewritings of concept queries as considered by Seylan et al. (2009). Theorem 4.11 also shows that Theorem 1 by Seylan et al. (2010), which claims a single exponential upper bound on the size of explicit definitions in $\mathcal{A L C}$, is wrong. The source of the problem in the proof of Theorem 1 is Lemma 1, which claims a single exponential upper bound on the size of interpolants in $\mathcal{A L C}$.

### 4.2 Failure of Beth Definability in the Presence of Role Hierarchies

We now show that BP fails in the description logics that we consider that include role hierarchies $(\mathcal{H})$. This shows that BP is indeed a stronger property than CBP because the same logics have CBP (ten Cate et al., 2006).

Theorem 4.18. Let $\mathscr{L}$ be $\mathcal{A L C H}$ or any of its extensions with constructors from $\{\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{I}, \mathcal{F}\}$. Then $\mathscr{L}$ does not have BP.

Proof. Let $\Sigma=\left\{R_{1}, R_{2}\right\}$ and consider the $\mathcal{A L C H}$-TBox $\mathcal{T}$ that consists of

$$
\begin{aligned}
S & \sqsubseteq R_{1} \\
S & \sqsubseteq R_{2} \\
\exists R_{1} \cdot A \sqcap \forall S . \perp & \sqsubseteq \forall R_{2} \cdot \neg A \\
\exists R_{1} \cdot \neg A \sqcap \forall S . \perp & \sqsubseteq \forall R_{2} . A
\end{aligned}
$$

It is easy to see that $\mathcal{T}$ is satisfiable. In fact, we will present two models of $\mathcal{T}$ below.
Claim 4.19. $\exists$ S. $\top$ is implicitly definable from $\Sigma$ under $\mathcal{T}$.


Figure 5: Interpretations $\mathcal{I}$ and $\mathcal{J}$ that are used for disproving BP for $\mathcal{A L C H}$
Proof of claim. Define $X_{\mathcal{I}}=\left\{s \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}} \mid \exists t \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}} .\langle s, t\rangle \in R_{1}^{\mathcal{I}} \cap R_{2}^{\mathcal{I}}\right\}$. We will show that, whenever $\mathcal{I} \vDash \mathcal{T}$, then $(\exists S . \top)^{\mathcal{I}}=X_{\mathcal{I}}$. This establishes the claim, since $X_{\mathcal{I}}$ depends only on $R_{1}^{\mathcal{I}}$ and $R_{2}^{\mathcal{I}}$.

First, we show $(\exists S . \top)^{\mathcal{I}} \subseteq X_{\mathcal{I}}$. Suppose that $s \in(\exists S . \top)^{\mathcal{I}}$. Then there is some $t \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$ such that $\langle s, t\rangle \in S^{\mathcal{I}}$. By the RIAs in $\mathcal{T}$, we then have that $\langle s, t\rangle \in R_{1}^{\mathcal{I}} \cap R_{2}^{\mathcal{I}}$. Hence $s \in X_{\mathcal{I}}$.

Next, we show $X_{\mathcal{I}} \subseteq(\exists S . \top)^{\mathcal{I}}$. For contradiction, suppose that $s \in X_{\mathcal{I}}$ and $s \notin(\exists S . \top)^{\mathcal{I}}$, i.e., $s \in(\forall S . \perp)^{\mathcal{I}}$. Then there is some $t \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$ such that $\langle s, t\rangle \in R_{1}^{\mathcal{I}} \cap R_{2}^{\mathcal{I}}$ and $\langle s, t\rangle \notin S^{\mathcal{I}}$. By the definition of an interpretation, either (i) $t \in A^{\mathcal{I}}$ or (ii) $t \in(\neg A)^{\mathcal{I}}$. If (i), then by $\exists R_{1} . A \sqcap \forall S . \perp \sqsubseteq \forall R_{2} \neg A \in \mathcal{T}$, we have $t \in(\neg A)^{\mathcal{I}}$, which is a contradiction. If (ii), then by $\exists R_{1} \cdot \neg A \sqcap \forall S . \perp \sqsubseteq \forall R_{2} . A \in \mathcal{T}$, we have $t \in A^{\mathcal{I}}$, which is a contradiction. Hence $X_{\mathcal{I}} \subseteq(\exists S . \top)^{\mathcal{I}}$.

Let $\mathcal{I}=\left\langle\Delta^{\mathcal{I}},{ }^{\mathcal{I}}\right\rangle$ be the interpretation where

- $\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}=\{s, t\}$,
- $R_{1}^{\mathcal{I}}=R_{2}^{\mathcal{I}}=S^{\mathcal{I}}=\{\langle s, t\rangle\} ;$
- $R^{\mathcal{I}}=\emptyset$, for all $R \in N_{R} \backslash(\Sigma \cup\{S\})$;
- $B^{\mathcal{I}}=\emptyset$, for all $B \in N_{C}$.

Let $\mathcal{J}=\left\langle\Delta^{\mathcal{J}},{ }^{\mathcal{J}}\right\rangle$ be the interpretation where

- $\Delta^{\mathcal{J}}=\{w, v, a, b\}$,
- $R_{1}^{\mathcal{J}}=\{\langle w, a\rangle,\langle v, b\rangle\}, R_{2}^{\mathcal{J}}=\{\langle w, b\rangle,\langle v, a\rangle\} ;$
- $R^{\mathcal{J}}=\emptyset$, for all $R \in N_{R} \backslash \Sigma$;
- $A^{\mathcal{J}}=\{a\}$;
- $B^{\mathcal{J}}=\emptyset$, for all $B \in\left(N_{C} \backslash\{A\}\right)$.

The interpretations $\mathcal{I}$ and $\mathcal{J}$ are depicted in Figure 5. It is not hard to see that $\mathcal{I}$ and $\mathcal{J}$ are models of $\mathcal{T}$. Furthermore, the two structures are indistinguishable by concepts in the signature $\Sigma$, in the following sense:
Claim 4.20. For all $\mathcal{S H} \mathcal{I F}$-concepts $C$ with $\operatorname{sig}(C) \subseteq \Sigma=\left\{R_{1}, R_{2}\right\}$, we have

1. $s \in C^{\mathcal{I}}$ if and only if $w \in C^{\mathcal{J}}$;
2. $s \in C^{\mathcal{I}}$ if and only if $v \in C^{\mathcal{J}}$;
3. $t \in C^{\mathcal{I}}$ if and only if $a \in C^{\mathcal{J}}$;
4. $t \in C^{\mathcal{I}}$ if and only if $b \in C^{\mathcal{J}}$

The proof of this claim is straightforward, by simultaneous induction on the structure of the concept $C$ (alternatively, bisimulations can be used to establish the same result).

Since $s \in(\exists S . T)^{\mathcal{I}}$ and $w \notin(\exists S . \top)^{\mathcal{J}}$, it follows that there is no $\mathcal{S H \mathcal { H } F}$-concept $C$ such that $\operatorname{sig}(C) \subseteq \Sigma$ and $\mathcal{T} \models \exists S$. $\top \equiv C$. In summary, we have that the $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C H}$-concept $\exists S$. $\top$ is implicitly definable from $\Sigma$ under the $\mathcal{A L C H}$-TBox $\mathcal{T}$, but $\exists S$. T is not explicitly definable from $\Sigma$ under $\mathcal{T}$ in $\mathcal{S H I F}$. We can conclude that BP fails for every description logic that includes $\mathcal{A L C H}$ and that is included in $\mathcal{S H I F}$.

Theorem 4.18 shows that Theorem 10 by Seylan et al. (2010), which claims that $\mathcal{A L C H}$ and its extensions with $\mathcal{S}$ and/or $\mathcal{I}$ have BP, is incorrect. The mistake in the proof is that Theorem 9 , which presents a reduction from the concept satisfiability problem w.r.t. TBoxes in $\mathcal{S H \mathcal { I }}$ to the same problem in $\mathcal{A L C}$, can not actually be used for computing $\mathcal{S H I}$-interpolants.

### 4.3 Failure of Beth Definability in the Finite

We now consider BPF (the analogue of Beth Definability over finite structures). Before we start, we explain our motivations. Seylan et al. (2009) consider an ontology-based data access setting, where traditional ABoxes are replaced by DBoxes. Syntactically, DBoxes are defined in the same way as ABoxes, but their semantics is different: while an ABox is merely assumed to express true facts, a DBox is assumed to list all true facts for some specified subset of the signature (known as the set of data predicates). Thus, for example, $\mathcal{D}=\{A(a), R(a, b)\}$ is a DBox for data predicates $A$ and $R$, and, by the definition of the semantics of DBoxes, we have that, in every model $\mathcal{I}$ of $\mathcal{D}, A^{\mathcal{I}}=\left\{a^{\mathcal{I}}\right\}$ and $R^{\mathcal{I}}=\left\{\left\langle a^{\mathcal{I}}, b^{\mathcal{I}}\right\rangle\right\}$. In this setting, the TBox may contain other predicates than the data predicates and the authors use BP to determine whether a concept query over the signature of the TBox can be rewritten to an equivalent first-order query over the data predicates. When this is possible, computing the certain answers of the original query can then be reduced to computing the answers of the rewriting over the DBox, viewed as a database. In the setting we have described here, and for DLs without FMP, it is more natural to consider BPF than BP. The reason is that, in every interpretation of a DBox, the data predicates are, by definition, finite relations. In fact, the appropriate analogue of BP in this setting is one that is restricted to interpretations in which the data predicates are finite and the rest of the signature is unrestricted. This variant of BP can be viewed as a common generalization of BP and BFP. We do not study it here, but the negative results that we will present below for BFP apply to it as well.

Theorem 4.21 below establishes that BPF fails in $\mathscr{L}$, where $\mathscr{L}$ is any DL (among the ones we consider) lacking FMP. More precisely, we show that there is an $\mathscr{L}$-TBox $\mathcal{T}, \mathscr{L}$ concept $C$, and signature $\Sigma$ such that $C$ is f-implicitly definable from $\Sigma$ under $\mathcal{T}$, and that there is no f-explicit definition in $\mathscr{L}$, i.e., there is no $\mathscr{L}$-concept $D$ such that $\operatorname{sig}(D) \subseteq \Sigma$ and $\mathcal{T} \models_{f} C \equiv D$. Intuitively, the reason for the failure of BPF in these logics will be that
they can not express the transitive closure of a role (see also the discussion below after the proof of Theorem 4.21).

Theorem 4.21. Let $\mathscr{L}$ be $\mathcal{A L C F I}$ or any of its extensions with constructors from $\{\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{H}\}$. Then $\mathscr{L}$ does not have BPF.

Proof. We will, in fact, prove something stronger: we will construct an implicit definition for which there is no corresponding explicit definition even in full first-order logic.

Let $A, B, X$ be concept names and let $R$ be a role name. Suppose $\Sigma=\{R, A\}$. Consider the $\mathcal{A L C F}$ - -TBox $\mathcal{T}$ that consists of the following.

$$
\begin{aligned}
\top & \sqsubseteq \leq 1 R \sqcap \leq 1 R^{-} \\
B & \sqsubseteq \exists R . B \\
A & \sqsubseteq X \\
\exists R .(A \sqcap \neg B) & \sqsubseteq \neg X \\
\exists R . \neg X & \sqsubseteq \neg X
\end{aligned}
$$

We will show that some concept is f-implicitly definable from $\Sigma$ under $\mathcal{T}$ but it is not f-explicitly definable from $\Sigma$ under $\mathcal{T}$. The concept in question is $A \sqcap B$. Note that this concept is finitely satisfiable w.r.t. $\mathcal{T}$, i.e., there is some finite model $\mathcal{I}$ of $\mathcal{T}$ such that $(A \sqcap B)^{\mathcal{I}} \neq \emptyset$. In fact, we provide such a model $\mathcal{I}_{n}$ below.

For an interpretation $\mathcal{I}=\left\langle\Delta^{\mathcal{I}},{ }^{\mathcal{I}}\right\rangle$. A sequence $s_{0}, \ldots, s_{n}$ of elements of $\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$ is called a finite $R$-path if $n>0$ and $\left\langle s_{i}, s_{i+1}\right\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{I}}$ for all $i<n$. An infinite $R$-path is defined analogously. An $R$-path such that the start and the end nodes are the same is called an $R$-cycle. Now we will show two claims that will be useful for the proof of the theorem.

Claim 4.22. Let $\mathcal{I}$ be a finite model of $\mathcal{T}$. If $s \in B^{\mathcal{I}}$, then $\langle s, s\rangle \in\left(R^{\mathcal{I}}\right)^{+}$, where $\left(R^{\mathcal{I}}\right)^{+}$is the transitive closure of $R^{\mathcal{I}}$.

Proof of claim. Suppose that $s \in B^{\mathcal{I}}$. Then the axiom $B \sqsubseteq \exists R . B \in \mathcal{T}$ implies the existence of the following infinite $R$-path:

$$
p=s_{0}, s_{1}, \ldots
$$

where $s_{0}=s$ and for all $i \geq 0$, we have $s_{i} \in B^{\mathcal{I}}$.
Since $\mathcal{I}$ is finite, there is some $0 \leq n<m$ such that $s_{n}=s_{m}$. If $n=0$, we immediately have that $\langle s, s\rangle \in\left(R^{\mathcal{I}}\right)^{+}$. Otherwise, we claim that for all pairs $\left\langle s_{i}, s_{j}\right\rangle$ in the sequence $\left\langle s_{n}, s_{m}\right\rangle,\left\langle s_{n-1}, s_{m-1}\right\rangle, \ldots,\left\langle s_{0}, s_{m-n}\right\rangle$, we have $s_{i}=s_{j}$. The base case follows immediately from $s_{n}=s_{m}$. For the inductive step, we have by the inductive hypothesis that $s_{n-i}=$ $s_{m-i}=t$, for some $t \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$. Then by the definition of $p,\left\langle s_{n-i-1}, t\right\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{I}}$ and $\left\langle s_{m-i-1}, t\right\rangle \in$ $R^{\mathcal{I}}$, which imply by the axiom $T \sqsubseteq \leq 1 R^{-} \in \mathcal{T}$ and $\mathcal{I} \models \mathcal{T}$ that $s_{n-i-1}=s_{m-i-1}$. Hence we have that $s=s_{0}=s_{m-n}$. But then $\langle s, s\rangle \in\left(R^{\mathcal{L}}\right)^{+}$, which is what we wanted to show. $\dashv$

Claim 4.23. $A \sqcap B$ is f-implicitly definable from $\Sigma$ under $\mathcal{T}$.
Proof of claim. For all interpretations $\mathcal{I}$, define

$$
Y_{\mathcal{I}}=\left\{s \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}} \mid\langle s, s\rangle \in\left(R^{\mathcal{I}}\right)^{+} \wedge s \in A^{\mathcal{I}}\right\} .
$$

We will show that, for all finite models $\mathcal{I}$ of $\mathcal{T},(A \sqcap B)^{\mathcal{I}}=Y_{\mathcal{I}}$. This implies the claim, since $Y_{\mathcal{I}}$ depends only on $R^{\mathcal{I}}$ and $A^{\mathcal{I}}$.
$(\Rightarrow)$ Suppose $s \in(A \sqcap B)^{\mathcal{I}}$. By Claim 4.22, we know that $\langle s, s\rangle \in\left(R^{\mathcal{I}}\right)^{+}$. But then $s \in Y_{\mathcal{I}}$.
$(\Leftarrow)$ Suppose $s \in Y_{\mathcal{I}}$. Then $s \in A^{\mathcal{I}}$ and $\langle s, s\rangle \in\left(R^{\mathcal{I}}\right)^{+}$. Since $s \in A^{\mathcal{I}}$, it is enough to show that $s \in B^{\mathcal{I}}$. By the definition of an interpretation, either $s \in B^{\mathcal{I}}$ or $s \in(\neg B)^{\mathcal{I}}$. If $s \in(\neg B)^{\mathcal{I}}$, then by $\langle s, s\rangle \in\left(R^{\mathcal{I}}\right)^{+}, s \in(A \sqcap \neg B)^{\mathcal{I}}$, and the axioms $\exists R .(A \sqcap \neg B) \sqsubseteq \neg X \in \mathcal{T}$ and $\exists R . \neg X \sqsubseteq \neg X \in \mathcal{T}$, we have $s \in(\neg X)^{\mathcal{I}}$ which would be a contradiction by $s \in A^{\mathcal{I}}$ and $A \sqsubseteq X \in \mathcal{T}$. So it must be that $s \in B^{\mathcal{I}}$.

The rest of the proof is all about showing that there is no f-explicit definition of $A \sqcap B$ from $\Sigma$ under $\mathcal{T}$. To this aim, we start by defining an interpretation $\mathcal{I}_{n}$, parameterized by a natural number $n>0$.

- $\Delta^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}=\left\{s_{0}, \ldots, s_{2 n+1}\right\} \cup\left\{t_{0}, \ldots, t_{2 n+1}\right\}$
- $R^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}=\left\{\left\langle s_{i}, s_{i+1}\right\rangle \mid 0 \leq i \leq 2 n\right\} \cup\left\{\left\langle t_{i}, t_{i+1}\right\rangle \mid 0 \leq i \leq 2 n\right\} \cup\left\{\left\langle t_{2 n+1}, t_{0},\right\}\right\rangle$
- $A^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}=\left\{s_{n}, t_{n}\right\}$
- $B^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}=X^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}=\left\{t_{i} \mid 0 \leq i \leq 2 n+1\right\}$

Claim 4.24. For every first-order formula $\varphi(x)$ there is an $n>0$ such that $\mathcal{I}_{n} \models \varphi\left[s_{n}\right]$ if and only if $\mathcal{I}_{n} \models \varphi\left[t_{n}\right]$.

Proof. We apply the Gaifman locality theorem (cf. Libkin, 2004). In the present setting, where we only have unary and binary relations, and we are concerned with formulas in a single free variable, the Gaifman locality theorem is particularly easy to state. Given an interpretation $\mathcal{I}$ and elements $a, b \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$, we say that $a$ and $b$ have distance at most $n$ relative to a signature $\Sigma$, if there is a sequence $s_{0}, \ldots, s_{m}$ with $0 \leq m \leq n$ such that $s_{0}=a, s_{m}=b$, and for all $0 \leq i<m$, pair $\left\langle s_{i}, s_{i+1}\right\rangle$ belongs to $P^{\mathcal{I}} \cup\left(P^{\mathcal{I}}\right)^{-}$for some binary relation (i.e., role name) $P \in \Sigma$. For any interpretation $\mathcal{I}$, element $a \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$, and natural number $n \geq 0$, we denote by $\mathcal{I} \upharpoonright_{a, n}$ the interpretation whose domain consists of the elements from $\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$ that have distance at most $n$ from $a$, and whose relations are the ones from $\mathcal{I}$ restricted to this subset of the domain. The Gaifman locality theorem can then be stated as follows: for every first-order formula $\varphi(x)$, there is a natural number $n>0$ such that, for all structures $\mathcal{I}$ and elements $a, b \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$, if $\mathcal{I} \upharpoonright_{a, n}$ is isomorphic to $\mathcal{I} \upharpoonright_{b, n}$, via an isomorphism that maps $a$ to $b$, then $\mathcal{I} \models \varphi[a]$ if and only if $\mathcal{I} \models \varphi[b]$.

Now, let $\varphi(x)$ be any first-order formula, and let $n>0$ be the natural number given by the Gaifman locality theorem. Consider the instance $\mathcal{I}_{n}$ that we constructed earlier. It is immediately clear from the construction of $\mathcal{I}_{n}$ that $\mathcal{I}_{n} \upharpoonright_{s_{n}, n}$ is isomorphic to $\mathcal{I}_{n} \upharpoonright_{t_{n}, n}$, via an isomorphism that maps $s_{n}$ to $t_{n}$. Therefore, $\mathcal{I}_{n} \models \varphi\left[s_{n}\right]$ if and only if $\mathcal{I}_{n} \models \varphi\left[t_{n}\right]$.

Claim 4.25. There is no $\mathcal{S H} \mathcal{I F}$-concept $C$ such that $\operatorname{sig}(C) \subseteq \Sigma$ and $\mathcal{T} \models_{f}(A \sqcap B) \equiv C$.
Proof of claim. We proceed towards a contradiction. Suppose $C$ is an $\mathcal{A L C} \mathcal{F} \mathcal{I}$-concept such that $\operatorname{sig}(C) \subseteq \Sigma=\{R, A\}$ and $\mathcal{T} \models_{f} A \sqcap B \equiv C$. Let $\varphi(x)=\pi_{x}(C)$. Since $s_{n} \in(A \sqcap B)^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}$, $\mathcal{T} \models_{f} A \sqcap B \equiv C$, and the fact that $\mathcal{I}_{n}$ is a finite model of $\mathcal{T}$, we have $\mathcal{I}_{n} \not \models \varphi\left[s_{n}\right]$; and
by the same reasoning, we have $\mathcal{I}_{n} \models \varphi\left[t_{n}\right]$. But by the previous claim, $\mathcal{I}_{n} \models \varphi\left[s_{n}\right]$ if and only if $\mathcal{I}_{n} \models \varphi\left[t_{n}\right]$, which is a contradiction.

In summary, we have that the $\mathcal{A L C F} \mathcal{I}$-concept $A \sqcap B$ is f-implicitly definable from $\Sigma$ under the $\mathcal{A L C \mathcal { L I }}$-TBox $\mathcal{T}$, but $A \sqcap B$ is not f-explicitly definable from $\Sigma$ under $\mathcal{T}$ even in $\mathcal{S H I F}$ (or in first-order logic, for that matter). It follows that, if $\mathscr{L}$ is any proper extension of $\mathcal{A L C F I}$ with constructors from $\{\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{H}\}$, then $\mathscr{L}$ does not have BPF.

We point out that the specific counterexample to BPF described in the proof of Theorem 4.21 actually admits an explicit definition if one were to allow the use of transitive closure. Specifically, it can be shown that $A \sqcap(\exists R . \top) \sqcap\left(\neg \exists R^{+} . \neg \exists R . \top\right)$ is an explicit definition, where $R^{+}$denotes the transitive closure of the role $R$.

### 4.4 The Transitive Closure Operator

The proof of Theorem 4.21 suggests that the failure of BPF in the considered logics may be caused by the fact that they can not express transitive closure. This raises the question whether one can regain BPF by adding the transitive closure constructor to $\mathcal{A L C F I}$. In this section, we show that $\mathcal{A L C F I}$ extended with the transitive closure constructor still lacks BPF.

In the following, we denote by $\mathscr{L}_{+}$the language obtained from $\mathscr{L}$ by additionally allowing $R^{+}$as a role for every role $R$ in $\mathscr{L}$. This allows us to include such roles in the inductive definition of concepts. However, if $\mathscr{L}$ includes functionality restrictions, then, as usual, we forbid the use of transitive closure inside these functionality restrictions. In other words, in concepts of the form $\leq 1 R, R$ is not allowed to make use of the transitive closure constructor.

The semantics of the transitive closure construct is as expected, namely, $\left(R^{+}\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$ is the relation
$\left\{\langle s, t\rangle \mid\right.$ there are $s_{1}, \ldots, s_{n}(n>1)$ with $s_{1}=s, s_{n}=t$, and $\left\langle s_{i}, s_{i+1}\right\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{L}}$ for $\left.1 \leq i<n\right\}$.
Theorem 4.26. $\mathcal{A L C F I}_{+}$does not have BPF.
Proof. Consider the following $\mathcal{A L C F I}_{+}-$TBox $\mathcal{T}$.

$$
\begin{array}{llrl}
\top & \sqsubseteq & A R^{-} & \sqsubseteq \neg B \\
\top & \exists \exists R . \top & \exists R . B & \sqsubseteq \neg B \\
\top & \sqsubseteq R^{+} . A & \exists R . \neg B & \sqsubseteq B
\end{array}
$$

It is easy to see that $\mathcal{T}$ is finitely satisfiable, i.e., $\mathcal{T}$ has a finite model. In fact, we provide finite models $\mathcal{I}_{n}$, for $n>0$, of $\mathcal{T}$ below. We first show that the concept name $B$ is f-implicitly definable from $\Sigma=\{R, A\}$ under $\mathcal{T}$ and then show that there is no f-explicit definition of this concept from $\Sigma$ in the language. For an interpretation $\mathcal{I}$, an $R$-path and $R$-cycle in $\mathcal{I}$ are defined as in the proof of Theorem 4.21.

Claim 4.27. Let $\mathcal{I}$ be a finite model of $\mathcal{T}$. Then for all $s \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$, we have $\langle s, s\rangle \in\left(R^{+}\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$. Proof of claim. Identical to the proof of Claim 4.22 in the proof of Theorem 4.21.

Claim 4.28. We have
(a) $\mathcal{T} \models_{f} \top \sqsubseteq \exists R^{-} . \top$, and
(b) $\mathcal{T} \models_{f} \top \sqsubseteq \leq 1 R$.

Proof of claim. Part (a) follows immediately from the previous claim.
To prove part (b), suppose, for the sake of a contradiction that $\mathcal{T} \not \vDash_{f} \top \sqsubseteq \leq 1 R$. Then there is some finite model $\mathcal{I}$ of $\mathcal{T}$ and $s, t, u \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$ such that $t \neq u$ and $\langle s, t\rangle,\langle s, u\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{I}}$. Since $T \sqsubseteq \leq 1 R^{-} \in \mathcal{T}$ and $\mathcal{I} \models \mathcal{T}$ and by part (a) of our claim, we have that $\left(R^{-}\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$ is the graph of a total function on $\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$. Since $t \neq u$ and $\langle s, t\rangle,\langle s, u\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{I}}$, we also know that the cardinality of the image $Y$ of this function must be strictly smaller than the cardinality of the domain, i.e., $|Y|<\left|\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}\right|$. This implies that $Y \subsetneq \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$. But this contradicts with $\top \sqsubseteq \exists R . \top \in \mathcal{T}$ and $\mathcal{I} \models \mathcal{T}$. Hence we conclude that $\mathcal{T} \models_{f} \top \sqsubseteq \leq 1 R$.

For $s, t \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$, we write $\operatorname{odd}(s, t)$ if there is an $R$-path of odd length from $s$ to $t$, that is, an $R$-path $s_{0}, \ldots, s_{n}$ such that $s=s_{0}, t=s_{n}$, and $n$ is odd. Note that in an $R$-path like $s_{0}, \ldots, s_{n}$, we always have $n>0$.

Claim 4.29. For all finite models $\mathcal{I}$ of $\mathcal{T}$, we have

$$
B^{\mathcal{I}}=\left\{s \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}} \mid \exists t \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}} . \operatorname{odd}(s, t) \wedge t \in A^{\mathcal{I}}\right\} .
$$

Proof of claim. $(\Rightarrow)$ Suppose $s \in B^{\mathcal{I}}$. By the first claim, there is some $R$-cycle $p=s_{0}, \ldots, s_{n}$, where $s_{0}=s_{n}=s$ and $n>0$. Since $\top \sqsubseteq \exists R^{+} . A \in \mathcal{T}$ and $\mathcal{I} \models \mathcal{T}$, there is some $t \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$ such that $\langle s, t\rangle \in\left(R^{+}\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$ and $t \in A^{\mathcal{I}}$. We claim that $t=s_{i}$, for some $i \in\{1, \ldots, n-1\}$. To show this, we proceed towards a contradiction.

Suppose that our claim does not hold. Then there is some $R$-path $t_{0}, \ldots, t_{m}$, where $t_{0}=s$ and $t_{m}=t$. Obviously, this path is different from the $R$-cycle $p$ since $t$ does not occur in $p$. Now by using $\mathcal{T} \models_{f} \top \sqsubseteq \leq 1 R$ from the previous claim, we can show that every individual $t_{i}$ actually appears in $p$, which contradicts with the fact that $t$ does not appear in $p$. Hence we conclude that there is some $i \in\{1, \ldots, n-1\}$ such that $s_{i}=t$.

We will now show that $i$ is odd. By $A \sqsubseteq \neg B \in \mathcal{T}, \mathcal{I} \models \mathcal{T}$, and $t \in A^{\mathcal{I}}$, we have $t \notin B^{\mathcal{I}}$. Then by using $s \in B^{\mathcal{I}}$ and the axioms $\exists R . B \sqsubseteq \neg B \in \mathcal{T}, \exists R . \neg B \sqsubseteq B \in \mathcal{T}$, one can easily show by induction that $i$ is odd. This implies odd $(s, t)$.

Hence there is some $t \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$ such that $\operatorname{odd}(s, t)$ and $t \in A^{\mathcal{I}}$, which is what we wanted to show.
$(\Leftarrow)$ Suppose $s \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$ such that there is some $t \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$ with odd $(s, t)$ and $t \in A^{\mathcal{I}}$. This implies that there is some $R$-path $s_{0}, \ldots, s_{n}$ such that $s_{0}=s, s_{n}=t$, and $n$ is odd. By $t \in A^{\mathcal{I}}$, $A \sqsubseteq \neg B \in \mathcal{T}$, and $\mathcal{I} \models \mathcal{T}$, we have $t \notin B^{\mathcal{I}}$. Then by using the fact that $n$ is odd, the axioms $\exists R . B \sqsubseteq \neg B \in \mathcal{T}$ and $\exists R . \neg B \sqsubseteq B \in \mathcal{T}$, one can easily show by induction that $s \in B^{\mathcal{I}}$.

Claim 4.29 implies that $B$ is f-implicitly definable from $\Sigma$ under $\mathcal{T}$. The rest of the proof shows that there is no f-explicit definition of $B$ from $\Sigma$ under $\mathcal{T}$. For each $n \geq 0$, let $\mathcal{I}_{n}$ be the following interpretation:

- $\Delta^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}=\left\{s_{0}, \ldots, s_{2 n+3}\right\}$
- $R^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}=\left\{\left\langle s_{i}, s_{i+1}\right\rangle \mid 0 \leq i<2 n+3\right\} \cup\left\{\left\langle s_{2 n+3}, s_{0}\right\rangle\right\}$
- $A^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}=\left\{s_{n+2}\right\}$,
- $B^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}=\left\{s_{i} \mid 0 \leq i \leq 2 n+3\right.$ and $\left.\operatorname{odd}\left(s_{i}, s_{n+2}\right)\right\}$.

Intuitively, $\mathcal{I}_{n}$ is an $R$-cycle of (even) length $2 n+4$, some of whose elements satisfy the concept name $A$ and/or $B$. Observe that $\mathcal{I}_{n}$, for $n \geq 0$, is a model of $\mathcal{T}$. Define the function $d: \Delta^{\mathcal{I}_{n}} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ as follows.

$$
d\left(s_{i}\right)= \begin{cases}i-(n+2) & \text { if } i \geq n+2 \\ (n+2)-i & \text { if } i<n+2\end{cases}
$$

In other words, $d(s)$ is the distance between $s$ and $s_{n+2}$.
For each $\mathcal{A L C F} \mathcal{I}_{+}$-concept $C$, we will denote by $\operatorname{md}(C)$ the modal depth of $C$, that is, the maximal nesting depth of role constructors in $C$. Formally,

- $\operatorname{md}(A)=\operatorname{md}(\mathrm{T})=\operatorname{md}(\leq 1 R)=0$
- $\operatorname{md}(\neg C)=\operatorname{md}(C)$
- $\operatorname{md}(C \sqcap D)=\max \{\operatorname{md}(C), \operatorname{md}(D)\}$
- $\operatorname{md}(\exists R . C)=\operatorname{md}\left(\exists R^{+} . C\right)=\operatorname{md}(C)+1$
where $A \in C_{A}$ and $R$ is of the form $P$ or $P^{-}$with $P \in N_{R}$.
Claim 4.30. For all $i \in\{0, \ldots, n\}$ and all $s, s^{\prime} \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}_{n}} \backslash\left\{s \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}_{n}} \mid d(s) \leq i\right\}$, we have

$$
s \in C^{\mathcal{I}_{n}} \text { iff } s^{\prime} \in C^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}
$$

for all $\mathcal{A L C F I} \mathcal{I}_{+}$-concepts with $\operatorname{md}(C) \leq i$ and $\operatorname{sig}(C) \subseteq \Sigma$.
Proof of claim. Let $i \in\{0, \ldots, n\}, s, s^{\prime} \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}_{n}} \backslash\left\{s \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}_{n}} \mid d(s) \leq i\right\}$, and $C$ be an $\mathcal{A L C F} \mathcal{I}_{+}$-concept with $\mathrm{md}(C) \leq i$ and $\operatorname{sig}(C) \subseteq \Sigma$. The proof is by induction on $i$.

For $i=0$. Since $\operatorname{md}(C)=0$ and $\operatorname{sig}(C) \subseteq \Sigma, C$ obeys the following grammar:

$$
C::=\top|A| \leq 1 S|\neg C| C \sqcap C
$$

where $S=R$ or $S=R^{-}$(recall that we forbid the use of transitive closure inside functionality restrictions).

By induction on the structure of $C$, we show that $s \in C^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}$ iff $s^{\prime} \in C^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}$.

- $C=\top$. By the definition of an interpretation, we have $s \in T^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}$ and $s^{\prime} \in \top^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}$. Hence $s \in T^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}$ iff $s^{\prime} \in T^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}$.
- $C=A$ (recall that $A$ is the only concept name in $\Sigma$ ). By assumption, we have $s \neq s_{n+2}$ and $s^{\prime} \neq s_{n+2}$. Then by the definition of $\mathcal{I}_{n}$, we obtain $s \notin A^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}$ and $s^{\prime} \notin A^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}$. Hence $s \in A^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}$ iff $s^{\prime} \in A^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}$.
- $C=\leq 1 S$. By the definition of $\mathcal{I}_{n}$, we have for all $t \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}$ that $\left|S^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}(t)\right|=1$. Then in particular, $\left|S^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}(s)\right|=\left|S^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}\left(s^{\prime}\right)\right|=1$. Hence $s \in(\leq 1 S)^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}$ iff $s^{\prime} \in(\leq 1 S)^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}$.
- $C=\neg D$. Follows easily by the inductive hypothesis for $C$.
- $C=C_{1} \sqcap C_{2}$. Follows easily by the inductive hypothesis for $C$.

Hence we conclude that $s \in C^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}$ iff $s^{\prime} \in C^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}$, for $i=0$.
Next, consider the case that $i>0$, and let $\operatorname{md}(C) \leq i$ and $\operatorname{sig}(C) \subseteq \Sigma$. Then we have that $C$ obeys the following grammar:

$$
C::=\exists S . E\left|\exists S^{+} . E\right| \neg C \mid C \sqcap C
$$

where $\operatorname{md}(E) \leq i-1$, and $S=R$ or $S=R^{-}$. By induction on the structure of $C$, we show that $s \in C^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}$ iff $s^{\prime} \in C^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}$.

- $C=\exists S$. $E$ with $\operatorname{md}(E) \leq i-1$, and $S=R$ or $S=R^{-}$. By the definition of $\mathcal{I}_{n}$, we have that there is exactly one $t \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}$ with $\langle s, t\rangle \in S^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}$ and exactly one $t^{\prime} \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}$ with $\left\langle s^{\prime}, t^{\prime}\right\rangle \in S^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}$. Moreover, $t, t^{\prime} \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}_{n}} \backslash\left\{s \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}_{n}} \mid d(s) \leq i-1\right\}$. We have that the following are equivalent:
$-s \in(\exists S . E)^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}$
$-t \in E^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}$ (since $t$ is the only individual with $\langle s, t\rangle \in S^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}$ )
$-t^{\prime} \in E^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}$ (by the inductive hypothesis for $i$ )
$-s^{\prime} \in(\exists S . E)^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}$ (since $t$ is the only individual with $\left\langle s^{\prime}, t^{\prime}\right\rangle \in S^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}$ ).
- $D=\exists S^{+} . E$ with $\operatorname{md}(E)=i-1$, and $S=R$ or $S=R^{-}$. Suppose first $s \in\left(\exists S^{+} . E\right)^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}$. Then there is some $t \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$ such that $\langle s, t\rangle \in\left(S^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}\right)^{+}$and $t \in E^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}$. We distinguish the following cases:
$-t \neq s^{\prime}$. Then by the definition of $\mathcal{I}_{n}$, we immediately obtain $\left\langle s^{\prime}, t\right\rangle \in\left(S^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}\right)^{+}$; and by $t \in E^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}$ this implies $s^{\prime} \in\left(\exists S^{+} . E\right)^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}$.
$-t=s^{\prime}$. By the definition of $\mathcal{I}_{n}$, we have $\left\langle s^{\prime}, s\right\rangle \in\left(S^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}\right)^{+}$. Moreover, $s, s^{\prime} \in$ $\Delta^{\mathcal{I}_{n}} \backslash\left\{s \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}_{n}} \mid d(s) \leq i-1\right\}$. Then by the inductive hypothesis on $i$ and $s^{\prime} \in E^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}$, we have $s \in E^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}$, which implies by $\left\langle s^{\prime}, s\right\rangle \in\left(S^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}\right)^{+}$that $s^{\prime} \in\left(\exists S^{+} . E\right)^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}$.

Hence $s^{\prime} \in\left(\exists S^{+} . E\right)^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}$ in both cases, which is what we wanted to show. The direction from right to left can be shown analogously.

- The other cases can be shown easily by the inductive hypothesis on $C$.

Hence the claim follows.
Claim 4.31. There is no $\mathcal{A L C F} \mathcal{I}_{+}$-concept $C$ such that $\operatorname{sig}(C) \subseteq\{A, R\}$ and $\mathcal{T}=_{f} B \equiv C$.
Proof of claim. We proceed towards a contradiction so suppose the existence of such a concept $C$. By definition, $\operatorname{md}(C)=n$, for some $n \geq 0$; and $s_{0}, s_{1} \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}_{n}} \backslash\left\{s \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}_{n}} \mid d(s) \leq\right.$ $n\}$. Then by the previous claim, we have $s_{0} \in C^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}$ iff $s_{1} \in C^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}$. Then by the fact that $\mathcal{I}_{n}$ is a finite model of $\mathcal{T}$ and $\mathcal{T} \models_{f} B \equiv C$, we have $s_{0} \in B^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}$ iff $s_{1} \in B^{\mathcal{I}_{n}}$. This implies by the definition of $\mathcal{I}_{n}$ and Claim 4.29 that odd $\left(s_{0}, s_{n+2}\right)$ iff odd $\left(s_{1}, s_{n+2}\right)$, which is a contradiction. Hence we conclude that there exists no $\mathcal{A L C F} \mathcal{I}_{+}$-concept $C$ such that $\operatorname{sig}(C) \subseteq\{A, R\}$ and $\mathcal{T} \models B \equiv C$.

Now the proof of the theorem is as follows. By Claim 4.29, $B$ is f-implicitly definable from $\Sigma=\{A, R\}$ under $\mathcal{T}$. But by Claim 4.31, $B$ is not f-explicitly definable from $\Sigma$ under $\mathcal{T}$. Hence $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C F} \mathcal{I}_{+}$does not have BPF.

## 5. Concluding Remarks

In this paper, we studied BP in expressive DLs with commonly used concept constructors. All of these constructors appear in the Web Ontology Language OWL-Lite (Horrocks et al., 2003). OWL-Lite is now superseded by OWL 2, which supports some other important constructors such as nominals, denoted by $\mathcal{O}$ in the language, and qualified number restrictions, denoted by $\mathcal{Q}$ in the language. There are already some results available regarding BP in logics having $\mathcal{Q}$ or $\mathcal{O}$.
$\mathcal{Q}$ is a generalization of $\mathcal{F}$ and ten Cate et al. (2006) show via a model-theoretic argument that CBP holds in $\mathcal{A L C Q}$. We believe that BP can also be shown to hold for $\mathcal{A L C Q}$ and $\mathcal{A L C Q I}$ using a model-theoretic argument; although such an argument gives no upper bound on the size of explicit definitions. Extending our upper bound results on the size of explicit definitions to these logics appears to be more difficult because of the unavailability of a natural and optimal tableau algorithm for these logics.

In logics with $\mathcal{O}$, besides the concept and role names, we assume a set $N_{I}=\{i, j, \ldots\}$ of nominals. Syntactically, nominals are treated as atomic concepts but semantically each nominal is interpreted as a singleton set. The presence of nominals gives rise to two different Beth definability properties. In the first one, we are allowed to restrict the nominals appearing in implicit/explicit definitions by making them part of the signature $\Sigma$; in the second one, definitions are allowed to use any nominal from $N_{I}$. Obviously, the first one is a stronger property. Ten Cate et al. (2006) show that even the second property fails in $\mathcal{A L C O}$. They also observe that extending $\mathcal{A L C O}$ with concepts of the form $@_{i} C$ is enough to regain CBP. Intuitively, $@_{i} C$ says that the point satisfying the nominal $i$ also satisfies the concept $C$.

In a similar way, one can try to identify an extension of $\mathcal{A L C H}$ that has BP . In the proof of Theorem 4.18, our argument for the failure of BP in the considered logics was that they can not express role conjunction. It remains open if $\mathcal{A L C H}$ extended with the role conjunction constructor has BP. Another interesting open question is to identify a minimal extension of $\mathcal{A L C \mathcal { L I }}$ having BPF.

By Theorem 3.36, we know how to compute first-order explicit definitions of single exponential size, given that a concept is implicitly defined under a TBox. We leave as another open problem the existence of a matching lower bound, i.e., is there a family of TBoxes implicitly defining a concept such that smallest explicit definitions in first-order logic are single exponentially big?

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## Appendix A. Quasimodels

Decision procedures based on semantic tableau do not construct a model of the given formula/concept, but a finite representation of a model from which the model can be unfolded. In this paper, we will use the term 'quasimodel' to denote such a finite representation following Andréka, Németi, and van Benthem (1998). Various other names have been used in the literature, including Hintikka structures (Schwendimann, 1998), model graph (Goré, 1999), and even tableau (Horrocks \& Sattler, 2007). Modulo some differences, the building blocks of these structures are sets of finite concepts each of which is a subset of a relevant concept closure. We will be using the definition of concept closure $\mathrm{cl}(C, \mathcal{T})$ given in Section 3.1.

Remark A.1. For the rest of the appendix, we assume that $\mathcal{A L C \mathcal { F }}$-concepts are defined recursively as in Section 2.1 using also $\perp, \sqcup, \forall R . C$, and $\geq 2 R$ as primitives; all concepts are in NNF; and $\mathcal{A L C \mathcal { F }}$-TBoxes consist only of axioms of the form $T \sqsubseteq C$. For a discussion of these assumptions, we refer the reader to the beginning of Section 3.1.

Not every subset of the concept closure is suitable to take part in a quasimodel. Depending on the logic at hand, these sets satisfy some basic consistency requirements. Following, e.g., Lutz et al. (2005), we will use the term 'type' to denote these sets satisfying these requirements. Note, however, that the non-membership of a concept in a type does not imply the membership of the negation of the concept in the type. In this respect, our types are similar to Hintikka sets, which are also called downward-saturated sets (cf. Fitting, 1996).

Definition A.2. Let $C_{0}$ be an $\mathcal{A L C \mathcal { F }}$-concept and let $\mathcal{T}$ be an $\mathcal{A L C \mathcal { F }}$-TBox. $A \tau \subseteq$ $\mathrm{cl}\left(C_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right)$ is called an $\left\langle C_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right\rangle$-type for $\mathcal{A L C \mathcal { F }}$ if and only if for all $A, C, C_{1}, C_{2}, \exists R . C, \geq$ $2 R, \leq 1 R \in \mathrm{cl}\left(C_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right)$,

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \left(\mathrm{P}_{\perp}\right) \perp \notin \tau ; \\
& \left(\mathrm{P}_{\neg}\right)\{A, \neg A\} \nsubseteq \tau ; \\
& \left(\mathrm{P}_{\square}\right) \text { if } C_{1} \sqcap C_{2} \in \tau \text {, then } C_{1} \in \tau \text { and } C_{2} \in \tau ; \\
& \left(\mathrm{P}_{\sqcup}\right) \text { if } C_{1} \sqcup C_{2} \in \tau \text {, then } C_{1} \in \tau \text { or } C_{2} \in \tau ; \\
& \left.\left(\mathrm{P}_{\sqsubseteq}\right) \text { if }\right\rceil \sqsubseteq C \in \mathcal{T} \text {, then } C \in \tau ; \\
& \left(\mathrm{P}_{\bowtie}\right)\{\leq 1 R, \geq 2 R\} \nsubseteq \tau ; \\
& \left(\mathrm{P}_{\leq 1}\right) \text { if }\{\leq 1 R, \exists R . C\} \subseteq \tau \text {, then } \forall R . C \in \tau .
\end{aligned}
$$

When a type belongs to a quasimodel, it may force some other type to also belong to the quasimodel, for instance to witness an existential statement. In fact, a quasimodel is a collection of types coherent with each other in this sense.

Definition A.3. Let $C_{0}$ be an $\mathcal{A L C F}$-concept, $\mathcal{T}$ an $\mathcal{A L C F}$-TBox and $\tau, v$ two $\left\langle C_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right\rangle$ types for $\mathcal{A L C F}$.

- We write $\tau \stackrel{\exists R . C}{ } v$ if $\exists R . C \in \tau$ and $\{C\} \cup\left\{C^{\prime} \mid \forall R . C^{\prime} \in \tau\right\} \subseteq v$.
- We write $\tau \stackrel{\geqq 2 R}{ } v$ if $\geq 2 R \in \tau$ and $\left\{C^{\prime} \mid \forall R . C^{\prime} \in \tau\right\} \subseteq v$.
- A set $Q$ of $\left\langle C_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right\rangle$-types for $\mathcal{A L C \mathcal { F }}$ is a $\left\langle C_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right\rangle$-quasimodel for $\mathcal{A L C \mathcal { F }}$ if it satisfies:
(a) there is some $\tau_{0} \in Q$ such that $C_{0} \in \tau_{0}$;
(b) for every $\tau \in Q$ and $\exists R . C \in \tau$, there is a type $v \in Q$ such that $\tau \xrightarrow{\exists R . C} v$; and
(c) for every $\tau \in Q$ and $\geq 2 R \in \tau$, there is a type $v \in Q$ such that $\tau \stackrel{\geqq 2 R}{\Longrightarrow} v$.

The following theorem will be useful in soundness and completeness proofs of the tableau and interpolation algorithms. Its proof is inspired by Marx and Venema (2007).

Theorem A.4. An $\mathcal{A L C F}$-concept $C_{0}$ is satisfiable w.r.t. an $\mathcal{A L C F}$-TBox $\mathcal{T}$ if and only if there is some $\left\langle C_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right\rangle$-quasimodel for $\mathcal{A L C \mathcal { F }}$.

Proof. $(\Rightarrow)$ Given a model $\mathcal{I}=\left\langle\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}, \cdot^{\mathcal{I}}\right\rangle$ of $\mathcal{T}$ with $C_{0}^{\mathcal{I}} \neq \emptyset$, we carve out for all $s \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$, a set of concepts $\mathcal{L}(s) \subseteq \mathrm{cl}\left(C_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right)$ as follows.

$$
\mathcal{L}(s)=\left\{C \in \mathrm{cl}\left(C_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right) \mid s \in C^{\mathcal{I}}\right\} .
$$

Now let $Q=\left\{\mathcal{L}(s) \mid s \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}\right\}$.
Claim A.5. Each $\tau \in Q$ is a $\left\langle C_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right\rangle$-type for $\mathcal{A L C \mathcal { F }}$.
Proof of claim. Suppose $\tau \in Q$. Then $\tau=\mathcal{L}(s)$ for some $s \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$. We verify the conditions in Definition A. 2.

- By definition, $\perp^{\mathcal{I}}=\emptyset$ and thus $s \notin \perp^{\mathcal{I}}$ and thus $\perp \notin \mathcal{L}(s)$. Hence $\left(\mathrm{P}_{\perp}\right)$ is satisfied.
- By the virtue of $\mathcal{I}$ being an interpretation, it is not the case that $s \in A^{\mathcal{I}}$ and $s \in(\neg A)^{\mathcal{I}}$. Hence $\left(P_{\neg}\right)$ is satisfied.
- If $C_{1} \sqcap C_{2} \in \mathcal{L}(s)$, then $s \in\left(C_{1} \sqcap C_{2}\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$. Since $\mathcal{I}$ is an interpretation, $s \in C_{1}^{\mathcal{I}}$ and $s \in C_{2}^{\mathcal{I}}$. But then $C_{1}, C_{2} \in \mathcal{L}(s)$. Hence ( $\mathrm{P}_{\square}$ ) is satisfied.
- If $C_{1} \sqcup C_{2} \in \mathcal{L}(s)$, then $s \in\left(C_{1} \sqcup C_{2}\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$. Since $\mathcal{I}$ is an interpretation, $s \in C_{1}^{\mathcal{I}}$ or $s \in C_{2}^{\mathcal{I}}$. But then $C_{1} \in \mathcal{L}(s)$ or $C_{2} \in \mathcal{L}(s)$. Hence ( $\mathrm{P}_{\sqcup}$ ) is satisfied.
- If $T \sqsubseteq C \in \mathcal{T}$, then $\Delta^{\mathcal{I}} \subseteq C^{\mathcal{I}}$ and thus $s \in C^{\mathcal{I}}$. But then $C \in \mathcal{L}(s)$. Hence $\left(\mathrm{P}_{\sqsubseteq}\right)$ is satisfied.
- Suppose for a contradiction that $\left(\mathrm{P}_{\bowtie}\right)$ does not hold. Then $s \in(\leq 1 R)^{\mathcal{I}}$ and $s \in(\geq$ $2 R)^{\mathcal{I}}$. But this is a contradiction. Hence $\left(\mathrm{P}_{\bowtie}\right)$ is satisfied.
- Suppose $\{\leq 1 R, \exists R . C\} \subseteq \tau$. By assumption $s \in(\leq 1 R)^{\mathcal{I}}$ and $s \in(\exists R . C)^{\mathcal{I}}$. Then it follows that there is exactly one $t \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$ such that $\langle s, t\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{I}}$ and $t \in C^{\mathcal{I}}$. But then $s \in(\forall R . C)^{\mathcal{I}}$. Hence $\left(\mathrm{P}_{\leq 1}\right)$ is satisfied.

Since we have shown that all the conditions in Definition A. 2 are satisfied, we conclude that $\tau$ is a $\left\langle C_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right\rangle$-type for $\mathcal{A L C F}$.

We claim that $Q$ is a $\left\langle C_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right\rangle$-quasimodel. By Claim A.5, if $\tau \in Q$, then $\tau$ is a $\left\langle C_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right\rangle$-type for $\mathcal{A L C F}$. Thus it remains to show that condition (a), (b), and (c) from Definition A. 3 are satisfied.

For (a), since $C_{0}^{\mathcal{I}} \neq \emptyset$, there is some $s_{0} \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$ such that $s_{0} \in C_{0}^{\mathcal{I}}$ and by the construction of $Q, \mathcal{L}\left(s_{0}\right)$ is in $Q$. Hence, condition (a) is satisfied.

For condition (b), suppose $\exists R . C \in \mathcal{L}(s)$ for some $s \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$. This means $s \in(\exists R . C)^{\mathcal{I}}$, i.e., there is some individual $t$ such that $\langle s, t\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{I}}$ and $t \in C^{\mathcal{I}}$. Then by the construction of $Q$, we have $C \in \mathcal{L}(t)$. Now let $\forall R . D \in \mathcal{L}(s)$. Then by the construction of $Q$, we have $s \in(\forall R . D)^{\mathcal{I}}$. This implies by $\langle s, t\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{I}}$ that $t \in D^{\mathcal{I}}$. By the construction of $Q$ again, we obtain $D \in \mathcal{L}(t)$. Hence, $\mathcal{L}(s) \xrightarrow{\exists R . C} \mathcal{L}(t)$; and we conclude that (b) is satisfied.

The proof for (c) is analogous.
$(\Leftarrow)$ Suppose that $Q$ is a $\left\langle C_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right\rangle$-quasimodel for $\mathcal{A L C F}$. The idea of the proof is to construct an interpretation $\mathcal{I}$ inductively using $Q$ and then show that $\mathcal{I} \models \mathcal{T}$ and $C_{0}^{\mathcal{I}} \neq \emptyset$. For this construction, we need to introduce some notation first.

Let $\mathcal{I}$ be an interpretation and let $\mathcal{L}: \Delta^{\mathcal{I}} \rightarrow Q$. A pair $\langle s, C\rangle$ with $s \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$ and $C \in \operatorname{cl}\left(C_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right)$ is called a defect of $\mathcal{I}$ w.r.t. $\mathcal{L}$, if and only if,

- $\exists R . C \in \mathcal{L}(s)$ and there is no $t \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$ such that $\langle s, t\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{I}}$ and $C \in \mathcal{L}(t)$, or
- $\geq 2 R \in \mathcal{L}(s)$ and $\left|\left\{t \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}} \mid\langle s, t\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{I}}\right\}\right|<2$.

Fix a map $f: \mathrm{cl}\left(C_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right) \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$, and let $\preceq$ be any linear order on the Cartesian product $\mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N}$ of order type $\omega$ (recall that a countably infinite linear order is said to have order type $\omega$ if for each element in the order there are only finitely many elements that are less than it; it is well known that there are linear orders on $\mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N}$ of order type $\omega$ ).

We are now ready to define by induction the interpretations $\mathcal{I}_{i}=\left\langle\Delta^{\mathcal{I}_{i}}, \mathcal{I}_{i}\right\rangle$ with $\Delta^{\mathcal{I}_{i}} \subseteq \mathbb{N}$ and mappings $\mathcal{L}_{i}: \Delta^{\mathcal{I}_{i}} \rightarrow Q$, for $i \in \mathbb{N}$.
Base case. By condition (a) from Definition A.3, there is some type $\tau_{0} \in Q$ with $C_{0} \in \tau_{0}$. Define the interpretation $\mathcal{I}_{0}$ as follows.

- $\Delta^{\mathcal{I}_{0}}=\{s\}$, for some $s \in \mathbb{N} ;$
- for all $A \in N_{C}$,
- if $A \in \tau_{0}$, then $A^{\mathcal{I}_{0}}=\{s\}$,
- if $A \notin \tau_{0}$, then $A^{\mathcal{I}_{0}}=\emptyset ;$
- for all $R \in N_{R}, R^{\mathcal{I}_{0}}=\emptyset$.

Set $\mathcal{L}_{0}=\left\{s \mapsto \tau_{0}\right\}$.
Inductive step. If there is no defect of $\mathcal{I}_{i}$ w.r.t. $\mathcal{L}_{i}$, then set $\mathcal{I}_{i+1}=\mathcal{I}_{i}$ and $\mathcal{L}_{i+1}=\mathcal{L}_{i}$; otherwise, let $\langle s, C\rangle$ be the least defect of $\mathcal{I}_{i}$ w.r.t. $\mathcal{L}_{i}$, i.e., for every defect $\langle t, D\rangle$ of $\mathcal{I}_{i}$ w.r.t. $\mathcal{L}_{i}$, we have $\langle s, f(C)\rangle \preceq\langle t, f(D)\rangle$ (using the fact that $\prec$ has order type $\omega$ ). By $\mathcal{L}_{i}(s) \in Q$ and conditions (b) and (c) from Definition A.3, there is some $\tau \in Q$ such that $\mathcal{L}_{i}(s) \stackrel{C}{\Rightarrow} \tau$. If $C=\exists R . D$, then let $t \in \mathbb{N} \backslash \Delta^{\mathcal{I}_{i}}$ and define

- $\Delta^{\mathcal{I}_{i+1}}=\Delta^{\mathcal{I}_{i}} \cup\{t\}$,
- for all $A \in N_{C}$,
- if $A \in \tau$, then $A^{\mathcal{I}_{i+1}}=A^{\mathcal{I}_{i}} \cup\{t\}$,
- if $A \notin \tau$, then $A^{\mathcal{I}_{i+1}}=A^{\mathcal{I}_{i}}$;
- for all $S \in N_{R}$,
- if $S=R$, then $S^{\mathcal{I}_{i+1}}=\{\langle s, t\rangle\} \cup S^{\mathcal{I}_{i}}$,
- if $S \neq R$, then $S^{\mathcal{I}_{i+1}}=S^{\mathcal{I}_{i}}$.

Also set $\mathcal{L}_{i+1}=\mathcal{L}_{i} \cup\{t \mapsto \tau\}$. If $C=\geq 2 R$, then let $t_{1}, t_{2} \in \mathbb{N} \backslash \Delta^{\mathcal{I}_{i}}$ with $t_{1} \neq t_{2}$ and define

- $\Delta^{\mathcal{I}_{i+1}}=\Delta^{\mathcal{I}_{i}} \cup\left\{t_{1}, t_{2}\right\}$,
- for all $A \in N_{C}$,
- if $A \in \tau$, then $A^{\mathcal{I}_{i+1}}=A^{\mathcal{I}_{i}} \cup\left\{t_{1}, t_{2}\right\}$,
- if $A \notin \tau$, then $A^{\mathcal{I}_{i+1}}=A^{\mathcal{I}_{i}}$;
- for all $S \in N_{R}$,
- if $S=R$, then $S^{\mathcal{I}_{i+1}}=\left\{\left\langle s, t_{1}\right\rangle,\left\langle s, t_{2}\right\rangle\right\} \cup S^{\mathcal{I}_{i}}$,
- if $S \neq R$, then $S^{\mathcal{I}_{i+1}}=S^{\mathcal{I}_{i}}$.

Also set $\mathcal{L}_{i+1}=\mathcal{L}_{i} \cup\left\{t_{1} \mapsto \tau, t_{2} \mapsto \tau\right\}$. This finishes our inductive construction. Now define the interpretation $\mathcal{I}$ as follows:

- $\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}=\bigcup_{i \geq 0} \Delta^{\mathcal{I}_{i}}$,
- for all $P \in N_{C} \cup N_{R}, P^{\mathcal{I}}=\bigcup_{i \geq 0} P^{\mathcal{I}_{i}}$.

Also set $\mathcal{L}=\bigcup_{i \geq 0} \mathcal{L}_{i}$. Observe that $\mathcal{L}$ is a total mapping from $\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$ to $Q$.
Claim A.6. For all concepts $C \in \operatorname{cl}\left(C_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right)$ and all $s \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$, if $C \in \mathcal{L}(s)$ then $s \in C^{\mathcal{I}}$.
Proof of claim. Let $s$ and $C$ be as stated in the claim. Suppose $C \in \mathcal{L}(s)$. Then by the definition of $\mathcal{L}$, there is some $i \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $C \in \mathcal{L}_{i}(s)$; let $i$ be the smallest natural number satisfying $C \in \mathcal{L}_{i}(s)$, i.e., $\mathcal{I}_{i}$ is the interpretation that we introduced $s$. By induction on the structure of $C$, we show that $s \in C^{\mathcal{I}}$. Since for all $\tau \in Q$, we have $\perp \notin \tau$ by ( $\mathrm{P}_{\perp}$ ), it follows that $C \neq \perp$. Hence, we consider the remaining cases for $C$.

- $C=\top$. We have by assumption that $s \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$, i.e., $s \in \top^{\mathcal{I}}$.
- $C=A$, for some $A \in N_{C}$. Then by the definition of $\mathcal{I}_{i}$ and $A \in \mathcal{L}_{i}(s)$, it immediately follows that $s \in A^{\mathcal{I}_{i}}$. This implies by the definition of $\mathcal{I}$ that $s \in A^{\mathcal{I}}$.
- $C=\neg A$, for some $A \in N_{C}$. Since $\mathcal{L}_{i}(s) \in Q, \mathcal{L}_{i}(s)$ satisfies $\left(\mathrm{P}_{\neg}\right)$. Then by $\neg A \in \mathcal{L}_{i}(s)$, we have $A \notin \mathcal{L}_{i}(s)$. One can now easily show by induction that for all $k \geq i$, we have $s \notin A^{\mathcal{I}_{k}}$. This implies by our assumption about $i$ that for all $k \in \mathbb{N}, s \notin A^{\mathcal{I}_{k}}$. Then by the definition of $\mathcal{I}$, we obtain $s \notin A^{\mathcal{I}}$, i.e., $s \in(\neg A)^{\mathcal{I}}$.
- $C=C_{1} \sqcap C_{2}$. Follows easily by the inductive hypothesis and ( $\mathrm{P}_{\square}$ ).
- $C=C_{1} \sqcup C_{2}$. Follows easily by the inductive hypothesis and $\left(\mathrm{P}_{\sqcup}\right)$.
- $C=\forall R . D$. Let $t \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$ such that $\langle s, t\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{I}}$. We need to show that $t \in D^{\mathcal{I}}$. By $\langle s, t\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{I}}$, there is some $k \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $\langle s, t\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{I}_{k}}$; w.l.o.g. assume that $\mathcal{I}_{k}$ is the interpretation that we introduced $t$. It follows that there is some $E \in \operatorname{cl}\left(C_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right)$ such that $\langle s, E\rangle$ is a defect of $\mathcal{I}_{k-1}$ w.r.t. $\mathcal{L}_{k-1}$ and $\mathcal{L}_{k}(s) \stackrel{E}{\Rightarrow} \mathcal{L}_{k}(t)$. This implies $D \in \mathcal{L}_{k}(t)$. Then by the definition of $\mathcal{L}$, we obtain $D \in \mathcal{L}(t)$. By the inductive hypothesis, this implies $t \in D^{\mathcal{I}}$. Hence, $s \in(\forall R . D)^{\mathcal{I}}$.
- $C=\exists R$.D. By our assumption about $i$, we have that $\langle s, C\rangle$ is a defect of $\mathcal{I}_{i}$ w.r.t. $\mathcal{L}_{i}$. By the definition of $\preceq$, there are finitely many pairs $\langle t, E\rangle$ with $t \in \mathbb{N}$ and $E \in \operatorname{cl}\left(C_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right)$ such that $\langle t, f(E)\rangle \preceq\langle s, f(C)\rangle$. This implies that there is some $k>i$ such that we 'fix' the defect $\langle s, C\rangle$ at step $k$. Then there is some $t \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}_{k}}$ such that $\langle s, t\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{I}_{k}}$ and $D \in \mathcal{L}_{k}(t)$. By the definition of $\mathcal{I}$, we then have $\langle s, t\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{I}}$ and $D \in \mathcal{L}(t)$. By the inductive hypothesis, the latter implies $t \in D^{\mathcal{I}}$. Hence, $s \in(\exists R . D)^{\mathcal{I}}$.
- $C=\leq 1 R$. Suppose for a contradiction that there are $t_{1}, t_{2} \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$ such that $t_{1} \neq t_{2}$ and $\left\langle s, t_{1}\right\rangle,\left\langle s, t_{2}\right\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{I}}$. Then there are $k_{1}, k_{2} \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $\left\langle s, t_{i}\right\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{I}_{k_{i}}}$ and $\mathcal{I}_{k_{i}}$ is the interpretation that we introduced $t_{i}$, for each $i \in\{1,2\}$. By our construction, this implies that there are concepts $C_{1}, C_{2} \in \mathrm{cl}\left(C_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right)$ such that $\left\langle s, C_{i}\right\rangle$ is a defect of $\mathcal{I}_{k_{i}-1}$ w.r.t. $\mathcal{L}_{k_{i}-1}$ and $\mathcal{L}_{k_{i}}(s) \stackrel{C_{i}}{\Longrightarrow} \mathcal{L}_{k_{i}}\left(t_{i}\right)$, for each $i \in\{1,2\}$. It follows that $C_{i} \neq \geq 2 R$, for each $i \in\{1,2\}$; otherwise, we would obtain a contradiction by ( $\mathrm{P}_{\bowtie}$ ). Thus, $C_{1}=\exists R . D_{1}$ and $C_{2}=\exists R . D_{2}$. Then by the definition of $\mathrm{cl}\left(C_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right)$, we have $\forall R . D_{1}, \forall R . D_{2} \in \mathrm{cl}\left(C_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right)$; and by $\left(\mathrm{P}_{\leq 1}\right)$, this implies $\forall R . D_{1}, \forall R . D_{2} \in \mathcal{L}_{k_{1}}(s)=$ $\mathcal{L}_{k_{2}}(s)$. Suppose w.l.o.g. that $k_{1}<k_{2}$. Then $D_{2} \in \mathcal{L}_{k_{1}}\left(t_{1}\right)$. But this contradicts with the fact that $\left\langle s, \exists R . D_{2}\right\rangle$ is a defect of $\mathcal{I}_{k_{2}-1}$ w.r.t $\mathcal{L}_{k_{2}-1}$.
- $C=\geq 2 R$. This case can be shown similarly to the case $C=\exists R . D$.

Since we considered all the possible cases, we conclude that the claim holds.
Using Claim A.6, this direction of the Theorem can now be shown easily as follows. By the base case of our inductive construction, there is some $s \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}_{0}}$ such that $C_{0} \in \mathcal{L}_{0}(s)$. This implies $C_{0} \in \mathcal{L}(s)$ and then by Claim A.6, we obtain $s \in C_{0}^{\mathcal{I}}$. Moreover, by Claim A. 6 and ( $\mathrm{P}_{\sqsubseteq}$ ), we have $\mathcal{I} \models \mathcal{T}$. Hence $C_{0}$ is satisfiable w.r.t. $\mathcal{T}$.

## Appendix B. Useful Lemmas for Tableau Correctness and Interpolation

For all $\Phi \subseteq$ cll $\cup$ clr, we define

$$
\Phi(\mathbf{l})=\left\{C \mid C^{\mathbf{l}} \in \Phi \cap \mathrm{cll}\right\} \text { and } \Phi(\mathbf{r})=\left\{C \mid C^{\mathbf{r}} \in \Phi \cap \mathrm{clr}\right\} .
$$

$\Phi(\lambda)$ is a shorthand for $\Phi(\mathbf{l}) \cup \Phi(\mathbf{r})$. In the following the signature of a set of $\mathcal{A L C} \mathcal{F}$ concepts $S$ will be of concern. We define $\operatorname{sig}(S)=\bigcup_{C \in S} \operatorname{sig}(C)$. Let $\tau$ be a finite set of $\mathcal{A L C} \mathcal{F}$-concepts and $\mathcal{T}$ be an $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C} \mathcal{F}$-TBox. We say that $\tau$ is satisfiable w.r.t. $\mathcal{T}$ if and only if $\prod_{D \in \mathcal{T}} D$ is satisfiable w.r.t. $\mathcal{T}$. Moreover a $\Phi \subseteq \mathrm{cll} \cup$ clr is satisfiable w.r.t. $\mathcal{T}$ if and only if $\Phi(\lambda)$ is satisfiable w.r.t. $\mathcal{T}$.

Lemma B.1. Let $\Phi \subseteq \mathrm{cll} \cup \mathrm{clr}$ be satisfiable w.r.t. $\mathcal{T}$. We have

- if $\chi$ is an $\star$-burden of $\Phi$ for $\star \in\{\sqcap, \leq 1, \exists, \geq 2\}$ and $\Psi$ is the $\chi$-relief of $\Phi$, then $\Psi$ is satisfiable w.r.t. $\mathcal{T}$;
- if $\chi$ is an $\sqcup-b u r d e n$ of $\Phi$, then there is some $\chi$-relief $\Psi$ of $\Phi$ such that $\Psi$ is satisfiable w.r.t. $\mathcal{T}$.

Proof. Suppose that $\Phi$ is as stated in the Theorem, i.e., it is satisfiable w.r.t. $\mathcal{T}$. This means $\Phi(\lambda)$ is satisfiable w.r.t. $\mathcal{T}$. By Theorem A.4 we then have that there is some $\langle C, \mathcal{T}\rangle$-quasimodel $Q$ for $\mathcal{A L C \mathcal { F }}$, where $C=\prod_{D \in \Phi(\lambda)} D$. This means there is some $\tau \in Q$ such that $\Phi(\lambda) \subseteq \tau$. We will also use the term $\langle\tau, \mathcal{T}\rangle$-quasimodel for $Q$.

Assume that $\left(C_{1} \sqcap C_{2}\right)^{\lambda}$ is an $\sqcap$-burden of $\Phi$. Then the $\left(C_{1} \sqcap C_{2}\right)^{\lambda}$-relief of $\Phi$ is $\Psi=$ $\Phi \cup\left\{\left(C_{1}\right)^{\lambda},\left(C_{2}\right)^{\lambda}\right\}$. By $\left(\mathrm{P}_{\square}\right),\left\{C_{1}, C_{2}\right\} \subseteq \tau$ and thus $\Psi(\lambda) \subseteq \tau$. Hence $\Psi(\lambda)$ is satisfiable w.r.t. $\mathcal{T}$.

Assume that $(\leq 1 R)^{\lambda}$ is an $\leq 1$-burden of $\Phi$. Then the $(\leq 1 R)^{\lambda}$-relief of $\Phi$ is $\Psi=$ $\Phi \cup\left\{(\forall R . C)^{\kappa} \mid(\exists R . C)^{\kappa} \in \Phi\right\}$. If $(\exists R . C)^{\kappa} \in \Phi$, then $\exists R . C \in \tau$ and by $\left(\mathrm{P}_{\leq 1}\right), \forall R . C \in \tau$. Hence $\Psi(\lambda) \subseteq \tau$ and $\Psi$ is satisfiable w.r.t. $\mathcal{T}$.

Assume that $(\exists R . C)^{\lambda}$ is an $\exists$-burden of $\Phi . ~ \Phi(\lambda) \subseteq \tau$ so by condition (b) of Definition A.3, there is some $v \in Q$ such that $v \supseteq\{C\} \cup\{D \mid \forall R . D \in \Phi(\lambda)\}$; and by ( $\mathrm{P}_{\sqsubseteq}$ ), $\{E \mid \top \sqsubseteq E \in \mathcal{T}\} \subseteq v$. Let $\Psi$ be the $(\exists R . C)^{\lambda}$-relief of $\Phi$. Then we have $\Psi(\lambda) \subseteq v$. Hence $\Psi$ is satisfiable w.r.t. $\mathcal{T}$.

Assume that $(\geq 2 R)^{\lambda}$ is an $\geq 2$-burden of $\Phi . ~ \Phi(\lambda) \subseteq \tau$ so by condition (b) of Definition A.3, there is some $v \in Q$ such that $v \supseteq\{D \mid \forall R . D \in \Phi(\lambda)\}$; and by ( $\mathrm{P}_{\sqsubseteq}$ ), $\{E \mid \top \sqsubseteq E \in \mathcal{T}\} \subseteq v$. Let $\Psi$ be the $\geq 2 R$-relief of $\Phi$. Then we have $\Psi(\lambda) \subseteq v$. Hence $\Psi$ is satisfiable w.r.t. $\mathcal{T}$.

Assume that $\left(C_{1} \sqcup C_{2}\right)^{\lambda}$ is an $\sqcup$-burden $\Phi$. Then for some $\left(C_{1} \sqcup C_{2}\right)^{\lambda}$-relief $\Psi$ of $\Phi$, we have $\Psi(\lambda) \subseteq \tau$ by $\left(\mathrm{P}_{\sqcup}\right)$. Hence, there is some $\left(C_{1} \sqcup C_{2}\right)^{\lambda}$-relief of $\Phi$ that is satisfiable w.r.t. $\mathcal{T}$.

Proposition B.2. Let $\mathcal{T}$ be an $\mathcal{A L C \mathcal { F }}$-TBox and $C_{0}, C_{1}, \ldots, C_{n}, D$ be $\mathcal{A L C \mathcal { F }}$-concepts.

1. If $\mathcal{T} \equiv C_{0} \sqcap C_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap C_{n} \sqsubseteq D$, then

$$
\mathcal{T} \models \exists R . C_{0} \sqcap \forall R . C_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap \forall R . C_{n} \sqsubseteq \exists R . D .
$$

2. If $\mathcal{T} \models D \sqsubseteq C_{1} \sqcup \ldots \sqcup C_{n}$, then

$$
\mathcal{T} \models \exists R . D \sqsubseteq \exists R . C_{1} \sqcup \ldots \sqcup \exists R . C_{n} .
$$

3. If $\mathcal{T} \models C_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap C_{n} \sqsubseteq D$, then

$$
\mathcal{T} \equiv \geq 2 R \sqcap \forall R . C_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap \forall R . C_{n} \sqsubseteq \exists R . D .
$$

Proof. For 1, we proceed towards a contradiction. Suppose $\mathcal{T} \vDash C_{0} \sqcap C_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap C_{n} \sqsubseteq D$ and $\mathcal{T} \not \vDash \exists R . C_{0} \sqcap \forall R . C_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap \forall R . C_{n} \sqsubseteq \exists R . D$. Then there is some model $\mathcal{I}$ of $\mathcal{T}$ such that $\mathcal{I} \vDash C_{0} \sqcap C_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap C_{n} \sqsubseteq D$ and $\mathcal{I} \not \vDash \exists R . C_{0} \sqcap \forall R . C_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap \forall R . C_{n} \sqsubseteq \exists R . D$. By the latter
there is some $s \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$ such that $s \in\left(\exists R . C_{0} \sqcap \forall R . C_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap \forall R . C_{n}\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$ and $s \notin(\exists R . D)^{\mathcal{I}}$. That is, there is some $t \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$ such that $\langle s, t\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{I}}, t \in\left(C_{0} \sqcap C_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap C_{n}\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$, and $t \in(\neg D)^{\mathcal{I}}$. But this contradicts with $\mathcal{I} \models C_{0} \sqcap C_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap C_{n} \sqsubseteq D$.

For 2, we proceed towards a contradiction. Suppose $\mathcal{T} \models D \sqsubseteq C_{1} \sqcup \ldots \sqcup C_{n}$ and $\mathcal{T} \not \models \exists R . D \sqsubseteq \exists R . C_{1} \sqcup \ldots \sqcup \exists R . C_{n}$. Then there is some model $\mathcal{I}$ of $\mathcal{T}$ such that $\mathcal{I} \models D \sqsubseteq$ $C_{1} \sqcup \ldots \sqcup C_{n}$ and $\mathcal{I} \not \models \exists R . D \sqsubseteq \exists R . C_{1} \sqcup \ldots \sqcup \exists R . C_{n}$. By the latter there is some $s \in \Delta^{\overline{\mathcal{I}}}$ such that $s \in(\exists R . D)^{\mathcal{I}}$ and $s \notin\left(\exists R . C_{1} \sqcup \ldots \sqcup \exists R . C_{n}\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$. That is there is some $t \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$ such that $\langle s, t\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{I}}, t \in D^{\mathcal{I}}$, and $t \in\left(\neg C_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap \neg C_{n}\right)^{\mathcal{I}}$. But this contradicts with $\mathcal{I} \models D \sqsubseteq C_{1} \sqcup \ldots \sqcup C_{n}$.

Proposition B.3. Let $C$ be an $\mathcal{A L C} \mathcal{F}$-concept and $R$ be a role name. Then

$$
\models \leq 1 R \sqcap \exists R . C \sqcap \forall R . C \equiv \leq 1 R \sqcap \exists R . C .
$$

Proof. That $\models \leq 1 R \sqcap \exists R . C \sqcap \forall R . C \sqsubseteq \leq 1 R \sqcap \exists R . C$ is trivial. For the other direction, suppose for a contradiction that $\forall=\leq 1 R \sqcap \exists R . C \sqsubseteq \leq 1 R \sqcap \exists R . C \sqcap \forall R . C$. This means there is some interpretation $\mathcal{I}=\left\langle\Delta^{\mathcal{I}}, \cdot \mathcal{I}\right\rangle$ such that $\mathcal{I} \not \vDash \leq 1 R \sqcap \exists R . C \sqsubseteq \leq 1 R \sqcap \exists R . C \sqcap \forall R . C$. Thus there is some $s \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$ such that $s \in(\leq 1 R)^{\mathcal{I}}, s \in(\exists R . C)^{\mathcal{I}}$, and $s \in(\exists R . \neg C)^{\mathcal{I}}$. By the last two there are $t_{1}, t_{2} \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}}$ such that $\left\langle s, t_{1}\right\rangle,\left\langle s, t_{2}\right\rangle \in R^{\mathcal{I}}, t_{1} \in C^{\mathcal{I}}$, and $t_{2} \in(\neg C)^{\mathcal{I}}$. But by $s \in(\leq 1 R)^{\mathcal{I}}, t_{1}=t_{2}$ which is a contradiction.

Lemma B.4. Let $\Phi \subseteq \mathrm{cll} \cup \mathrm{clr}$. We have

1. if $\perp^{1} \in \Phi$, then $\perp$ is an interpolant of $\Phi$;
2. if $\perp^{\mathbf{r}} \in \Phi$, then $\top$ is an interpolant of $\Phi$;
3. for a concept $C$ of the form $A$ or $\leq 1 R$,
(a) if $\left\{C^{\mathbf{1}},(\dot{\neg} C)^{\mathbf{1}}\right\} \subseteq \Phi$, then $\perp$ is an interpolant of $\Phi$;
(b) if $\left\{C^{\mathbf{r}},(\neg C)^{\mathbf{r}}\right\} \subseteq \Phi$, then $\top$ is an interpolant of $\Phi$;
(c) if $\left\{C^{\mathbf{1}},(\dot{\neg} C)^{\mathbf{r}}\right\} \subseteq \Phi$, then $C$ is an interpolant of $\Phi$;
(d) if $\left\{C^{\mathbf{r}},(\neg C)^{\mathbf{1}}\right\} \subseteq \Phi$, then $\dot{\rightarrow} C$ is an interpolant of $\Phi$;
4. if $\Psi$ is the $\left(C_{1} \sqcap C_{2}\right)^{\lambda}$-relief of $\Phi$ and $I$ is an interpolant of $\Psi$, then $I$ is an interpolant of $\Phi$;
5. if $\Psi_{1}$ and $\Psi_{2}$ are $\left(C_{1} \sqcup C_{2}\right)^{1}$-reliefs of $\Phi$, and $I_{1}, I_{2}$ are interpolants of $\Psi_{1}, \Psi_{2}$ respectively, then $I_{1} \sqcup I_{2}$ is an interpolant of $\Phi$;
6. if $\Psi_{1}$ and $\Psi_{2}$ are $\left(C_{1} \sqcup C_{2}\right)^{\mathbf{r}}$-reliefs of $\Phi$, and $I_{1}, I_{2}$ are interpolants of $\Psi_{1}, \Psi_{2}$ respectively, then $I_{1} \sqcap I_{2}$ is an interpolant of $\Phi$;
7. if $\Psi$ is the $(\leq 1 R)^{1}$-relief of $\Phi$, there is no biased concept of the form $(\exists R . C)^{\mathbf{r}} \in \Phi$, and $I$ is an interpolant of $\Psi$, then $I$ is an interpolant of $\Phi$;
8. if $\Psi$ is the $(\leq 1 R)^{\mathbf{r}}$-relief of $\Phi$, there is no biased concept of the form $(\exists R . C)^{\mathbf{1}} \in \Phi$, and $I$ is an interpolant of $\Psi$, then $I$ is an interpolant of $\Phi$;
9. if $\Psi$ is the $(\leq 1 R)^{1}$-relief of $\Phi$, there is some biased concept of the form $(\exists R . C)^{\mathbf{r}} \in \Phi$, and $I$ is an interpolant of $\Psi$, then $I \sqcap \leq 1 R$ is an interpolant of $\Phi$;
10. if $\Psi$ is the $(\leq 1 R)^{\mathbf{r}}$-relief of $\Phi$, there is some biased concept of the form $(\exists R . C)^{\mathbf{1}} \in \Phi$, and $I$ is an interpolant of $\Psi$, then $I \sqcup \geq 2 R$ is an interpolant of $\Phi$;
11. if $\Psi$ is the $(\exists R . C)^{1}$-relief of $\Phi, I$ is an interpolant of $\Psi$, and there is no biased concept of the form $(\forall R . D)^{\mathbf{r}} \in \Phi$, then $\perp$ is an interpolant of $\Phi$;
12. if $\Psi$ is the $(\exists R . C)^{\mathbf{r}}$-relief of $\Phi, I$ is an interpolant of $\Psi$, and there is no biased concept of the form $(\forall R . D)^{1} \in \Phi$, then $T$ is an interpolant of $\Phi$;
13. if $\Psi$ is the $(\exists R . C)^{1}$-relief of $\Phi, I$ is an interpolant of $\Psi$, and there is some biased concept of the form $(\forall R . D)^{\mathbf{r}} \in \Phi$, then $\exists R$.I is an interpolant of $\Phi$;
14. if $\Psi$ is the $(\exists R . C)^{\mathrm{r}}$-relief of $\Phi, I$ is an interpolant of $\Psi$, and there is some biased concept of the form $(\forall R . D)^{1} \in \Phi$, then $\forall R$.I is an interpolant of $\Phi$;
15. if $\Psi$ is the $(\geq 2 R)^{1}$-relief of $\Phi, I$ is an interpolant of $\Psi$, and there is no biased concept of the form $(\forall R . D)^{\mathbf{r}} \in \Phi$, then $\perp$ is an interpolant of $\Phi$;
16. if $\Psi$ is the $(\geq 2 R)^{\mathbf{r}}$-relief of $\Phi, I$ is an interpolant of $\Psi$, and there is no biased concept of the form $(\forall R . D)^{1} \in \Phi$, then $\top$ is an interpolant of $\Phi$;
17. if $\Psi$ is the $(\geq 2 R)^{1}$-relief of $\Phi, I$ is an interpolant of $\Psi$, and there is some biased concept of the form $(\forall R . D)^{\mathbf{r}} \in \Phi$, then $\exists R$.I is an interpolant of $\Phi$;
18. if $\Psi$ is the $(\geq 2 R)^{\mathbf{r}}$-relief of $\Phi, I$ is an interpolant of $\Psi$, and there is some biased concept of the form $(\forall R . D)^{1} \in \Phi$, then $\forall R$.I is an interpolant of $\Phi$.

Proof. For 1. Suppose $\Phi(\mathbf{l})=\left\{X_{1}, \ldots, X_{n}\right\} \cup\{\perp\}$ and $\Phi(\mathbf{r})=\left\{Y_{1}, \ldots, Y_{m}\right\}$. But $\mathcal{T} \models$ $\perp \sqcap X_{1} \sqcap \ldots, X_{n} \sqsubseteq \perp$ and $\mathcal{T} \models \perp \sqsubseteq \neg Y_{1} \sqcup \ldots \sqcup \neg Y_{m}$ hold trivially. Since $\perp$ is a logical constant, $\emptyset=\operatorname{sig}(\perp) \subseteq \operatorname{sig}(\Phi(\mathbf{l})) \cap \operatorname{sig}(\Phi(\mathbf{r}))$. Hence 1 is satisfied.

For 2. Suppose $\Phi(\mathbf{r})=\left\{Y_{1}, \ldots, Y_{m}\right\} \cup\{\perp\}$ and $\Phi(\mathbf{l})=\left\{X_{1}, \ldots, X_{n}\right\}$. But $\mathcal{T} \models$ $X_{1} \sqcap \ldots, X_{n} \sqsubseteq \top$ and $\mathcal{T} \models \top \sqsubseteq \neg Y_{1} \sqcup \ldots \sqcup \neg Y_{m} \sqcup \top$ hold trivially. Since $T$ is a logical constant, $\emptyset=\operatorname{sig}(T) \subseteq \operatorname{sig}(\Phi(\mathbf{l})) \cap \operatorname{sig}(\Phi(\mathbf{r}))$. Hence 2 is satisfied.

For 3a. Suppose $\Phi(\mathbf{l})=\left\{X_{1}, \ldots, X_{n}\right\} \cup\{C, \dot{\neg} C\}$ and $\Phi(\mathbf{r})=\left\{Y_{1}, \ldots, Y_{m}\right\}$. But $\mathcal{T} \models$ $X_{1} \sqcap \ldots, X_{n} \sqcap C \sqcap \neg C \sqsubseteq \perp$ and $\mathcal{T} \models \perp \sqsubseteq \neg Y_{1} \sqcup \ldots \sqcup \neg Y_{m}$ hold trivially. Since $\perp$ is a logical constant, $\emptyset=\operatorname{sig}(\perp) \subseteq \operatorname{sig}(\Phi(\mathbf{l})) \cap \operatorname{sig}(\Phi(\mathbf{r}))$. Hence 3a is satisfied.

The argument for 3b is analogous to the previous case.
For 3c. Suppose $\Phi(\mathbf{l})=\left\{X_{1}, \ldots, X_{n}\right\} \cup\{C\}$ and $\Phi(\mathbf{r})=\left\{Y_{1}, \ldots, Y_{m}\right\} \cup\{\neg C\}$. But $\mathcal{T} \models$ $X_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap X_{n} \sqcap C \sqsubseteq C, \mathcal{T} \models C \sqsubseteq \neg Y_{1} \sqcup \ldots \sqcup \neg Y_{m} \sqcup \neg(\neg C)$, and $\operatorname{sig}(C) \subseteq \operatorname{sig}(\Phi(\mathbf{l})) \cap \operatorname{sig}(\Phi(\mathbf{r}))$ hold trivially. Hence 3 c is satisfied.

The argument for 3 d is analogous to the previous case.
For 4. Suppose $\Psi$ is a $\left(C_{1} \sqcap C_{2}\right)^{1}$-relief of $\Phi, I$ is an interpolant of $\Psi, \Phi(\mathbf{l})=\left\{X_{1}, \ldots, X_{n}\right\} \cup$ $\left\{C_{1} \sqcap C_{2}\right\}$, and $\Phi(\mathbf{r})=\left\{Y_{1}, \ldots, Y_{m}\right\}$. By assumption, $\mathcal{T} \models X_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap X_{n} \sqcap\left(C_{1} \sqcap C_{2}\right) \sqcap C_{1} \sqcap C_{2} \sqsubseteq$ $I$, i.e., $\mathcal{T} \models X_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap X_{n} \sqcap\left(C_{1} \sqcap C_{2}\right) \sqsubseteq I$ and $\mathcal{T} \models I \sqsubseteq \neg Y_{1} \sqcup \ldots \sqcup \neg Y_{m}$. By assumption again, $\operatorname{sig}(\Psi(\mathbf{l}))=\operatorname{sig}(\Phi(\mathbf{l}))$ and $\operatorname{sig}(\Psi(\mathbf{r}))=\operatorname{sig}(\Phi(\mathbf{r}))$, and thus $\operatorname{sig}(I) \subseteq \operatorname{sig}(\Phi(\mathbf{l})) \cap \operatorname{sig}(\Phi(\mathbf{r}))$.

Therefore $I$ is an interpolant of $\Phi$. The case for when $\Psi$ is a $\left(C_{1} \sqcap C_{2}\right)^{\mathbf{r}}$-relief of $\Phi$ and $I$ is an interpolant of $\Psi$ can be shown analogously. Hence 4 is satisfied.

For 5. Suppose $\Psi_{1}$ and $\Psi_{2}$ are $\left(C_{1} \sqcup C_{2}\right)^{1}$-reliefs of $\Phi, I_{1}, I_{2}$ are interpolants of $\Psi_{1}, \Psi_{2}$ respectively, $\Phi(\mathbf{l})=\left\{X_{1}, \ldots, X_{n}\right\} \cup\left\{C_{1} \sqcup C_{2}\right\}$, and $\Phi(\mathbf{r})=\left\{Y_{1}, \ldots, Y_{m}\right\}$. By assumption, $\mathcal{T} \models X_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap X_{n} \sqcap\left(C_{1} \sqcup C_{2}\right) \sqcap C_{1} \sqsubseteq I_{1}$ and $\mathcal{T} \models X_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap X_{n} \sqcap\left(C_{1} \sqcup C_{2}\right) \sqcap C_{2} \sqsubseteq I_{2}$. Then we have the following.

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{T} \models I_{1} \sqcup I_{2} \sqsupseteq & \left(X_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap X_{n} \sqcap\left(C_{1} \sqcup C_{2}\right) \sqcap C_{1}\right) \sqcup \\
& \left(X_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap X_{n} \sqcap\left(C_{1} \sqcup C_{2}\right) \sqcap C_{2}\right) \\
\mathcal{T} \models I_{1} \sqcup I_{2} \sqsupseteq & \left(X_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap X_{n} \sqcap\left(C_{1} \sqcup C_{2}\right)\right) \sqcap\left(C_{1} \sqcup C_{2}\right) \\
\mathcal{T} \models I_{1} \sqcup I_{2} \sqsupseteq & X_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap X_{n} \sqcap\left(C_{1} \sqcup C_{2}\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

For the other half, by assumption $\mathcal{T} \models I_{1} \sqsubseteq \neg Y_{1} \sqcup \ldots \sqcup \neg Y_{m}$ and $\mathcal{T} \models I_{2} \sqsubseteq \neg Y_{1} \sqcup \ldots \sqcup \neg Y_{m}$. But then $\mathcal{T} \models I_{1} \sqcup I_{2} \sqsubseteq \neg Y_{1} \sqcup \ldots \sqcup \neg Y_{m}$. Clearly, $\operatorname{sig}\left(I_{1} \sqcup I_{2}\right) \subseteq \operatorname{sig}(\Phi(\mathbf{l})) \cap \operatorname{sig}(\Phi(\mathbf{r}))$. Hence 5 is satisfied.

The argument for 6 is analogous to the previous case.
For 7. Suppose

- $\Psi$ is a $(\leq 1 R)^{1}$-relief of $\Phi$,
- $I$ is an interpolant of $\Psi$,
- $\Phi(\mathbf{l})=\left\{X_{1}, \ldots, X_{n}\right\} \cup\{\leq 1 R\} \cup\left\{\exists R . C_{1}, \ldots, \exists R . C_{k}\right\}$, where $\left\{\exists R . C_{1}, \ldots, \exists R . C_{k}\right\}=$ $\{\exists R . C \in \Phi(\mathbf{l})\}$,
- $\Phi(\mathbf{r})=\left\{Y_{1}, \ldots, Y_{m}\right\}$,
- there is no biased concept of the form $(\exists R . C)^{\mathbf{r}} \in \Phi$.

Let $E=\forall R . C_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap \forall R . C_{k}$. By assumption,

$$
\mathcal{T} \models X_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap X_{n} \sqcap \leq 1 R \sqcap \exists R . C_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap \exists R . C_{k} \sqcap E \sqsubseteq I .
$$

Then by Proposition B. 3

$$
\mathcal{T} \models X_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap X_{n} \sqcap \leq 1 R \sqcap \exists R . C_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap \exists R . C_{k} \sqsubseteq I
$$

which is what we wanted to show. For the other half, since there is no biased concept of the form $(\exists R . C)^{\mathbf{r}} \in \Phi$, we have $\Phi(\mathbf{r})=\Psi(\mathbf{r})$. But then

$$
\mathcal{T} \models I \sqsubseteq \neg Y_{1} \sqcup \ldots \sqcup \neg Y_{m}
$$

which is what we wanted to show. By assumption $\operatorname{sig}(\Psi(\mathbf{l}))=\operatorname{sig}(\Phi(\mathbf{l}))$ and $\operatorname{sig}(\Psi(\mathbf{r}))=$ $\operatorname{sig}(\Phi(\mathbf{r}))$, and thus $\operatorname{sig}(I) \subseteq \operatorname{sig}(\Phi(\mathbf{l})) \cap \operatorname{sig}(\Phi(\mathbf{r}))$. Therefore $I$ is an interpolant of $\Phi$. Hence 7 is satisfied.

8 can be shown analogously to the previous case.
For 9. Suppose

- $\Psi$ is a $(\leq 1 R)^{1}$-relief of $\Phi$,
- $I$ is an interpolant of $\Psi$,
- $\Phi(\mathbf{l})=\left\{X_{1}, \ldots, X_{n}\right\} \cup\{\leq 1 R\} \cup\left\{\exists R . C_{1}, \ldots, \exists R . C_{k}\right\}$, where $\left\{\exists R . C_{1}, \ldots, \exists R . C_{k}\right\}=$ $\{\exists R . C \in \Phi(\mathbf{l})\}$,
- $\Phi(\mathbf{r})=\left\{Y_{1}, \ldots, Y_{m}\right\} \cup\left\{\exists R . D_{1}, \ldots, \exists R . D_{l}\right\}$, where $\left\{\exists R . D_{1}, \ldots, \exists R . D_{l}\right\}=\{\exists R . C \in$ $\Phi(\mathbf{r})\}$,
- there is some biased concept of the form $(\exists R . C)^{\mathbf{r}} \in \Phi$.

Let $E=\forall R . C_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap \forall R . C_{k}$. By assumption,

$$
\mathcal{T} \models X_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap X_{n} \sqcap \leq 1 R \sqcap \exists R . C_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap \exists R . C_{k} \sqcap E \sqsubseteq I .
$$

Also, we trivially have the following.

$$
\mathcal{T} \models X_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap X_{n} \sqcap \leq 1 R \sqcap \exists R . C_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap \exists R . C_{k} \sqcap E \sqsubseteq \leq 1 R .
$$

Combining these two, we get

$$
\mathcal{T} \models X_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap X_{n} \sqcap \leq 1 R \sqcap \exists R . C_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap \exists R . C_{k} \sqcap E \sqsubseteq I \sqcap \leq 1 R
$$

which is what we wanted to show.
For the other half, let $F=\exists R . \neg C_{1} \sqcup \ldots \sqcup \exists R . \neg C_{l}$. By the assumption about $I$,

$$
\mathcal{T} \models I \sqsubseteq \neg Y_{1} \sqcup \ldots \sqcup \neg Y_{m} \sqcup \forall R . \neg C_{1} \sqcup \ldots \sqcup \forall R . \neg C_{l} \sqcup F .
$$

From this, we trivially get

$$
\mathcal{T} \models I \sqsubseteq \neg Y_{1} \sqcup \ldots \sqcup \neg Y_{m} \sqcup \forall R . \neg C_{1} \sqcup \ldots \sqcup \forall R . \neg C_{l} \sqcup F \sqcup \geq 2 R .
$$

Then by Proposition B.3.

$$
\mathcal{T} \models I \sqsubseteq \neg Y_{1} \sqcup \ldots \sqcup \neg Y_{m} \sqcup \forall R . \neg C_{1} \sqcup \ldots \sqcup \forall R . \neg C_{l} \sqcup \geq 2 R,
$$

which implies

$$
\mathcal{T} \models I \sqcap \leq 1 R \sqsubseteq \neg Y_{1} \sqcup \ldots \sqcup \neg Y_{m} \sqcup \forall R . \neg C_{1} \sqcup \ldots \sqcup \forall R . \neg C_{l},
$$

and this is what we wanted to show. By assumption $\operatorname{sig}(\Psi(\mathbf{l}))=\operatorname{sig}(\Phi(\mathbf{l}))$ and $\operatorname{sig}(\Psi(\mathbf{r}))=$ $\operatorname{sig}(\Phi(\mathbf{r}))$, and thus $\operatorname{sig}(I) \subseteq \operatorname{sig}(\Phi(\mathbf{l})) \cap \operatorname{sig}(\Phi(\mathbf{r}))$. Moreover, since there is some biased concept of the form $(\exists R . C)^{\mathbf{r}} \in \Phi, R \in \operatorname{sig}(\Phi(\mathbf{l})) \cap \operatorname{sig}(\Phi(\mathbf{r}))$. In conclusion, $\operatorname{sig}(I \sqcap \leq 1 R) \in$ $\operatorname{sig}(\Phi(\mathbf{l})) \cap \operatorname{sig}(\Phi(\mathbf{r}))$. Hence 9 is satisfied.

10 can be shown analogously to the previous case.
For 11. Suppose the following:

- $\Psi$ is the $(\exists R . C)^{1}$-relief of $\Phi$,
- $I$ is an interpolant of $\Psi$,
- $E=\Pi_{T \sqsubseteq C \in \mathcal{T}_{1}} C, F=\bigsqcup_{\top \sqsubseteq C \in \mathcal{T}_{\mathbf{r}}} \neg C$,
- $\Phi(\mathbf{l})=\left\{X_{1}, \ldots, X_{n}\right\} \cup\{\exists R . C\} \cup\left\{\forall R . D_{1}, \ldots, \forall R . D_{k}\right\}$, where $\left\{\forall R . D_{1}, \ldots, \forall R . D_{k}\right\}=$ $\{\forall R . D \in \Phi(\mathbf{l})\}$,
- there is no biased concept of the form $(\forall R . D)^{\mathbf{r}} \in \Phi$.

By the last assumption, $\Psi(\mathbf{r})=\left\{C \mid \top \sqsubseteq C \in \mathcal{T}_{\mathbf{r}}\right\}$. By assumption, $\mathcal{T} \models I \sqsubseteq F$. Since $\mathcal{T} \models F \sqsubseteq \perp$, we have that $\mathcal{T} \models I \equiv \perp$ and thus $\mathcal{T} \models \exists R . I \equiv \perp$. By assumption again $\mathcal{T} \models C \sqcap D_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap D_{k} \sqcap E \sqsubseteq I$. Since $\mathcal{T} \models T \sqsubseteq E$, we have that $\mathcal{T} \models C \sqcap D_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap D_{k} \sqsubseteq I$. By Proposition B. 2

$$
\mathcal{T} \models \exists R . C \sqcap \forall R . D_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap \forall R . D_{k} \sqsubseteq \exists R . I .
$$

However by $\mathcal{T} \models \exists R . I \equiv \perp$ this means

$$
\mathcal{T} \models \exists R . C \sqcap \forall R . D_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap \forall R . D_{k} \sqsubseteq \perp .
$$

Hence,

$$
\mathcal{T} \models X_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap X_{n} \sqcap \exists R . C \sqcap \forall R . D_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap \forall R . D_{k} \sqsubseteq \perp
$$

which is what we wanted to show. For the other half, let $\Phi(\mathbf{r})=\left\{Y_{1}, \ldots, Y_{m}\right\}$. Since $\mathcal{T} \models I \equiv \perp$, we have trivially

$$
\mathcal{T} \models \perp \sqsubseteq \neg Y_{1} \sqcup \ldots \sqcup \neg Y_{m}
$$

As the final step, we need to show that

$$
\operatorname{sig}(\perp) \subseteq \operatorname{sig}(\Phi(\mathbf{l})) \cap \operatorname{sig}(\Phi(\mathbf{r}))
$$

But this follows easily since $\perp$ is a logical constant. Hence 11 is satisfied.
For 12. Suppose the following:

- $\Psi$ is the $(\exists R . C)^{\mathbf{r}}$-relief of $\Phi$,
- $I$ is an interpolant of $\Psi$,
- $E=\Pi_{T \sqsubseteq C \in \mathcal{T}_{1}} C, F=\bigsqcup_{\top \sqsubseteq C \in \mathcal{T}_{\mathbf{r}}} \neg C$,
- $\Phi(\mathbf{r})=\left\{Y_{1}, \ldots, Y_{m}\right\} \cup\{\exists R . C\} \cup\left\{\forall R . D_{1}, \ldots, \forall R . D_{k}\right\}$, where $\left\{\forall R . D_{1}, \ldots, \forall R . D_{k}\right\}=$ $\{\forall R . D \in \Phi(\mathbf{r})\}$,
- there is no biased concept of the form $(\forall R . D)^{1} \in \Phi$.

By the last assumption, $\Psi(\mathbf{l})=\left\{C \mid \top \sqsubseteq C \in \mathcal{T}_{1}\right\}$. By assumption, $\mathcal{T} \models E \sqsubseteq I$. Since $\mathcal{T} \models \top \sqsubseteq E$, we have that $\mathcal{T} \models I \equiv \top$ and thus $\mathcal{T} \models \forall R . I \equiv \mathrm{~T}$. By assumption again $\mathcal{T} \models$ $I \sqsubseteq \neg C \sqcup \neg D_{1} \sqcup \ldots \sqcup \neg D_{k} \sqcup F$. Since $\mathcal{T} \models F \sqsubseteq \perp$, we have that $\mathcal{T} \models I \sqsubseteq \neg C \sqcup \neg D_{1} \sqcup \ldots \sqcup \neg D_{k}$. By Proposition B. 2

$$
\mathcal{T} \models \forall R . I \sqsubseteq \forall R . \neg C \sqcup \exists R . \neg D_{1} \sqcup \ldots \sqcup \exists R . \neg D_{k} .
$$

However by $\mathcal{T} \models \top \equiv \forall R . I$, this means

$$
\mathcal{T} \models \top \sqsubseteq \forall R . \neg C \sqcup \exists R . \neg D_{1} \sqcup \ldots \sqcup \exists R . \neg D_{k} .
$$

Hence,

$$
\mathcal{T} \equiv \top \sqsubseteq \neg Y_{1} \sqcup \ldots \sqcup \neg Y_{m} \sqcup \forall R . \neg C \sqcup \exists R . \neg D_{1} \sqcup \ldots \sqcup \exists R . \neg D_{k}
$$

which is what we wanted to show. For the other half, let $\Phi(\mathbf{l})=\left\{X_{1}, \ldots, X_{n}\right\}$. Since $\mathcal{T} \models I \equiv \mathrm{~T}$, we have trivially

$$
\mathcal{T} \models X_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap X_{n} \sqsubseteq \top
$$

As the final step, we need to show that

$$
\operatorname{sig}(T) \subseteq \operatorname{sig}(\Phi(\mathbf{l})) \cap \operatorname{sig}(\Phi(\mathbf{r})) .
$$

But this follows easily since $T$ is a logical constant. Hence 12 is satisfied.
For 13. Suppose the following:

- $\Psi$ is the $(\exists R . C)^{1}$-relief of $\Phi$,
- $I$ is an interpolant of $\Psi$,
- $E=\Pi_{\top \sqsubseteq C \in \mathcal{T}_{1}} C, F=\bigsqcup_{\top \sqsubseteq C \in \mathcal{T}_{\mathbf{r}}} \neg C$,
- $\Phi(\mathbf{l})=\left\{X_{1}, \ldots, X_{n}\right\} \cup\{\exists R . C\} \cup\left\{\forall R . D_{1}, \ldots, \forall R . D_{k}\right\}$, where $\left\{\forall R . D_{1}, \ldots, \forall R . D_{k}\right\}=$ $\{\forall R . D \in \Phi(\mathbf{l})\}$,
- $\Phi(\mathbf{r})=\left\{Y_{1}, \ldots, Y_{m}\right\} \cup\left\{\forall R . C_{1}, \ldots, \forall R . C_{l}\right\}$, where $l \geq 1$ and $\left\{\forall R . C_{1}, \ldots, \forall R . C_{l}\right\}=$ $\{\forall R . C \in \Phi(\mathbf{r})\}$.

By assumption, $\mathcal{T} \models C \sqcap D_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap D_{k} \sqcap E \sqsubseteq I$. Since $\mathcal{T} \models \top \sqsubseteq E$, we have that $\mathcal{T} \models C \sqcap D_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap D_{k} \sqsubseteq I$. By Proposition B. 2

$$
\begin{equation*}
\mathcal{T} \models \exists R . C \sqcap \forall R . D_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap \forall R . D_{k} \sqsubseteq \exists R . I \tag{5}
\end{equation*}
$$

Now by (5), we have

$$
\mathcal{T} \models X_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap X_{n} \sqcap \exists R . C \sqcap \forall R . D_{1} \sqcap \ldots \sqcap \forall R . D_{k} \sqsubseteq \exists R . I
$$

which is what we wanted to show. Now we argue for the other half. By assumption, $\mathcal{T} \models I \sqsubseteq \neg C_{1} \sqcup \ldots \sqcup \neg C_{l} \sqcup F$. Since $\mathcal{T} \models F \sqsubseteq \perp$, we have that $\mathcal{T} \models I \sqsubseteq \neg C_{1} \sqcup \ldots \sqcup \neg C_{l}$. By Proposition B. 2

$$
\begin{equation*}
\mathcal{T} \models \exists R . I \sqsubseteq \neg \forall R . C_{1} \sqcup \ldots \sqcup \neg \forall R . C_{l} \tag{6}
\end{equation*}
$$

Now by (6), we have

$$
\mathcal{T} \models \exists R . I \sqsubseteq \neg Y_{1} \sqcup \ldots \sqcup \neg Y_{m} \sqcup \neg \forall R . C_{1} \sqcup \ldots \sqcup \neg \forall R . C_{l}
$$

which is what we wanted to show. As the final step, we need to show that

$$
\operatorname{sig}(\exists R . I) \subseteq \operatorname{sig}(\Phi(\mathbf{l})) \cap \operatorname{sig}(\Phi(\mathbf{r}))
$$

But this follows easily since by assumption $\operatorname{sig}(I) \subseteq \operatorname{sig}(\Phi(\mathbf{l})) \cap \operatorname{sig}(\Phi(\mathbf{r}))$ and $R \in \operatorname{sig}(\Phi(\mathbf{l})) \cap$ $\operatorname{sig}(\Phi(\mathbf{r}))$, where the latter is a consequence of $l \geq 1$.

The argument for 14 is analogous to the previous case. Moreover 15, 16, 17,18 can be shown similarly to 11, 12, 13, 14, respectively.

## Appendix C. Tableau Correctness, Termination, and Interpolation

Lemma C.1. Let $\mathbf{T}=\langle\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E}\rangle$ be the output of the second phase. Then for every node $g \in \mathcal{V}$ :

1. g.status is either sat or unsat.
2. If $g . s t a t u s=$ unsat, then either one of the following holds.

- $g$ is a sink nod $\underbrace{3}$ containing a clash;
- there is exactly one successor of $g^{\prime}$ of $g$ such that for some $\left(C_{1} \sqcap C_{2}\right)^{\lambda} \in g$.content, $g^{\prime}$.content is a $\left(C_{1} \sqcap C_{2}\right)^{\lambda}$-relief of $g$.content and $g^{\prime}$.status $=$ unsat;
- there is exactly one successor of $g^{\prime}$ of $g$ such that for some $(\leq 1 R)^{\lambda} \in g$.content, $g^{\prime}$.content is $a(\leq 1 R)^{\lambda}$-relief of $g$.content and $g^{\prime}$.status $=$ unsat;
- there are exactly $n$ successors $g_{1}, \ldots, g_{n}$ of $g$, where $n$ is the cardinality of the set $\left\{\left(C_{1}\right)^{\lambda_{1}}, \ldots,\left(C_{n}\right)^{\lambda_{n}}\right\}$ of all $\exists$ - or $\geq 2$-burdens of $g$.content, $g_{i}$.content is the $\left(C_{i}\right)^{\lambda_{i}}$-relief of $g$.content for $i \in\{1, \ldots, n\}$, and there is some $i \in\{1, \ldots, n\}$ such that $g_{i}$.status =unsat; or
- there are exactly two successors $g_{1}, g_{2}$ of $g$ such that for some $\left(C_{1} \sqcup C_{2}\right)^{\lambda} \in$ $g$.content, $g_{i}$.content is a $\left(C_{1} \sqcup C_{2}\right)^{\lambda}$-relief of $g$.content for $i \in\{1,2\}, g_{1}$.content $\neq$ $g_{2}$.content, and $g_{i}$.status $=$ unsat for $i \in\{1,2\}$.

3. If $g$. status $=$ sat, then either one of the following holds.

- $g$ is a sink node not containing a clash,
- there is exactly one successor of $g^{\prime}$ of $g$ such that for some $\left(C_{1} \sqcap C_{2}\right)^{\lambda} \in g$.content, $g^{\prime}$.content is a $\left(C_{1} \sqcap C_{2}\right)^{\lambda}$-relief of $g$.content and $g^{\prime}$.status $=$ sat;
- there is exactly one successor of $g^{\prime}$ of $g$ such that for some $(\leq 1 R)^{\lambda} \in g$.content, $g^{\prime}$.content is a $(\leq 1 R)^{\lambda}$-relief of $g$.content and $g^{\prime}$.status $=$ sat;
- there are exactly $n$ successors $g_{1}, \ldots, g_{n}$ of $g$, where $n$ is the cardinality of the set $\left\{\left(C_{1}\right)^{\lambda_{1}}, \ldots,\left(C_{n}\right)^{\lambda_{n}}\right\}$ of all $\exists$ - or $\geq 2$-burdens of $g$.content, $g_{i}$.content is the $\left(C_{i}\right)^{\lambda_{i}}$-relief of $g$.content for $i \in\{1, \ldots, n\}$, and for all $i \in\{1, \ldots, n\}$ we have $g_{i}$.status $=$ sat; or
- there are exactly two successors $g_{1}, g_{2}$ of $g$ such that for some $\left(C_{1} \sqcup C_{2}\right)^{\lambda} \in$ $g$.content, $g_{i}$.content is a $\left(C_{1} \sqcup C_{2}\right)^{\lambda}$-relief of $g$.content for $i \in\{1,2\}, g_{1}$.content $\neq$ $g_{2}$.content, and there is some $i \in\{1,2\}$ such that $g_{i}$.status $=$ sat.

Proof. 1 clearly follows from the fact that every node that is not assigned the status unsat during the Propagate step of Algorithm 1 gets the status sat at the end (Assign) of Algorithm 1 .

Let $g \in \mathcal{V}$. By the definition of the tableau algorithm, $g$ satisfies exactly one of the following structural conditions:

- $g$ is a sink node;

3. a node with no outgoing edges

- there are exactly two successors $g_{1}, g_{2}$ of $g$ such that for some $\left(C_{1} \sqcup C_{2}\right)^{\lambda} \in g$.content, $g_{i}$.content is a $\left(C_{1} \sqcup C_{2}\right)^{\lambda}$-relief of $g$.content for $i \in\{1,2\}$;
- there is exactly one successor of $g^{\prime}$ of $g$ such that for some $\left(C_{1} \sqcap C_{2}\right)^{\lambda} \in g$.content, $g^{\prime}$.content is a $\left(C_{1} \sqcap C_{2}\right)^{\lambda}$-relief of $g$.content;
- there is exactly one successor of $g^{\prime}$ of $g$ such that for some $(\leq 1 R)^{\lambda} \in g$.content, $g^{\prime}$.content is a $(\leq 1 R)^{\lambda}$-relief of $g$.content;
- there are exactly $n$ successors $g_{1}, \ldots, g_{n}$ of $g$, where $n$ is the cardinality of the set $\left\{\left(C_{1}\right)^{\lambda_{1}}, \ldots,\left(C_{n}\right)^{\lambda_{n}}\right\}$ of all $\exists$ - or $\geq 2$-burdens of $g$.content, and $g_{i}$.content is the $\left(C_{i}\right)^{\lambda_{n}}$ relief of $g$.content for $i \in\{1, \ldots, n\}$.

Suppose first $g$.status $=$ unsat then $g$ clearly respects 2 because these are the only ways for a node to get status unsat in Propagate. Suppose now $g$. status $=$ sat. Then $g$.status is determined in Assign of Algorithm 1. We distinguish between the structural properties of $g$ above.

Suppose $g$ is a sink node. This means that no rule is applied to $g$. Then by $g$.status $=$ sat, we immediately obtain that $g$.status does not contain a clash; because if $g$.status contains a clash, we would have $g$. status $=$ unsat and this contradicts with the fact that for every node $g \in \mathcal{V}$, the value of $g$.status is only calculated once.

Suppose there are exactly two successors $g_{1}, g_{2}$ of $g$ such that for some $\left(C_{1} \sqcup C_{2}\right)^{\lambda} \in$ $g$.content, $g_{i}$.content is a $\left(C_{1} \sqcup C_{2}\right)^{\lambda}$-relief of $g$.content for $i \in\{1,2\}$. Since $g$.status $=$ sat, $g$.status was undefined right before Assign. This implies that there is some $i \in\{1,2\}$ such that $g_{i}$.status was undefined because otherwise $g$.status $=$ unsat. Then after Assign, $g_{i} \cdot$ status $=$ sat. Hence, $g$ satisfies 3.

Suppose there is exactly one successor of $g^{\prime}$ of $g$ such that for some $\left(C_{1} \sqcap C_{2}\right)^{\lambda} \in$ $g$.content, $g^{\prime}$.content is a $\left(C_{1} \sqcap C_{2}\right)^{\lambda}$-relief of $g$.content. Since $g$.status $=$ sat, $g$.status was undefined right before Assign. This implies that, $g^{\prime}$.status was undefined before Assign because otherwise $g$. status $=$ unsat. Then after Assign, $g^{\prime}$.status $=$ sat. Hence, $g$ satisfies 3.

The remaining cases can be shown analogously. Hence the lemma follows.
Proof of Lemma 3.7. We start with some observations. Algorithm 1 assigns the status unsat to nodes in $\mathcal{V}$ during the Propagate phase. These status assignment steps induce a sequence $0,1,2 \ldots$. To each assignment step $i$, we can associate a set $\mathcal{V}_{i}$ such that $\mathcal{V}_{i}$ are all the nodes with status unsat so far. Observe that from step $i$ to step $i+1$, we extend $\mathcal{V}_{i}$ by a single node only. By induction on the number of status assignment steps, we first show that for all $g \in \mathcal{V}_{i}$,

- $g$.content is unsatisfiable w.r.t. $\mathcal{T}$;
- there is some $\mathcal{A L C F}$-concept $C$ such that
$-\operatorname{int}(g)=C$,
- $C$ is an interpolant of $g$.content,
$-|\operatorname{int}(g)| \leq 2^{i+2}-1$.

As the base case, we have that $\mathcal{V}_{0}=\{g\}$ for some sink node $g \in \mathcal{V}$ containing a clash. Obviously, $g$.content is unsatisfiable. The interpolant calculation rules of Figure 2 cover all the cases for this clash and thus, some $\mathcal{A} \mathcal{L C} \mathcal{F}$-concept is assigned to int $(g)$. By Lemma B.4, $\operatorname{int}(g)$ is an interpolant of $g$.content. We claim that $|\operatorname{int}(g)| \leq 2$. For $\operatorname{int}(g)$ of the form T, $\perp$, $A$, or $\neg A$, this is clear; and for $\operatorname{int}(g)$ of the form $\leq 1 R$ (or $\geq 2 R$ ), we observe that it can be encoded using one symbol for $\leq 1$ (resp. $\geq 2$ ) and one symbol for $R$. Hence, $|\operatorname{int}(g)| \leq 2 \leq 2^{i+2}-1$ and the inductive hypothesis holds for the base case.

For the inductive step, let $\mathcal{V}_{i+1}=\mathcal{V}_{i} \cup\{g\}$. The inductive hypothesis holds for every $g^{\prime} \in \mathcal{V}_{i}$, trivially; thus, we only consider the case for $g$. By Lemma C.1, we have five cases to distinguish:

1. $g$ is a sink node containing a clash. This can be shown analogously to the base case.
2. There is exactly one successor of $g^{\prime}$ of $g$ such that for some $\left(C_{1} \sqcap C_{2}\right)^{\lambda} \in g$.content, $g^{\prime}$.content is a $\left(C_{1} \sqcap C_{2}\right)^{\lambda}$-relief of $g$.content and $g^{\prime}$.status $=$ unsat. By the inductive hypothesis, $g^{\prime}$.content is unsatisfiable w.r.t. $\mathcal{T}$, $\operatorname{int}\left(g^{\prime}\right)$ is an interpolant of $g^{\prime}$, and $\left|\operatorname{int}\left(g^{\prime}\right)\right| \leq 2^{i+2}-1$. Then by (the contrapositive version of) Lemma B.1, $g . c o n t e n t$ is unsatisfiable w.r.t. $\mathcal{T}$. Moreover, $\mathrm{C}_{\square}$ was applied to calculate $\operatorname{int}(g)$ and $\operatorname{int}(g)=$ $\operatorname{int}\left(g^{\prime}\right)$. By Lemma B.4, $\operatorname{int}(g)$ is an interpolant of $g$.content. We have by $\operatorname{int}(g)=$ $\operatorname{int}\left(g^{\prime}\right)$ and $\left|\operatorname{int}\left(g^{\prime}\right)\right| \leq 2^{i+2}-1$ that $|\operatorname{int}(g)| \leq 2^{i+3}-1$. Hence the inductive hypothesis holds for this case.
3. There are exactly two successors $g_{1}, g_{2}$ of $g$ such that for some $\left(C_{1} \sqcup C_{2}\right)^{\lambda} \in g$.content, $g_{j}$.content is a $\left(C_{1} \sqcup C_{2}\right)^{\lambda}$-relief of $g$.content for $j \in\{1,2\}, g_{1}$. content $\neq g_{2}$.content, and $g_{j}$.status $=$ unsat for $j \in\{1,2\}$. By the inductive hypothesis, $g_{j}$.content is unsatisfiable w.r.t. $\mathcal{T}, \operatorname{int}\left(g_{j}\right)$ is an interpolant of $g_{j}$, and $\left|\operatorname{int}\left(g_{j}\right)\right| \leq 2^{i+2}-1$, for $j \in$ $\{1,2\}$. Then by (the contrapositive version of) Lemma B.1. $g$.content is unsatisfiable w.r.t. $\mathcal{T}$. Moreover, depending on $\lambda$, either $\mathrm{C}_{\sqcup}^{1}$ or $\mathrm{C}_{\sqcup}^{\mathbf{r}}$ was applied to calculate $\operatorname{int}(g)$. By Lemma B.4, $\operatorname{int}(g)$ is an interpolant of $g$.content. We have that $|\operatorname{int}(g)|=\left|\operatorname{int}\left(g_{1}\right)\right|+$ $\left|\operatorname{int}\left(g_{2}\right)\right|+1$. Then by the inductive hypothesis, we obtain

$$
|\operatorname{int}(g)| \leq\left(2^{i+2}-1\right)+\left(2^{i+2}-1\right)+1=2^{i+3}-1 .
$$

Thus, the inductive hypothesis holds for this case.
4. The other cases can be shown similarly.

Hence, our claim follows.
Now, we use the claim that we have just shown to prove the lemma. Let $g \in \mathcal{V}$ with $g$. status $=$ unsat. By Lemma 3.5, we have $|\mathcal{V}| \leq 2^{n}$, where $n=|\mathrm{cll} \cup \mathrm{clr}|$. Thus, in the worst case, there are $2^{n}$ status assignment steps in Propagate because then $\mathcal{V}_{2^{n}}=\mathcal{V}$. Since $g$. status $=$ unsat, it follows that $g \in \mathcal{V}_{2^{n}}$. Then by our claim, $g$.content is unsatisfiable w.r.t. $\mathcal{T}, \operatorname{int}(g)$ is defined and it is an interpolant of $g$.content, and $|\operatorname{int}(g)| \leq 2^{2^{n}+2}-1=4 \cdot 2^{2^{n}}-1$. But then $\operatorname{int}(g) \in O\left(2^{2^{n}}\right)$. Hence the lemma follows.

Proof of Lemma 3.8. Algorithm 1 consists of two stages: Propagate and Assign.
In Assign, we make $2^{n}$ assignments because by Lemma 3.5 the number of nodes in the tableau is bounded by that number. Moreover, each assignment step takes a constant time. So the whole Assign stage takes time $O\left(2^{n}\right)$.

In Propagate, we have a for loop inside a do-while loop. The for loop iterates over $2^{n}$ nodes and assigns, if possible, the status unsat to a node by checking in the worst case $n$ direct successors of the node. If the algorithm assigns the status unsat to a node $g$, then it also assigns a concept to int $(g)$. By Lemma 3.7, $|\operatorname{int}(g)| \leq O\left(2^{2^{n}}\right)$. Thus it spends most of its time calculating $\operatorname{int}(g)$. Suppose the for loop finished its iteration over all nodes in the tableau. Now if during its execution, none of the nodes got the status unsat, the do-while loop terminates because done $=$ true. In the worst case, a status will be assigned only to one node in each iteration of the do-while loop. Hence the do-while loop iterates at most $2^{n}$ times and as we discussed each iteration takes time at most $O\left(2^{2^{n}}\right)$ because of interpolation calculation. Since this dominates the runtime of Algorithm 1, the lemma follows.

Lemma C. 2 (Soundness). If $\mathbf{T}$ is a closed $\left\langle C_{0} \sqsubseteq D_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right\rangle$-tableau, then $\mathcal{T} \models C_{0} \sqsubseteq D_{0}$.
Proof. Let $\mathbf{T}$ be a closed $\left\langle C_{0} \sqsubseteq D_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right\rangle$-tableau. Since $\mathbf{T}$ is closed, $g_{0}$.content $=$ unsat. By $g_{0}$.content $=\left\{\left(C_{0}\right)^{\mathbf{1}},\left(\neg D_{0}\right)^{\mathbf{r}}\right\} \cup\left\{E^{\mathbf{1}} \mid \top \sqsubseteq E \in \mathcal{T}_{1}\right\} \cup\left\{E^{\mathbf{r}} \mid \top \sqsubseteq E \in \mathcal{T}_{\mathbf{r}}\right\}$ and Lemma 3.7. this implies

$$
\mathcal{T} \models C_{0} \sqcap \prod_{\top \sqsubseteq E \in \mathcal{T}_{1}} E \sqsubseteq D_{0} \sqcup \bigsqcup_{\top \sqsubseteq E \in \mathcal{T}_{\mathbf{r}}} \neg E
$$

But then $\mathcal{T} \models C_{0} \sqsubseteq D_{0}$.
Definition C.3. Let $\mathbf{T}=\langle\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E}\rangle$ be the output of the second phase. We say that a node $g \in \mathcal{V}$ is saturated if and only if

- $g$. status $=$ sat and $g$ is a sink node, or
- $g$.status $=$ sat and $\mathrm{R}_{\exists}$ was applied to $g$.

For $g, g^{\prime} \in \mathcal{V}, g^{\prime}$ is called a saturation of $g$ if and only if $g^{\prime}$ is saturated, and there is a path $g=g_{0}, g_{1}, \ldots, g_{k}=g^{\prime}$ with $k \geq 0$ in $\mathbf{T}$ such that for each $0 \leq i<k$, we have $g_{i}$.status $=$ sat and the edge $\left\langle g_{i}, g_{i+1}\right\rangle$ was created by an application of a rule in $\left\{\mathrm{R}_{\square}, \mathrm{R}_{\sqcup}, \mathrm{R}_{\leq 1}\right\}$.

Lemma C.4. Let $\mathbf{T}=\langle\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E}\rangle$ be a complete tableau for $\left\langle C_{0} \sqsubseteq D_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right\rangle$. Then we have

1. If $g \in \mathcal{V}$ is saturated, then $g$.content $(\lambda)$ is a $\left\langle C_{0} \sqcap \dot{\neg} D_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right\rangle$-type.
2. If $g \in \mathcal{V}$ with $g$.status $=$ sat, then there is some saturation $g^{\prime}$ of $g$ with $g^{\prime} . c o n t e n t \supseteq$ g.content.

Proof. For 1, suppose that $g$ is saturated. We need to show that $g$.content $(\lambda)$ satisfies Definition A.2. We start with $g$. content $(\lambda) \subseteq \operatorname{cl}\left(C_{0} \sqcap \dot{\neg} D_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right)$. Let $C \in g$.content $(\lambda)$. Then it follows that $C^{\lambda} \in g$.content, for some $\lambda \in\{\mathbf{l}, \mathbf{r}\}$. Since $g$.content $\subseteq$ cll $\cup$ clr, we have that $C^{\lambda} \in \mathrm{cll} \cup$ clr. This implies $C \in \operatorname{cl}\left(C_{0}, \mathcal{T}_{\mathbf{1}}\right) \cup \mathrm{cl}\left(\neg D_{0}, \mathcal{T}_{\mathbf{r}}\right)$. But then $C \in \mathrm{cl}\left(C_{0} \sqcap \dot{\neg} D_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right)$, which is what we wanted to show.

Now we show that the properties in Definition A.2 are satisfied. By definition, $g$. status $=$ sat. $g$ does not contain a clash because otherwise $g$.status $=$ unsat which would contradict our assumption. Hence, $\left(\mathrm{P}_{\perp}\right),\left(\mathrm{P}_{\neg}\right)$, and $\left(\mathrm{P}_{\bowtie}\right)$ are satisfied. By definition, $g$ is a sink node or $R_{\exists}$ was applied to $g$. In both cases, we have that none of $\left\{R_{\square}, R_{\sqcup}, R_{\leq 1}\right\}$ is applicable to $g$ : for the former, this follows from the fact that no rule is applicable to $g$; and for the
latter, this follows from our rule precedence. Hence, $\left(\mathrm{P}_{\square}\right),\left(\mathrm{P}_{\sqcup}\right),\left(\mathrm{P}_{\leq 1}\right)$ are satisfied. Finally, we have $\{C \mid \top \sqsubseteq C \in \mathcal{T}\} \subseteq g$.content $(\lambda)$ as an easy consequence of the definition of the tableau algorithm. This means ( $\mathrm{P}_{\sqsubseteq}$ ) is satisfied. Hence, we conclude that 1 holds.

For 2, suppose $g \in \mathcal{V}$ with $g$.status $=$ sat. That there is some saturation $g^{\prime}$ of $g$ with $g^{\prime}$.content $\supseteq g$.content follows easily by Lemma C.1.

Lemma C. 5 (Completeness). If $\mathbf{T}$ is an open $\left\langle C_{0} \sqsubseteq D_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right\rangle$-tableau, then $\mathcal{T} \not \models C_{0} \sqsubseteq D_{0}$.
Proof. Suppose $\mathbf{T}=\langle\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E}\rangle$ is an open $\left\langle C_{0} \sqsubseteq D_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right\rangle$-tableau. Since $\mathbf{T}$ is open, we have $g_{0}$. status $=$ sat. Then by Lemma C.4, there is some saturation $g_{\star}$ of $g_{0}$ such that $g_{\star}$.content $\supseteq$ $g_{0}$.content. Since $g_{\star}$ is saturated, it follows by Lemma C. 4 that $g_{\star}$.content $(\lambda)$ is a $\left\langle C_{0} \sqcap\right.$ $\left.\dot{\neg} D_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right\rangle$-type. Let $\tau_{0}=\left\{C_{0} \sqcap \dot{\neg} D_{0}\right\} \cup g_{\star}$. content $(\lambda)$. We claim that $\tau_{0}$ is also a $\left\langle C_{0} \sqcap \dot{\neg} D_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right\rangle$ type. Suppose for a contradiction that it is not. Since $g_{\star}$.content $(\lambda)$ is such a type, it follows that $\left(\mathrm{P}_{\square}\right)$ is violated for $C_{0} \sqcap \dot{\neg} D_{0} \in \tau_{0}$, i.e., $\left\{C_{0}, \dot{\neg} D_{0}\right\} \nsubseteq \tau_{0}$. Then by the definition of $\tau_{0}$, this means $\left\{C_{0}, \neg D_{0}\right\} \nsubseteq g_{\star}$ content $(\lambda)$. But we know that $\left\{C_{0}, \neg D_{0}\right\} \subseteq g_{0}$.content $(\lambda)$ and by $g_{\star}$.content $\supseteq g_{0}$.content, this implies $\left\{C_{0}, \neg D_{0}\right\} \subseteq g_{\star}$.content $(\lambda)$, i.e., a contradiction. Hence we conclude that $\tau_{0}$ is a $\left\langle C_{0} \sqcap \dot{\neg} D_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right\rangle$-type. Define

$$
Q=\left\{\tau_{0}\right\} \cup\{g \text {.content }(\lambda) \mid g \in \mathcal{V} \text { is saturated }\} .
$$

We show that $Q$ is a $\left\langle C_{0} \sqcap \dot{\neg} D_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right\rangle$-quasimodel because then $\mathcal{T} \not \vDash C_{0} \sqsubseteq D_{0}$ follows by Theorem A.4. It is easy to see that $Q$ is a set of $\left\langle C_{0} \sqcap \dot{\neg} D_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right\rangle$-types: we have already shown that $\tau_{0}$ is such a type; and for $g$.content $(\lambda)$ with $g \in \mathcal{V}$ is saturated, this fact follows immediately by Lemma C.4. It remains to show that conditions (a), (b), (c) from Definition A. 3 hold.

Condition (a) holds since $\tau_{0} \in Q$ and $C_{0} \sqcap \dot{\neg} D_{0} \in \tau_{0}$.
Suppose that $\exists R . C \in \tau$ for some $\tau \in Q$. We distinguish between $\tau=\tau_{0}$ and $\tau=$ $g$.content $(\lambda)$ for some saturated $g \in \mathcal{V}$. We first argue for the latter. Since $g$ is saturated and $\exists R . C \in g$.content $(\lambda), \mathrm{R}_{\exists}$ was applied to $g$; since $g$ is saturated, we have $g$.status $=$ sat. Then by Lemma C.1, there is some successor $g^{\prime}$ of $g$ in $\mathbf{T}$ such that $\{C\} \cup\{D \mid \forall R . D \in$ $\tau\} \subseteq g^{\prime}$.content $(\lambda)$ and $g^{\prime}$.status $=$ sat. Then by Lemma C.4. there is some saturation $g^{\prime \prime}$ of $g^{\prime}$ such that $g^{\prime \prime}$.content $\supseteq g^{\prime}$.content. Since $g^{\prime \prime}$ is saturated, we have that $g^{\prime \prime}$.content $(\lambda) \in Q$ and $g^{\prime \prime}$.content $(\lambda)$ is a $\left\langle C_{0} \sqcap \dot{\neg} D_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right\rangle$-type. But then $\tau \xrightarrow{\exists R . C} g^{\prime \prime}$.content $(\lambda)$. The case for $\tau=\tau_{0}$ follows analogously by using the fact that there is some successor $g^{\prime}$ of $g_{\star}$ in $\mathbf{T}$ such that $\{C\} \cup\{D \mid \forall R . D \in \tau\} \subseteq g^{\prime}$.content $(\lambda)$ and $g^{\prime}$.status = sat. Hence condition (b) from Definition $\widehat{A} 3$ is satisfied.

That condition (c) holds can be shown very similarly to the previous case; we leave it to the reader to verify this. Hence, we conclude that $Q$ is a $\left\langle C_{0} \sqcap \dot{\neg} D_{0}, \mathcal{T}\right\rangle$-quasimodel.

Proposition 3.9 now follows immediately from Lemma C. 2 and Lemma C.5.

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